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//+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Microsoft Windows
//
// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation 2000
//
// File: userapi.cxx
//
// Contents: User-mode APIs to the NtDigest security package
//
// Main user mode entry points into this dll:
// SpUserModeInitialize
// SpInstanceInit
// SpDeleteUserModeContext
// SpInitUserModeContext
// SpMakeSignature
// SpVerifySignature
// SpSealMessage
// SpUnsealMessage
// SpGetContextToken
// SpQueryContextAttributes
// SpCompleteAuthToken
// SpFormatCredentials
// SpMarshallSupplementalCreds
// SpExportSecurityContext
// SpImportSecurityContext
//
// Helper functions:
// SspCreateTokenDacl
// SspMapContext (this is called in Lsa mode)
//
// History: ChandanS 26-Jul-1996 Stolen from kerberos\client2\userapi.cxx
// KDamour 18Mar00 Stolen from NTLM userapi.cxx
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// This area is still under determination as to support for userlevel functions
//
#include "global.h"
#include <stdio.h> // For sprintf
#if (DBG | DBG2)
#define TEMPSIZE 4000
#endif
// Winsock-ish host/network byte order converters for short and long integers.
//
#define htons(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF) | (((x) << 8) & 0xFF00))
#define htonl(x) ((((x) >> 24) & 0x000000FFL) | \
(((x) >> 8) & 0x0000FF00L) | \ (((x) << 8) & 0x00FF0000L) | \ (((x) << 24) & 0xFF000000L))
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpUserModeInitialize
//
// Synopsis: Initialize an the Digest DLL in a client's
// address space also called in LSA
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: LsaVersion - Version of the security dll loading the package
// PackageVersion - Version of the Digest package
// UserFunctionTable - Receives a copy of Digests's user mode
// function table
// pcTables - Receives count of tables returned.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS - normal completion
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - LsaVersion specified is incorrect
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY SpUserModeInitialize( IN ULONG LsaVersion, OUT PULONG PackageVersion, OUT PSECPKG_USER_FUNCTION_TABLE * UserFunctionTable, OUT PULONG pcTables ) { #if DBG
DebugInitialize(); #endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUserModeInitialize: Entering\n" ));
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (LsaVersion != SECPKG_INTERFACE_VERSION) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; goto CleanUp; }
*PackageVersion = SECPKG_INTERFACE_VERSION;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.InstanceInit = SpInstanceInit; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.MakeSignature = SpMakeSignature; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.VerifySignature = SpVerifySignature; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.SealMessage = SpSealMessage; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.UnsealMessage = SpUnsealMessage; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.GetContextToken = SpGetContextToken; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.QueryContextAttributes = SpQueryContextAttributes; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.CompleteAuthToken = SpCompleteAuthToken; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.InitUserModeContext = SpInitUserModeContext; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.DeleteUserModeContext = SpDeleteUserModeContext; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.FormatCredentials = SpFormatCredentials; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.MarshallSupplementalCreds = SpMarshallSupplementalCreds; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.ExportContext = SpExportSecurityContext; g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.ImportContext = SpImportSecurityContext;
*UserFunctionTable = &g_NtDigestUserFuncTable; *pcTables = 1;
CleanUp: DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUserModeInitialize: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status)); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpInstanceInit
//
// Synopsis: Initialize an instance of the NtDigest package in a client's
// address space. Also called once in LSA
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: Version - Version of the security dll loading the package
// and it is Unused and Un-initialized
// FunctionTable - Contains helper routines for use by NtDigest
// and it is fixed static
// UserFunctions - Receives a copy of NtDigest's user mode
// function table - NOPE - has No information at all
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpInstanceInit( IN ULONG Version, IN PSECPKG_DLL_FUNCTIONS DllFunctionTable, OUT PVOID * UserFunctionTable ) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInstanceInit: Entering\n" )); NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(UserFunctionTable); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Version);
// Save the Alloc/Free functions
// Check if called in LSA or from Usermode - LSA calls SPInitialize then SPInstanceInit
if (g_NtDigestState != NtDigestLsaMode) { g_NtDigestState = NtDigestUserMode; // indicate in user address space
} g_UserFunctions = DllFunctionTable;
// Initialize reading of registry and load in values
NtDigestInitReadRegistry();
// Need to initialize Crypto stuff and nonce creations
Status = NonceInitialize(); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInstanceInit: Error from NonceInitialize is %d\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
//
// Init the UserMode Context stuff
//
Status = UserCtxtHandlerInit(); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInstanceInit: Error from UserCtxtHandlerInit 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
//
// Read in the registry values for SSP configuration - in user mode space
//
SPLoadRegOptions();
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInstanceInit: Leaving Status = 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpDeleteUserModeContext
//
// Synopsis: Deletes a user mode context by unlinking it and then
// dereferencing it.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Lsa context handle of the context to delete
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS on success, STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE if the
// context can't be located
//
// Notes:
// If this is an exported context, send a flag back to the LSA so that
// Lsa does not call the SecpDeleteSecurityContext in the lsa process
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpDeleteUserModeContext( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle ) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle )); PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pUserContext = NULL; NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
//
// Find the currently existing user context and dereference the app SecurityContext Handle
//
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, TRUE, FALSE, &pUserContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { //
// pContext is legally NULL when we are dealing with an incomplete
// context. This can often be the case when the second call to
// InitializeSecurityContext() fails.
//
/// Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext not found 0x%x\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
Status = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pUserContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerRelease error Status 0x%x\n", Status )); }
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx status 0x%x\n", ContextHandle, Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpInitUserModeContext
//
// Synopsis: Creates/updates a user-mode context from a packed LSA mode context
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Lsa mode context handle for the context
// PackedContext - A marshalled buffer containing the LSA
// mode context.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS or STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
//
// Notes: This function is called from ISC() or ASC() when there is Context
// data to map over to Usermode Application space. This context might be a partial
// context (which is not valid until fully auth'ed) or an update to indicate
// that ASC() has provided the application with a re-connect (so you just increment the
// ref count on the context if it already exists)
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpInitUserModeContext( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN PSecBuffer PackedContext ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS StatusSub = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContextSearch = NULL; PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserContext = NULL; BOOLEAN fRefCount = FALSE;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInitUserModeContext: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle )); ASSERT(PackedContext);
// If Marshalled data is too small for holding a Client Context - reject it
if (PackedContext->cbBuffer < sizeof(DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: ContextData size < DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
pPackedUserContext = (PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT) DigestAllocateMemory(PackedContext->cbBuffer); if (!pPackedUserContext) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestAllocateMemory for Packed Copy returns NULL\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
// Copy the Packed User Context from LSA to local memory so it wil be long word aligned
memcpy(pPackedUserContext, PackedContext->pvBuffer, PackedContext->cbBuffer);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: FlagOptions 0x%x\n", pPackedUserContext->ulFlags));
// Check to see if Context should be refcounted. With session reconnect - this will be set
// since a new SecurityContext Handle will be returned from ASC(). If an OldSecurityContextHandle
// is passed into ASC() then this will not be set
if (pPackedUserContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_REFCOUNT) { fRefCount = TRUE; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: RefCounting Context\n")); }
// Check to see if this is an update of reference count or add new context
// If the context is found, increment the application SecurityContext Handle ref count
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, fRefCount, &pContextSearch); if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { // Found the app user SecurityContext - just update as needed
// Most of the calls from ASC() will be to update and complete a partial context here
// Some will be for a simple ref-count on a reconnect as called with ASC() return SEC_I_COMPLETE_NEEDED
// No need to release the pContextSearch since in both cases we want to increment ref count from ASC() call
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: Found UserContext - update and ref count\n"));
if (pContextSearch->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_PARTIAL) { // update the context as it is only a initial partial context and not used yet
Status = DigestUnpackContext(pPackedUserContext, pContextSearch); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestUnpackContext for update context error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContextSearch); }
} else if (Status == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserContextInit creating 0x%x\n", pContext));
// Now we will unpack this transfered LSA context into UserMode space Context List
pContext = (PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT) DigestAllocateMemory( sizeof(DIGEST_USERCONTEXT) ); if (!pContext) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestAllocateMemory returns NULL\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
Status = UserCtxtInit(pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserContextInit error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Store the location of the context in the LSA
pContext->LsaContext = ContextHandle; pContext->ulNC = 1; // Force to one to account for ISC/ASC first message verify
pContext->lReferenceHandles = 1; // Indicate that a handle has been given to the application
Status = DigestUnpackContext(pPackedUserContext, pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestUnpackContext for new context error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// App SecurityContext not located - add in a new one for this call
Status = UserCtxtHandlerInsertCred(pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerInsertCred error status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
pContext = NULL; // turned memory over to CtxtHandler
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: (RefCount) created & listed 0x%x\n", pContext)); } else { Status = StatusSub; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: Could not find UserContextHandle Status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
if (pContext) { // Release the User context on error if allocated
UserCtxtFree(pContext); pContext = NULL; }
if (pContextSearch) { StatusSub = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContextSearch); if (!NT_SUCCESS(StatusSub)) { if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = StatusSub; // replace status only on success
} DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerInsertCred error statussub 0x%x\n", StatusSub)); } }
if (pPackedUserContext) { DigestFreeMemory(pPackedUserContext); pPackedUserContext = NULL; }
// Let FreeContextBuffer handle freeing the virtual allocs
if (PackedContext->pvBuffer != NULL) { FreeContextBuffer(PackedContext->pvBuffer); PackedContext->pvBuffer = NULL; PackedContext->cbBuffer = 0; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInitUserModeContext: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpMakeSignature
//
// Synopsis: Signs a message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of buffers to sign and
// to store the signature.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found.
// STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL - the signature buffer is too small
// to hold the signature
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleSignMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpMakeSignature( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN ULONG fQOP, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pMessage, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL; BOOL bServer = FALSE; DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMakeSignature:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle )); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(fQOP);
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: Could not find ContextHandle\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Since we are in UserMode we MUST have a sessionkey to use - if not then can not process
if (!pContext->strSessionKey.Length) { Status = STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: No Session Key contained in UserContext\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND; if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) || (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER)) { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL; } else { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP; }
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpMakeSignature: HTTP SignMessage selected\n")); Status = DigestUserHTTPHelper( pContext, eSign, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); } else { if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) || (!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) ) { Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: Did not negotiate INTEGRITY\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpMakeSignature: SASL SignMessage selected\n")); Status = DigestUserSignHelperMulti( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); }
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: DigestUserHTTP/SASLSignHelper returns %lx\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL) { SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = SubStatus; } } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMakeSignature:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpVerifySignature
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating the Digest Access
// for data bufferswith the current Security Context state.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Unused ULONG
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This routine should be called AFTER you have a valid security context
// from (usually) acceptsecuritycontext. The usermode context has a nonce
// count that is automatically incremented for each successful verify signature
// function call. Therefore, calling this functio with the same noncecount
// will return a failed status message.
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpVerifySignature( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, OUT PULONG pfQOP ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL; BOOL bServer = FALSE; DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpVerifySignature:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
// Reset output flags
if (pfQOP) { *pfQOP = 0; }
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: Could not find ContextHandle\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Since we are in UserMode we MUST have a sessionkey to use - if not then can not process
if (!pContext->strSessionKey.Length) { Status = STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: No Session Key contained in UserContext\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND; if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) || (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER)) { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL; } else { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP; }
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpVerifySignature: HTTP VerifyMessage selected\n")); Status = DigestUserHTTPHelper( pContext, eVerify, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); } else { if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) || (!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) ) { Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: Did not negotiate INTEGRITY\n" )); goto CleanUp; } else { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpVerifySignature: SASL VerifyMessage selected\n")); Status = DigestUserVerifyHelper( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); } }
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: DigestUserHTTP/SASLSignHelper returns %lx\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL) { SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = SubStatus; } } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpVerifySignature:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpSealMessage
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleSealMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpSealMessage( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN ULONG fQOP, IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL; BOOL bServer = FALSE;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpSealMessage:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle )); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(fQOP);
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Could not find ContextHandle\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Since we are in UserMode we MUST have a sessionkey to use - if not then can not process
if (!pContext->strSessionKey.Length) { Status = STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: No Session Key contained in UserContext\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Check to see if Confidentiality is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND; if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) || (!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) ) { // Since CONFIDENTIALITY not negoiated - check if integrity selected
if ((bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY)) || (!bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY)) ) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpSealMessage: No Confidentiality selected - use Integrity ONLY\n")); // Just call the Sign routine only
Status = DigestUserSignHelperMulti( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); } else { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Neither Confidentiality nor Integrity selected\n")); Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Did not negotiate CONFIDENTIALITY\n" )); goto CleanUp; } } else { if (fQOP & SECQOP_WRAP_NO_ENCRYPT) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Negotiated Confidentiality but selected Sign only\n")); Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto CleanUp; } // Use SignHelper for both SASL - HTTP not speced
Status = DigestUserSealHelperMulti( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); }
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: DigestUserSASLHelper returns %lx\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL) { SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = SubStatus; } } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpSealMessage:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpUnsealMessage
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleUnsealMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpUnsealMessage( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, OUT PULONG pfQOP ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL; BOOL bServer = FALSE; // acting as the server ?
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUnsealMessage:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
// Reset output flags
if (pfQOP) { *pfQOP = 0; }
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Could not find ContextHandle\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Since we are in UserMode we MUST have a sessionkey to use - if not then can not process
if (!pContext->strSessionKey.Length) { Status = STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: No Session Key contained in UserContext\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Check to see if Confidentiality is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND; if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) || (!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) ) { if ((bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY)) || (!bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY)) ) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpUnsealMessage: No Confidentiality selected - use Integrity ONLY\n")); Status = DigestUserVerifyHelper( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo );
// signal QOP was only for integrity
if (pfQOP) { *pfQOP = SECQOP_WRAP_NO_ENCRYPT; } } else { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Neither Confidentiality nor Integrity selected\n")); Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Did not negotiate CONFIDENTIALITY\n" )); goto CleanUp; } } else { Status = DigestUserUnsealHelper( pContext, pMessage, MessageSeqNo ); }
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: DigestUserSASLHelper returns %lx\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL) { SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = SubStatus; } } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUnsealMessage:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpGetContextToken
//
// Synopsis: returns a pointer to the token for a server-side context
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: Used in ImpersonateSecurityContext SSPI Call
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpGetContextToken( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, OUT PHANDLE ImpersonationToken ) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpGetContextToken: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpGetContextToken: UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext error 0x%x\n", Status)); }
if (pContext && pContext->ClientTokenHandle) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpGetContextToken: Client ImpersonationToken 0x%lx\n", pContext->ClientTokenHandle )); *ImpersonationToken = pContext->ClientTokenHandle; goto CleanUp; }
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpGetContextToken: no token handle\n" ));
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL) { Status = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext); }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpGetContextToken: Leaving Status 0x%lx\n", Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpQueryContextAttributes
//
// Synopsis: Querys attributes of the specified context
// This API allows a customer of the security
// services to determine certain attributes of
// the context. These are: sizes, names, and lifespan.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// ContextHandle - Handle to the context to query.
//
// Attribute - Attribute to query.
//
//
// Buffer - Buffer to copy the data into. The buffer must
// be large enough to fit the queried attribute.
//
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// STATUS_SUCCESS - Call completed successfully
//
// STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE -- Credential/Context Handle is invalid
// STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED -- Function code is not supported
//
// Notes:
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpQueryContextAttributes( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN ULONG Attribute, IN OUT PVOID Buffer ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpQueryContextAttributes: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
PSecPkgContext_Sizes ContextSizes = NULL; PSecPkgContext_DceInfo ContextDceInfo = NULL; PSecPkgContext_Names ContextNames = NULL; PSecPkgContext_PackageInfo PackageInfo = NULL; PSecPkgContext_NegotiationInfo NegInfo = NULL; PSecPkgContext_PasswordExpiry PasswordExpires = NULL; PSecPkgContext_KeyInfo KeyInfo = NULL; PSecPkgContext_AccessToken AccessToken = NULL; PSecPkgContext_StreamSizes StreamSizes = NULL; PSecPkgContext_AuthzID ContextAuthzID = NULL; PSecPkgContext_Target ContextTarget = NULL;
ULONG PackageInfoSize = 0; BOOL bServer = FALSE; LPWSTR pszEncryptAlgorithmName = NULL; LPWSTR pszSignatureAlgorithmName = NULL; ULONG ulBytes = 0; ULONG ulMaxMessage = 0;
DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, FALSE, &pContext); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpQueryContextAttributes: HandleToContext error 0x%x\n", Status)); Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; goto CleanUp; }
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) || (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER)) { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL; } else { typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP; }
//
// Handle each of the various queried attributes
//
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpQueryContextAttributes : 0x%lx\n", Attribute )); switch ( Attribute) { case SECPKG_ATTR_SIZES:
ContextSizes = (PSecPkgContext_Sizes) Buffer; ZeroMemory(ContextSizes, sizeof(SecPkgContext_Sizes)); ContextSizes->cbMaxToken = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE; if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { // HTTP has signature the same as token in Authentication Header info
ContextSizes->cbMaxSignature = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE; } else { // SASL has specialized signature block
ContextSizes->cbMaxSignature = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; } if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)) { ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; } else if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56)) { ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE; ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; } else { ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = 0; if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { // HTTP has signature the same as token in Authentication Header info
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = 0; } else { // SASL has specialized signature block
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; // handle Auth-int case
} } break; case SECPKG_ATTR_DCE_INFO:
ContextDceInfo = (PSecPkgContext_DceInfo) Buffer; ZeroMemory(ContextDceInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_DceInfo)); ContextDceInfo->AuthzSvc = 0;
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES:
ContextNames = (PSecPkgContext_Names) Buffer; ZeroMemory(ContextNames, sizeof(SecPkgContext_Names));
if (pContext->ustrAccountName.Length && pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer) { ulBytes = pContext->ustrAccountName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); ContextNames->sUserName = (LPWSTR)g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(ulBytes); if (ContextNames->sUserName) { ZeroMemory(ContextNames->sUserName, ulBytes); memcpy(ContextNames->sUserName, pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pContext->ustrAccountName.Length); } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; }
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_TARGET:
ContextTarget = (PSecPkgContext_Target) Buffer; ZeroMemory(ContextTarget, sizeof(SecPkgContext_Target));
if (pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length && pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Buffer) { ulBytes = pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length; ContextTarget->Target = (LPSTR)g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(ulBytes); if (ContextTarget->Target) { memcpy(ContextTarget->Target, pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Buffer, ulBytes); ContextTarget->TargetLength = ulBytes; } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_ID: ContextAuthzID = (PSecPkgContext_AuthzID) Buffer; ZeroMemory(ContextAuthzID, sizeof(SecPkgContext_AuthzID)); if (pContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_AUTHZID_PROVIDED) { if (pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length && pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Buffer) { ulBytes = pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length; ContextAuthzID->AuthzID = (LPSTR)g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(ulBytes); if (ContextAuthzID->AuthzID) { memcpy(ContextAuthzID->AuthzID, pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Buffer, ulBytes); ContextAuthzID->AuthzIDLength = ulBytes; } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } else { // a valid buffer and a zero length indicate a NULL strign was supplied by calling application
ContextAuthzID->AuthzID = (LPSTR)g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(1); if (ContextAuthzID->AuthzID) { ContextAuthzID->AuthzIDLength = 0; // to indicate that "" was used
} else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } } break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_PACKAGE_INFO: case SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO: //
// Return the information about this package. This is useful for
// callers who used SPNEGO and don't know what package they got.
//
if ((Attribute == SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO) && (g_fParameter_Negotiate == FALSE)) { Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto CleanUp; }
PackageInfo = (PSecPkgContext_PackageInfo) Buffer; ZeroMemory(PackageInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_PackageInfo)); PackageInfoSize = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW) + sizeof(WDIGEST_SP_NAME) + sizeof(NTDIGEST_SP_COMMENT); PackageInfo->PackageInfo = (PSecPkgInfoW) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(PackageInfoSize); if (PackageInfo->PackageInfo == NULL) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; goto CleanUp; } PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name = (LPWSTR) (PackageInfo->PackageInfo + 1); PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Comment = (LPWSTR) ((((PBYTE) PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name)) + sizeof(WDIGEST_SP_NAME)); wcscpy( PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name, WDIGEST_SP_NAME );
wcscpy( PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Comment, NTDIGEST_SP_COMMENT ); PackageInfo->PackageInfo->wVersion = SECURITY_SUPPORT_PROVIDER_INTERFACE_VERSION; PackageInfo->PackageInfo->wRPCID = RPC_C_AUTHN_DIGEST; PackageInfo->PackageInfo->fCapabilities = NTDIGEST_SP_CAPS; PackageInfo->PackageInfo->cbMaxToken = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE;
if ( Attribute == SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO ) { NegInfo = (PSecPkgContext_NegotiationInfo) PackageInfo ; NegInfo->NegotiationState = SECPKG_NEGOTIATION_COMPLETE ; }
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_PASSWORD_EXPIRY: PasswordExpires = (PSecPkgContext_PasswordExpiry) Buffer; if (pContext->ExpirationTime.QuadPart != 0) { PasswordExpires->tsPasswordExpires = pContext->ExpirationTime; } else Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_KEY_INFO: KeyInfo = (PSecPkgContext_KeyInfo) Buffer; ZeroMemory(KeyInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_KeyInfo)); if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { // HTTP mode
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_MD5; pszSignatureAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_MD5; KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR) * ((ULONG)wcslen(pszSignatureAlgorithmName) + 1)); if (KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName != NULL) { wcscpy( KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName, pszSignatureAlgorithmName ); } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } else { // SASL mode
KeyInfo->KeySize = 128; // All modes use a 128 bit key - may have less entropy though (i.e. rc4-XX)
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_HMAC; pszSignatureAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_HMAC_MD5; switch (pContext->typeCipher) { case CIPHER_RC4: case CIPHER_RC4_40: case CIPHER_RC4_56: KeyInfo->KeySize = 16 * 8; // All modes use a 128 bit key - may have less entropy though (i.e. rc4-XX)
KeyInfo->EncryptAlgorithm = CALG_RC4; pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_RC4; break; case CIPHER_DES: KeyInfo->KeySize = 7 * 8; KeyInfo->EncryptAlgorithm = CALG_DES; pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_DES; break; case CIPHER_3DES: KeyInfo->KeySize = 14 * 8; KeyInfo->EncryptAlgorithm = CALG_3DES_112; pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_3DES; break; } if (pszEncryptAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR) * ((ULONG)wcslen(pszEncryptAlgorithmName) + 1)); if (KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName != NULL) { wcscpy( KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName, pszEncryptAlgorithmName ); } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } if (pszSignatureAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR) * ((ULONG)wcslen(pszSignatureAlgorithmName) + 1)); if (KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName != NULL) { wcscpy( KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName, pszSignatureAlgorithmName ); } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } }
// Make sure that EncryptAlgorithmName and SignatureAlgorithmName is a valid NULL terminated string #601928
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status) && !KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR));
if (KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName[0] = L'\0'; } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status) && !KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR));
if (KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName) { KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName[0] = L'\0'; } else { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; } } break; case SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES: StreamSizes = (PSecPkgContext_StreamSizes) Buffer; ZeroMemory(StreamSizes, sizeof(SecPkgContext_StreamSizes));
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP) { } else { // SASL
ulMaxMessage = pContext->ulRecvMaxBuf; if (pContext->ulSendMaxBuf < ulMaxMessage) { ulMaxMessage = pContext->ulSendMaxBuf; } StreamSizes->cbMaximumMessage = ulMaxMessage - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING); }
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)) { StreamSizes->cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; StreamSizes->cbTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; } else if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56)) { StreamSizes->cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE; StreamSizes->cbTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; } break; case SECPKG_ATTR_ACCESS_TOKEN: AccessToken = (PSecPkgContext_AccessToken) Buffer; //
// ClientTokenHandle can be NULL, for instance:
// 1. client side context.
// 2. incomplete server context.
// Token is not duped - caller must not CloseHandle
AccessToken->AccessToken = (void*)pContext->ClientTokenHandle; break;
default: Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; }
CleanUp:
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { switch (Attribute) {
case SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES:
if (ContextNames && ContextNames->sUserName ) { g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(ContextNames->sUserName); ContextNames->sUserName = NULL; } break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_DCE_INFO:
if (ContextDceInfo && ContextDceInfo->pPac) { g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(ContextDceInfo->pPac); ContextDceInfo->pPac = NULL; } break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_KEY_INFO: if (KeyInfo && KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName) { g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName); KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName = NULL; } if (KeyInfo && KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName) { g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName); KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = NULL; } break; } }
if (pContext != NULL) { SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext); }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpQueryContextAttributes: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx status 0x%x\n", ContextHandle, Status )); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpCompleteAuthToken
//
// Synopsis: Completes a context - used to perform user mode verification of
// challenge response for non-persistent connections re-established via ASC
// call.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: Called after a Opaque Context lookup of SecurityContext. ASC will determine that
// this is a completed context and inform the app that it must call CompleteAuthToken. Currently,
// only HTTP mode has this processing done.
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpCompleteAuthToken( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN PSecBufferDesc InputBuffer ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG ulQOP = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpCompleteAuthToken: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
Status = SpVerifySignature(ContextHandle, InputBuffer, 0, &ulQOP);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpCompleteAuthToken: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx Status = 0x%x\n", ContextHandle, Status));
return(Status); }
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpFormatCredentials( IN PSecBuffer Credentials, OUT PSecBuffer FormattedCredentials ) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (Credentials); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (FormattedCredentials); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpFormatCredentials: Entering/Leaving\n")); return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION); }
NTSTATUS NTAPI SpMarshallSupplementalCreds( IN ULONG CredentialSize, IN PUCHAR Credentials, OUT PULONG MarshalledCredSize, OUT PVOID * MarshalledCreds ) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (CredentialSize); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (Credentials); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (MarshalledCredSize); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (MarshalledCreds); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMarshallSupplementalCreds: Entering/Leaving\n")); return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: NtDigestMakePackedContext
//
// Synopsis: Maps a context to the caller's address space
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: Context - The context to map
// MappedContext - Set to TRUE on success
// ContextData - Receives a buffer in the caller's address space
// with the mapped context.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NtDigestMakePackedContext( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT Context, OUT PBOOLEAN MappedContext, OUT PSecBuffer ContextData, IN ULONG Flags ) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Context); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(MappedContext); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ContextData); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "NtDigestMakePackedContext: Entering/Leaving\n"));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpExportSecurityContext
//
// Synopsis: Exports a security context to another process
//
// Effects: Allocates memory for output
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - handle to context to export
// Flags - Flags concerning duplication. Allowable flags:
// SECPKG_CONTEXT_EXPORT_DELETE_OLD - causes old context
// to be deleted.
// PackedContext - Receives serialized context to be freed with
// FreeContextBuffer
// TokenHandle - Optionally receives handle to context's token.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SpExportSecurityContext( IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle, IN ULONG Flags, OUT PSecBuffer PackedContext, OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle ) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ContextHandle); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(PackedContext); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(TokenHandle);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpExportSecurityContext:Entering/Leaving ContextHandle 0x%x\n", ContextHandle ));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpImportSecurityContext
//
// Synopsis:
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SpImportSecurityContext( IN PSecBuffer PackedContext, IN HANDLE Token, OUT PULONG_PTR ContextHandle ) { UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(PackedContext); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Token); UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ContextHandle);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpImportSecurityContext: Entering/Leaving ContextHandle 0x%x\n", ContextHandle));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION); }
/*++
RoutineDescription:
Gets the TOKEN_USER from an open token
Arguments:
Token - Handle to a token open for TOKEN_QUERY access
Return Value:
STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - not enough memory to complete the function.
Errors from NtQueryInformationToken.
--*/
NTSTATUS SspGetTokenUser( HANDLE Token, PTOKEN_USER * pTokenUser ) { PTOKEN_USER LocalTokenUser = NULL; NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG TokenUserSize = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspGetTokenUser: Entering Token 0x%x pTokenUser 0x%x\n", Token, pTokenUser));
//
// Query the token user. First pass in NULL to get back the
// required size.
//
Status = NtQueryInformationToken( Token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &TokenUserSize );
if (Status != STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { ASSERT(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS); DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspGetTokenUser: NtQueryInformationToken (1st call) returns 0x%lx for Token 0x%x\n", Status, Token )); goto CleanUp; }
//
// Now allocate the required ammount of memory and try again.
//
LocalTokenUser = (PTOKEN_USER) DigestAllocateMemory(TokenUserSize); if (LocalTokenUser == NULL) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; goto CleanUp; } Status = NtQueryInformationToken( Token, TokenUser, LocalTokenUser, TokenUserSize, &TokenUserSize );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { *pTokenUser = LocalTokenUser; } else { DigestFreeMemory(LocalTokenUser); DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspGetTokenUser: NtQueryInformationToken (2nd call) returns 0x%lx for Token 0x%x\n", Status, Token )); }
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspGetTokenUser: Leaving Token 0x%x with Status 0x%x\n", Token, Status)); return(Status); }
/*++
RoutineDescription:
Create a local context for a real context Don't link it to out list of local contexts. Called inside LSA to prep packed Context buffer to send to UserMode addr space
Arguments: pLsaContext - pointer to a Context in LSA to map over to User space pDigest - pointer to digest auth parameters - may be NULL and use Context instead ulFlagOptions - options set for this context - will be OR'ed into ulFlag for mapped context ContextData - packed Context information to send to usermode process
Return Value:
--*/ NTSTATUS SspMapDigestContext( IN PDIGEST_CONTEXT pLsaContext, // LSA Context
IN PDIGEST_PARAMETER pDigest, IN ULONG ulFlagOptions, OUT PSecBuffer ContextData ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserCtxt = NULL; // Return buffer to on good auth to UserMode addr space
USHORT cbLenNeeded = 0; PUCHAR pucLoc = NULL; HANDLE hTemp = NULL; int iAuth = 0; USHORT usAcctNameSize = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspMapContext: Entering for LSA context %lx\n", pLsaContext)); ASSERT(ContextData); ASSERT(pLsaContext);
if (!pLsaContext) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: pLsaContext invalid\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Copy over only selected fields
cbLenNeeded = sizeof(DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT); if (pDigest) { cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length; } else { cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length; cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length; }
// Next Output the session key only if nonce and cnonce are used
if (pLsaContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5_SESS) { cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Length; }
// Now output the unicode domain\accountname
usAcctNameSize = pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Length + pLsaContext->ustrDomain.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); // for \ char
cbLenNeeded = cbLenNeeded + usAcctNameSize;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SspMapContext: Packed Digest will be %d bytes \n", cbLenNeeded));
// DigestAllocateMemory will use g_LsaFunctions->AllocateLsaHeap()
pPackedUserCtxt = (PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT)g_LsaFunctions->AllocateLsaHeap(cbLenNeeded); if (!pPackedUserCtxt) { // Failed to allocate memory to send info to usermode space
ContextData->cbBuffer = 0; Status = SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: out of memory on usermode contextdata\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Now initialize the UserMode Context struct to return
ZeroMemory(pPackedUserCtxt, cbLenNeeded); pPackedUserCtxt->ExpirationTime = pLsaContext->ExpirationTime; pPackedUserCtxt->typeAlgorithm = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeAlgorithm; pPackedUserCtxt->typeCipher = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeCipher; pPackedUserCtxt->typeCharset = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeCharset; pPackedUserCtxt->typeDigest = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeDigest; pPackedUserCtxt->typeQOP = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeQOP; pPackedUserCtxt->ulSendMaxBuf = pLsaContext->ulSendMaxBuf; pPackedUserCtxt->ulRecvMaxBuf = pLsaContext->ulRecvMaxBuf; pPackedUserCtxt->ContextReq = pLsaContext->ContextReq; pPackedUserCtxt->CredentialUseFlags = pLsaContext->CredentialUseFlags;
// Incorporate any options set for this context (such as FLAG_CONTEXT_REFCOUNT)
pPackedUserCtxt->ulFlags = pLsaContext->ulFlags | ulFlagOptions;
// Now mark that there is data for these items ONLY non-zero items will be written out!!!
if (pDigest) { pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_REALM] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_NONCE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_QOP] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_URI] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length; } else { pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_REALM] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_NONCE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_QOP] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_URI] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_URI].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length; pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length; }
// the session key is mapped only if nonce and cnonce are used
if (pLsaContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5_SESS) { pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Length; } else { pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen = 0; }
pPackedUserCtxt->uAccountNameLen = (ULONG)usAcctNameSize;
// dup token if it exists
if (pLsaContext->TokenHandle != NULL) { Status = g_LsaFunctions->DuplicateHandle( pLsaContext->TokenHandle, &(hTemp));
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { if (pPackedUserCtxt) { DigestFreeMemory(pPackedUserCtxt); pPackedUserCtxt = NULL; } ContextData->cbBuffer = 0; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: DuplicateHandle returns 0x%lx\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } // Must pack the HANDLE into a fixed size structure for IA64 and i32 formats
pPackedUserCtxt->ClientTokenHandle = (ULONG) ((ULONG_PTR)hTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SspMapContext: DuplicateHandle successful ClientTokenHandle 0x%x\n", pPackedUserCtxt->ClientTokenHandle)); }
// Now copy over the string data elements
pucLoc = &(pPackedUserCtxt->ucData); if (pDigest) { for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++) { if (pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]) { memcpy(pucLoc, pDigest->refstrParam[iAuth].Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]); pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]; } }
if (pDigest->usFlags & FLAG_AUTHZID_PROVIDED) { pPackedUserCtxt->ulFlags |= FLAG_CONTEXT_AUTHZID_PROVIDED; } } else { for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++) { if (pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]) { memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->strDirective[iAuth].Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]); pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]; } } }
if (pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen) { memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen); pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen; }
if (usAcctNameSize) { memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->ustrDomain.Buffer, pLsaContext->ustrDomain.Length); pucLoc = pucLoc + pLsaContext->ustrDomain.Length; memcpy(pucLoc, L"\\", sizeof(WCHAR)); pucLoc = pucLoc + sizeof(WCHAR); memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Length); pucLoc = pucLoc + pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Length; }
ContextData->pvBuffer = pPackedUserCtxt; ContextData->cbBuffer = cbLenNeeded; ContextData->BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspMapContext: Leaving LsaContext %lx Status 0x%x\n", pLsaContext, Status)); return(Status); }
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserHTTPHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with HTTP for auth after initial ASC/ISC exchange
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserHTTPHelper( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN eSignSealOp Op, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG ulSeqNo = 0; PSecBuffer pChalRspInputToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pMethodInputToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pURIInputToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pHEntityInputToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pFirstOutputToken = NULL; DIGEST_PARAMETER Digest; USHORT usLen = 0; int iAuth = 0; char *cptr = NULL; char szNCOverride[2*NCNUM]; // Overrides the provided NC if non-zero using only NCNUM digits
STRING strURI = {0};
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Entering \n"));
Status = DigestInit(&Digest); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Digest init error status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 1) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Not enough input buffers 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } pChalRspInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[0]); if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pChalRspInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (ChalRspInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Set any digest processing parameters based on Context
if (pContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_NOBS_DECODE) { Digest.usFlags |= FLAG_NOBS_DECODE; }
// We have input in the SECBUFFER 0th location - parse it
Status = DigestParser2(pChalRspInputToken, MD5_AUTH_NAMES, MD5_AUTH_LAST, &Digest); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: DigestParser error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Now determine all of the other buffers
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: pContext->ContextReq 0x%lx \n", pContext->ContextReq));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HTTP SecBuffer Format\n")); // Retrieve the information from the SecBuffers & check proper formattting
if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 4) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Not enough input buffers 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } pMethodInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[1]); if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pMethodInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE)) { // Check to make sure that string is present
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (MethodInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
pURIInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[2]); if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pURIInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (URIInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
pHEntityInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[3]); if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pHEntityInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (HEntityInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Take care of the output buffer
if (Op == eSign) { if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 5) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: No Output Buffers %d\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } pFirstOutputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[4]); if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pFirstOutputToken, 0)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper, ContextIsTokenOK (FirstOutputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Reset output buffer
if (pFirstOutputToken && (pFirstOutputToken->pvBuffer) && (pFirstOutputToken->cbBuffer >= 1)) { cptr = (char *)pFirstOutputToken->pvBuffer; *cptr = '\0'; }
} else { pFirstOutputToken = NULL; // There is no output buffer
}
// Verify that there is a valid Method provided
if (!pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer || !pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer || (PBUFFERTYPE(pMethodInputToken) != SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Method SecBuffer must have valid method string status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
usLen = strlencounted((char *)pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer, (USHORT)pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer); if (!usLen) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Method SecBuffer must have valid method string status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].Length = usLen; Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer); Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].Buffer = (char *)pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
// Check to see if we have H(Entity) data to utilize
if (pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer) { // Verify that there is a valid Method provided
if (!pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer || (PBUFFERTYPE(pMethodInputToken) != SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HEntity SecBuffer must have valid string status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
usLen = strlencounted((char *)pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer, (USHORT)pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer);
if ((usLen != 0) && (usLen != (MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE * 2))) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HEntity SecBuffer must have valid MD5 Hash data 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if (usLen) { Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].Length = usLen; Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer); Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].Buffer = (char *)pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
} }
// Import the URI if it is a sign otherwise verify URI match if verify
if (Op == eSign) { // Pull in the URI provided in SecBuffer
if (!pURIInputToken || !pURIInputToken->cbBuffer || !pURIInputToken->pvBuffer) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: URI SecBuffer must have valid string 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if (PBUFFERTYPE(pURIInputToken) == SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS) { usLen = strlencounted((char *)pURIInputToken->pvBuffer, (USHORT)pURIInputToken->cbBuffer);
if (usLen > 0) { Status = StringCharDuplicate(&strURI, (char *)pURIInputToken->pvBuffer, usLen); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: StringCharDuplicate error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } } } else { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: URI buffer type invalid error %d\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
StringReference(&(Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_URI]), &strURI); // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
}
// If we have a NonceCount in the MessageSequenceNumber then use that
if (MessageSeqNo) { ulSeqNo = MessageSeqNo; } else { ulSeqNo = pContext->ulNC + 1; // Else use the next sequence number
}
sprintf(szNCOverride, "%0.8x", ulSeqNo); // Buffer is twice as big as we need (for safety) so just clip out first 8 characters
szNCOverride[NCNUM] = '\0'; // clip to 8 digits
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Message Sequence NC is %s\n", szNCOverride)); Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Length = (USHORT)NCNUM; Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(NCNUM+1); Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Buffer = (char *)szNCOverride; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
// Now link in the stored context values into the digest if this is a SignMessage
// If there are values there from the input auth line then override them with context's value
if (Op == eSign) { for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++) { if ((iAuth != MD5_AUTH_URI) && (iAuth != MD5_AUTH_HENTITY) && (iAuth != MD5_AUTH_METHOD) && pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length) { // Link in only if passed into the user context from the LSA context
Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].Length = pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length; Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].MaximumLength = pContext->strParam[iAuth].MaximumLength; Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].Buffer = pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer; // reference memory - no alloc!!!!
} } }
// Verify that ChallengeResponses directive values are the same as in original ChallangeResponse
if (Op == eVerify) { Status = DigestUserCompareDirectives(pContext, &Digest); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: DigestUserCompareDirectives error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Digest inputs processing completed\n"));
Status = DigestUserProcessParameters(pContext, &Digest, pFirstOutputToken); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: DigestUserProcessParameters error 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
pContext->ulNC = ulSeqNo; // Everything verified so increment to next nonce count
// Keep a copy of the new URI in ChallengeResponse
StringFree(&(pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI])); Status = StringDuplicate(&(pContext->strParam[MD5_AUTH_URI]), &(Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_URI])); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Failed to copy URI\n")); goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
DigestFree(&Digest);
StringFree(&strURI);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserSignHelperMulti
//
// Synopsis: Process multiple SecBuffers with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserSignHelperMulti( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufPad = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
BOOL bServer = FALSE; SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock = {0}; STRING strcSignKeyConst = {0}; // pointer to a constant valued string
ULONG Index = 0;
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(MessageSeqNo);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Entering \n"));
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN) { pSecBufToken = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_PADDING) { pSecBufPad = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } }
if ((!pSecBufPad) || (!pSecBufPad->cbBuffer)) { // If no SECBUFFER_PADDING, use SECBUFFER_TOKEN
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufToken; } else { pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufPad; if (pSecBufToken) { pSecBufToken->cbBuffer = 0; } } if (!pSecBufHMAC || !ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufHMAC, 0) || (pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer) { pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); } else { // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); }
Status = CalculateSASLHMACMulti(pContext, TRUE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum, pSecBuff, &MacBlock); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Error in CalculateSASLHMACMulti status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Write the calculated MAC block out to the SecBuffer
memcpy(pSecBufHMAC->pvBuffer, &MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelper: Wrote out the calculated MAC Block.\n")); pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE; // indicate number of bytes we used for padding and HMAC block
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSignHelperMulti: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserVerifyHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserVerifyHelper( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PBYTE pMsgHMAC = NULL; // Location of the HMAC in the message
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufStream = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE; SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock = {0}; SASL_MAC_BLOCK TokenMacBlock = {0}; STRING strcSignKeyConst = {0}; ULONG cbSecBufMsgIntegrity = 0; // Number of bytes in message to calc HMAC on
ULONG Index = 0;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); #endif
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(MessageSeqNo);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Entering \n"));
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA) { pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_STREAM) { pSecBufStream = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } }
// Must be for decrypt/verify
if ((!pSecBufStream) || (!pSecBufStream->cbBuffer)) { // If no SECBUFFER_STREAM, use SECBUFFER_DATA
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufData; } else { pSecBufMsg = pSecBufStream; }
if (!pSecBufMsg || (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0)) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) decrypt/verify failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } // Strip off the MsgType and the Sequence Number
cbSecBufMsgIntegrity = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
// Determine the sequence number to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer) { pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Verifying in Server Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); } else { // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Verifying in Client Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); }
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, FALSE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum, (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer, cbSecBufMsgIntegrity, &MacBlock); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Ready to compare MacBlocks\n"));
// Check validity of MAC block ONLY do not write it out
pMsgHMAC = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + cbSecBufMsgIntegrity; memcpy(&TokenMacBlock, pMsgHMAC, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE); if (MacBlock.dwSeqNumber != TokenMacBlock.dwSeqNumber) { Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks out of sequence. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status)); #if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
goto CleanUp; } if (memcmp(&MacBlock, &TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks do not match. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status)); #if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
goto CleanUp; } else { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks match!\n")); }
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++;
// Update the Data information (without the attached HMAC info block
if (pSecBufData) { pSecBufData->cbBuffer = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE; pSecBufData->pvBuffer = pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer; } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserSealHelperMulti
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC Supports Multiple Data Secbuffers
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserSealHelperMulti( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufPad = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
BOOL bServer = FALSE; SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock = {0}; STRING strcSignKeyConst = {0}; STRING strcSealKeyConst = {0}; PUCHAR pbIV = NULL;
BYTE bKcTempData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
ULONG Index = 0; USHORT cbHA1n = 0; // Number of bytes for Ha1 in Kcc/Kcs
DWORD cbKey = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key
DWORD cbKeyNoParity = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key with no parity
DWORD cbTempKey = 0; ULONG cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE; // Blocksize for the given cipher
ULONG cbPrefixPadding = 0; // number of bytes needed for padding out to blocksize
ULONG cbBlocks = 0; PBYTE pHMACTemp = NULL; ALG_ID Algid = 0; ULONG cbTotalData = 0; // total number of bytes to process in Data SecBuffers
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(MessageSeqNo);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Entering \n"));
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN) { pSecBufToken = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_PADDING) { pSecBufPad = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } }
if ((!pSecBufPad) || (!pSecBufPad->cbBuffer)) { // If no SECBUFFER_PADDING, use SECBUFFER_TOKEN
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufToken; } else { pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufPad; if (pSecBufToken) { pSecBufToken->cbBuffer = 0; } } if (!pSecBufHMAC || !ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufHMAC, 0) || (pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING))) { Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer) { pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY); RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SEAL_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); } else { // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY); RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SEAL_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); }
// Based on the Cypher selected - establish the byte count parameters - magic numbers from RFC
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) { cbHA1n = 5; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56) { cbHA1n = 7; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 8; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 7; cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_DES; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 14; cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_3DES_112; } else { Status = SEC_E_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
Status = CalculateDataCount(pSecBuff, &cbTotalData); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Error in CalculateDataCount status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// If the cipher is not a stream cipher - the place prefix padding before SASL MAC
// Modified to include padding based on message datasize + the 10 byte HMAC
if (cbBlockSize != 1) { cbBlocks = (cbTotalData + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE) / cbBlockSize; // integer divison
cbPrefixPadding = cbBlockSize - ((cbTotalData + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE) - (cbBlockSize * cbBlocks)); if (!cbPrefixPadding) { cbPrefixPadding = cbBlockSize; // if padding is zero set it to the blocksize - i.e. always pad
} DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: TotalDataSize %lu BlockSize %lu Padding %lu\n", cbTotalData, cbBlockSize, cbPrefixPadding)); }
Status = CalculateSASLHMACMulti(pContext, TRUE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum, pSecBuff, &MacBlock); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMACMulti status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Write the calculated MAC block out to the SecBuffer
// Put the padding as the prefix
pHMACTemp = (PBYTE)pSecBufHMAC->pvBuffer; memset(pHMACTemp, cbPrefixPadding, cbPrefixPadding); memcpy(pHMACTemp + cbPrefixPadding, &MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Wrote out the calculated MAC Block.\n")); pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding; // indicate number of bytes we used for padding and HMAC block
// Completed the Integrity calculation, now encrypt the data if requested
// Encrypt the message, padding and first SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE (10) bytes of HMAC (the integrity value)
// Compute Kc for encryption (seal) & generate Cryptkey
if (pContext->hSealCryptKey == NULL) { ASSERT(*pdwSeqNum == 0); // Should be first call into package
// Compute on first time call to encrypt - save for other sequence numbers
Status = CalculateKc(pContext->bSessionKey, cbHA1n, &strcSealKeyConst, pContext->bKcSealHashData); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// code to expand the DES key into multiple of 8 bytes (key with parity)
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES)) { Status = AddDESParity(pContext->bKcSealHashData, cbKeyNoParity, bKcTempData, &cbTempKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Error in AddDESParity status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } // replace with DES parity version
ASSERT(cbKey == cbTempKey); memcpy(pContext->bSealKey, bKcTempData, cbTempKey); pbIV = &(pContext->bKcSealHashData[8]); } else { memcpy(pContext->bSealKey, pContext->bKcSealHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); pbIV = NULL; }
// generate symmetric key from the cleartext
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(Algid, cbKey, pContext->bSealKey, pbIV, &pContext->hSealCryptKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
}
Status = EncryptData2Multi(pContext->hSealCryptKey, cbBlockSize, pSecBuff, (cbPrefixPadding + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE), pHMACTemp);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Error in EncryptData3 status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Data encrypted\n"));
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSealHelperMulti: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserUnsealHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserUnsealHelper( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufStream = NULL; PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE; SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock = {0}; SASL_MAC_BLOCK TokenMacBlock = {0}; // Extract the HMAC block imbedded in the message
STRING strcSignKeyConst = {0}; STRING strcSealKeyConst = {0}; PBYTE pMsgHMAC = NULL;
BYTE bKcTempData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
PUCHAR pbIV = NULL;
ULONG Index = 0; USHORT cbHA1n = 0; // Number of bytes for Ha1 in Kcc/Kcs
DWORD cbKey = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key
DWORD cbKeyNoParity = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key with no parity
DWORD cbTempKey = 0; ULONG cbBlockSize = 1; // Blocksize for the given cipher
UCHAR cbPrefixPadding = 0; // number of bytes needed for padding out to blocksize
ULONG cbMsg = 0; // number of bytes in the actual message
PBYTE pMsgPadding = NULL; // Location of a padding byte
ALG_ID Algid = 0;
ULONG cbSecBufMsgPrivacy = 0; // Number of bytes to decrypt (unseal)
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ULONG iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); #endif
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(MessageSeqNo);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Entering\n"));
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA) { pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_STREAM) { pSecBufStream = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]; } }
// Must be for decrypt/verify
if ((!pSecBufStream) || (!pSecBufStream->cbBuffer)) { // If no SECBUFFER_STREAM, use SECBUFFER_DATA
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufData; } else { pSecBufMsg = pSecBufStream; }
if (!pSecBufMsg || (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0)) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) decrypt/verify failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } // Strip off the MsgType and the Sequence Number
cbSecBufMsgPrivacy = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (SASL_MAC_MSG_SIZE + SASL_MAC_SEQ_SIZE);
if (!pSecBufMsg || !ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer) { pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY); RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SEAL_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); } else { // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum); RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY); RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SEAL_KEY); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum)); }
// Based on the Cypher selected - establish the byte count parameters - magic numbers from RFC
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) { cbHA1n = 5; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56) { cbHA1n = 7; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 8; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 7; cbBlockSize = 8; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_DES; } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) { cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 14; cbBlockSize = 8; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_3DES_112; } else { Status = SEC_E_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Decrypt the message, padding and first SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE (10) bytes of HMAC (the integrity value)
// Compute Kc for encryption (seal)
if (pContext->hUnsealCryptKey == NULL) { ASSERT(*pdwSeqNum == 0); // Compute on first time call to encrypt - save for other sequence numbers
Status = CalculateKc(pContext->bSessionKey, cbHA1n, &strcSealKeyConst, pContext->bKcUnsealHashData); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// code to expand the DES key into multiple of 8 bytes (key with parity)
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES)) { Status = AddDESParity(pContext->bKcUnsealHashData, cbKeyNoParity, bKcTempData, &cbTempKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in AddDESParity status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } // replace with DES parity version
ASSERT(cbKey == cbTempKey); memcpy(pContext->bUnsealKey, bKcTempData, cbKey); pbIV = &(pContext->bKcUnsealHashData[8]); } else { // For RC4 ciphers
memcpy(pContext->bUnsealKey, pContext->bKcUnsealHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); pbIV = NULL; }
// generate the symmetric key from the cleartext
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(Algid, cbKey, pContext->bUnsealKey, pbIV, &pContext->hUnsealCryptKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } }
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)) {
// Specify IV - take only the last 8 bytes per RFC 2831 sect 2.4
Status = DecryptData(pContext->hUnsealCryptKey, cbSecBufMsgPrivacy, (PUCHAR)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in DecryptData status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// Padding length is indicated in the actual padding - get the pad byte near HMAC
if (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1)) { Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Determining padding not enough space status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } pMsgPadding = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if ((MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1) < iTempLen) { iTempLen = (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1); } BinToHex(pMsgPadding, iTempLen, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: HMAC & padding byte Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1), szTemp)); } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: MAC block size %d bytes\n", MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)); #endif
cbPrefixPadding = *pMsgPadding; if (cbPrefixPadding > MAX_PADDING) { Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Padding selected (%d) too large status 0x%x\n", cbPrefixPadding, Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding)) { Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Message incorrect length status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; } cbMsg = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Padding found to be %d bytes\n", cbPrefixPadding)); } else { Status = DecryptData(pContext->hUnsealCryptKey, cbSecBufMsgPrivacy, (PUCHAR)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in EncryptData status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
// There is no padding on stream ciphers, so just remove the SASL HMAC block
cbMsg = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Stream Cipher - No padding\n")); }
// Locate the beginning of the message
pMsgHMAC = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, FALSE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum, (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer, cbMsg, &MacBlock); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Ready to compare MacBlocks\n"));
// Check validity of MAC block ONLY do not write it out
memcpy(&TokenMacBlock, pMsgHMAC, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE); if (MacBlock.dwSeqNumber != TokenMacBlock.dwSeqNumber) { Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks out of sequence. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status)); #if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
goto CleanUp; } if (memcmp(&MacBlock, &TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE)) { Status = SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks do not match. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status)); #if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
goto CleanUp; } else { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks match!\n")); }
// Write out to SECBUFFERDATA the length and location of message
if (pSecBufData) { pSecBufData->cbBuffer = cbMsg; pSecBufData->pvBuffer = pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer; }
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
// Process the Digest information with the context info and generate any output token info
NTSTATUS NTAPI DigestUserProcessParameters( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN PDIGEST_PARAMETER pDigest, OUT PSecBuffer pFirstOutputToken) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG ulNonceCount = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Entering\n"));
// Some common input verification tests
// We must have a noncecount specified since we specified a qop in the Challenge
// If we decide to support no noncecount modes then we need to make sure that qop is not specified
if (pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Length) { Status = RtlCharToInteger(pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Buffer, HEXBASE, &ulNonceCount); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Nonce Count badly formatted\n")); goto CleanUp; } }
// Check nonceCount is incremented to preclude replay
if (!(ulNonceCount > pContext->ulNC)) { // We failed to verify next noncecount
Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: NonceCount failed to increment!\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Copy the SessionKey from the Context into the Digest Structure to verify against
// This will have Digest Auth routines use the SessionKey rather than recompute H(A1)
StringFree(&(pDigest->strSessionKey)); Status = StringDuplicate(&(pDigest->strSessionKey), &(pContext->strSessionKey)); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Failed to copy over SessionKey\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Set the type of Digest Parameters we are to process
pDigest->typeDigest = pContext->typeDigest; pDigest->typeQOP = pContext->typeQOP; pDigest->typeAlgorithm = pContext->typeAlgorithm; pDigest->typeCharset = pContext->typeCharset;
if (pContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_QUOTE_QOP) { pDigest->usFlags |= FLAG_QUOTE_QOP; }
DigestPrint(pDigest);
// No check locally that Digest is authentic
Status = DigestCalculation(pDigest, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Oh no we FAILED Authentication!!!!\n")); goto CleanUp; }
// Send to output buffer only if there is an output buffer
// This allows this routine to be used in UserMode
if (pFirstOutputToken) { Status = DigestCreateChalResp(pDigest, NULL, pFirstOutputToken); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Failed to create Output String\n")); goto CleanUp; } }
CleanUp: DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status)); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUnpackContext
//
// Synopsis: Unpack the context from LSA mode into the User mode Context
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserContext -- packed Context data
// OUT PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext -- pointer to the UserContext to unpack data into
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes: This routine is called by the LSA from ISC() and ASC() based on setting MappedContext
// on the completion of these routines.
//
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS DigestUnpackContext( IN PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserContext, OUT PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PUCHAR pucLoc = NULL; USHORT uNumWChars = 0; int iAuth = 0;
ASSERT(pPackedUserContext); ASSERT(pContext);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUnpackContext: Entering\n"));
if (pPackedUserContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_PARTIAL) { // This partial context has no real data that we must process so just leave context alone for now
// This is needed for proper ref counting
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: partial context - no unpack needed context 0x%x\n", pContext->LsaContext )); pContext->ulFlags = pPackedUserContext->ulFlags; goto CleanUp; }
if (pContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_PARTIAL) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Completing partial context to full context\n" )); } //
// We now pass explicit flags to indicate ASC or ISC context
// Right now FLAG_CONTEXT_PARTIAL will catch ASC calls without a ClientTokenHandle,
// but this explicit check is better than checking on the TokenHandle should some ASC update calls not provide
// a TokenHandle
//
if (pPackedUserContext->ulFlags & FLAG_CONTEXT_SERVER) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Called from ASC\n" )); if (pPackedUserContext->ClientTokenHandle != NULL) { ASSERT(pContext->ClientTokenHandle == NULL); pContext->ClientTokenHandle = (HANDLE) ((ULONG_PTR)pPackedUserContext->ClientTokenHandle); if (FAILED(SspCreateTokenDacl(pContext->ClientTokenHandle))) { Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: SspCreateTokenDacl failed\n" )); goto CleanUp; } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: SspCreateTokenDacl has created the DACL\n" )); } } else { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Called from ISC\n" )); }
//
// Copy over all of the other fields - some data might be binary so
// use RtlCopyMemory(Dest, Src, len)
//
pContext->ExpirationTime = pPackedUserContext->ExpirationTime; pContext->typeAlgorithm = (ALGORITHM_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeAlgorithm; pContext->typeCharset = (CHARSET_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeCharset; pContext->typeCipher = (CIPHER_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeCipher; pContext->typeDigest = (DIGEST_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeDigest; pContext->typeQOP = (QOP_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeQOP; pContext->ulSendMaxBuf = pPackedUserContext->ulSendMaxBuf; pContext->ulRecvMaxBuf = pPackedUserContext->ulRecvMaxBuf; pContext->ContextReq = pPackedUserContext->ContextReq; pContext->CredentialUseFlags = pPackedUserContext->CredentialUseFlags; pContext->ulFlags = pPackedUserContext->ulFlags;
// Now check on the strings attached
pucLoc = &(pPackedUserContext->ucData); for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++) { if (pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]) { Status = StringAllocate(&(pContext->strParam[iAuth]), (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for Params returns NULL\n" )); goto CleanUp; } memcpy(pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer, pucLoc, (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]); pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]; pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]; // DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Param[%d] is length %d - %.50s\n",
// iAuth, pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth], pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer ));
} } // Now do the SessionKey
if (pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen) { ASSERT(pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen == MD5_HASH_HEX_SIZE); if (pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen != MD5_HASH_HEX_SIZE) { Status = STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: Session key length incorrect\n" )); goto CleanUp; }
Status = StringAllocate(&(pContext->strSessionKey), (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for SessionKey returns NULL\n" )); goto CleanUp; } memcpy(pContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, pucLoc, pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen); pContext->strSessionKey.Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen; pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen;
// Now determine the binary version of the SessionKey from HEX() version
HexToBin(pContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, MD5_HASH_HEX_SIZE, pContext->bSessionKey); } // Now do the AccountName
if (pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen) { uNumWChars = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen / sizeof(WCHAR); Status = UnicodeStringAllocate(&(pContext->ustrAccountName), uNumWChars); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for AccountName returns NULL\n" )); goto CleanUp; } memcpy(pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pucLoc, pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen); pContext->ustrAccountName.Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen; pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen; }
#if DBG2
{ char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pContext->bSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: verify SessionKey %Z is binary %s\n", &(pContext->strSessionKey), szTemp)); } #endif
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUnpackContext: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status)); return(Status); }
// Printout the fields present in usercontext pContext
NTSTATUS UserContextPrint(PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; int i = 0;
if (!pContext) { return (STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "UserContext: Entering for Context Handle at 0x%x\n", pContext));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: NC %ld\n", pContext->ulNC));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: LSA Context 0x%x\n", pContext->LsaContext));
if (pContext->typeDigest == DIGEST_CLIENT) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: DIGEST_CLIENT\n")); } if (pContext->typeDigest == DIGEST_SERVER) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: DIGEST_SERVER\n")); } if (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SASL_SERVER\n")); } if (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SASL_CLIENT\n")); }
if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH\n")); } if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH_INT) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH_INT\n")); } if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH_CONF) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH_CONF\n")); } if (pContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Algorithm: MD5\n")); } if (pContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5_SESS) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Algorithm: MD5_SESS\n")); }
if (pContext->typeCharset == ISO_8859_1) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Charset: ISO 8859-1\n")); } if (pContext->typeCharset == UTF_8) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Charset: UTF-8\n")); }
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4\n")); } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4_40\n")); } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4_56\n")); } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_DES\n")); } else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_3DES\n")); }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: ContextReq 0x%lx CredentialUseFlags 0x%x\n", pContext->ContextReq, pContext->CredentialUseFlags));
for (i=0; i < MD5_AUTH_LAST;i++) { if (pContext->strParam[i].Buffer && pContext->strParam[i].Length) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Digest[%d] = \"%Z\"\n", i, &pContext->strParam[i])); } }
if (pContext->strSessionKey.Length) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SessionKey %.10Z*********\n", &pContext->strSessionKey)); }
if (pContext->ustrAccountName.Length) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: AccountName %wZ\n", &pContext->ustrAccountName)); }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "UserContext: Leaving\n"));
return(Status); }
// CryptoAPI function support
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY CreateSymmetricKey( IN ALG_ID Algid, IN DWORD cbKey, IN UCHAR *pbKey, IN UCHAR *pbIV, OUT HCRYPTKEY *phKey ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PLAINTEXTBLOB PlainBlob = {0};
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CreateSymmetricKey: Entering\n"));
ASSERT(*phKey == NULL);
if (cbKey > MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey: Shared key too long\n")); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; }
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; // Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(pbKey, cbKey, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CreateSymmetricKey: Creating symmetric for %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
PlainBlob.Blob.bType = PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB; PlainBlob.Blob.bVersion = CUR_BLOB_VERSION; PlainBlob.Blob.reserved = 0; PlainBlob.Blob.aiKeyAlg = Algid; memcpy(PlainBlob.bKey, pbKey, cbKey); PlainBlob.dwKeyLen = cbKey;
// import thw simpleblob to get a handle to the symmetric key
if (!CryptImportKey(g_hCryptProv, (BYTE *)&PlainBlob, sizeof(PlainBlob), 0, 0, phKey)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey: CryptImportKey failed error 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; }
if ((Algid == CALG_DES) || (Algid == CALG_3DES_112)) {
if (!pbIV) { DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "CreateSymmetricKey: No IV selected for DES\n")); } else { #if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(pbIV, 8, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CreateSymmetricKey: IV bytes set to %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
if (!CryptSetKeyParam(*phKey, KP_IV, pbIV, 0)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey:CryptSetKeyParam() failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; } }
}
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CreateSymmetricKey: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status)); return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: EncryptData2Multi
//
// Synopsis: Encrypt a data buffers
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN hKey -- symmetric key to utilize
// IN cbBlocklength -- natural block length for encoding (RC will be 1 and DES will be 8)
// IN pSecBuff -- SecBuffer list containing data buffers to encrypt
// IN cbSignature -- number of signature bytes to encrypt after Data is encrypted
// IN pbSignature -- number of bytes in signature to encrypt
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY EncryptData2Multi( IN HCRYPTKEY hKey, IN ULONG cbBlocklength, IN PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, // List of databuffers to Encrypt. May be 1 or more SecBuffers
IN ULONG cbSignature, IN OUT UCHAR *pbSignature ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG cbBlocks = 0; ULONG cbDataExtra = 0; ULONG cbDataBytesUsed = 0; // Number of bytes already processed from current buffer (data or padding SecBuffer)
PBYTE pbData = NULL; // location for start of extra memory bytes
ULONG ulIndex = 0; BOOL fDataBuffers = TRUE; DWORD dwBytesEncrypt = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "EncryptData2Multi: Entering\n"));
ASSERT(pSecBuff); ASSERT(pbSignature);
// Scan through the SecBuffer list for data buffers to encrypt
// Currently look at SecBUffer[Index] and increment Index over all SecBuffers
cbDataBytesUsed = 0; // Number of databytes already processed in current buffer
while (fDataBuffers == TRUE) { if (ulIndex < pSecBuff->cBuffers) { // Locate a SecBuffer Data that has data to encrypt
if ((pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].BufferType != SECBUFFER_DATA) || (!pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].cbBuffer)) { ulIndex++; // Inspect the next SecBuffer
continue; // restart while loop
} } else { // No more SecBuffers Data to process
fDataBuffers = FALSE; continue; }
// If SecBuffer Data size greater than zero, encrypt maximum multiple of blockcount
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: located buffer %d %ld bytes to encrypt\n", ulIndex, (pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].cbBuffer - cbDataBytesUsed))); ASSERT(cbDataBytesUsed < cbBlocklength); // should always have used less than blocksize bytes
// Identify if there are extra bytes beyond blocksize for cipher
cbBlocks = (pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].cbBuffer - cbDataBytesUsed) / cbBlocklength; // integer division
cbDataExtra = (pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].cbBuffer - cbDataBytesUsed) - (cbBlocklength * cbBlocks);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: in buffer %lu blocks %lu extrbytes %lu\n", ulIndex, cbBlocks, cbDataExtra));
// If there are blocks to encrypt - do that
if (cbBlocks) { dwBytesEncrypt = cbBlocklength * cbBlocks; DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: buffer %lu start at %lu length %lu\n", ulIndex, cbDataBytesUsed, dwBytesEncrypt)); pbData = (PBYTE)pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulIndex].pvBuffer + cbDataBytesUsed; if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &dwBytesEncrypt, dwBytesEncrypt)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2Multi:CryptEncrypt first buffer (blocklength) failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; } cbDataBytesUsed = cbDataBytesUsed + dwBytesEncrypt; } // Handle the extra bytes not block encrypted
if (cbDataExtra) { // This will have to link potentially multiple SecBuffers or the Padding to fill in a blocklength
// of data to encrypt. The value of ulIndex and cbDataBytesUsed can change. If ulIndex points outside
// range of SecBuffers, then cbDataBytesUsed value refers to the padding SecBuffer state.
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: buffer %lu has %lu bytes to process. Use link.\n", ulIndex, cbDataExtra)); Status = LinkBuffersToEncrypt(hKey, cbBlocklength, pSecBuff, &ulIndex, &cbDataBytesUsed, pbSignature, cbSignature); if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2Multi: LinkBuffer failed 0x%x\n", Status )); goto CleanUp; }
} else { // No extra bytes in this SecBuffer to process, go to next Buffer
ulIndex++; cbDataBytesUsed = 0; }
}
// Encrypt remaining bytes in signature - assert that it must be a multiple of blocksize
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: Now process Signature buffer. link processed %lu of %lu bytes already\n", cbDataBytesUsed, cbSignature)); ASSERT(cbDataBytesUsed < cbSignature); dwBytesEncrypt = cbSignature - cbDataBytesUsed;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2Multi: Encrypt %lu signature bytes\n", dwBytesEncrypt)); if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, (pbSignature + cbDataBytesUsed), &dwBytesEncrypt, dwBytesEncrypt)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2Multi:CryptEncrypt one buffer failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; }
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "EncryptData2Multi: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: LinkBuffersToEncrypt
//
// Synopsis: Encrypt the boundary bytes that span over multiple data SecBuffers and Padding
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN hKey -- symmetric key to utilize
// IN cbBlocklength -- BlockLength for symmetric cipher (should be greater than 1)
// IN pSecBuff -- pointer to SecBuffers containing data to encrypt
// IN OUT pSecBuff -- pointer to current SecBuffer to process (must be a Data buffer)
// IN OUT pulIndex -- pointer to current SecBuffer to process (must be a Data buffer)
// IN OUT pcbDataBytesUsed -- pointer to number of bytes processed in current SecBuffer
// IN pbSignature -- pointer to buffer for signature block (contains padding plus HMAC)
// IN cbSignature -- number of bytes in signature block
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes: This function will handle the blocklength encryption boundaries between data SecBuffers and
// the padding bytes. The value
//
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY LinkBuffersToEncrypt( IN HCRYPTKEY hKey, IN ULONG cbBlocklength, IN PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, IN OUT PULONG pulIndex, IN OUT PULONG pcbDataBytesUsed, IN PUCHAR pbSignature, IN ULONG cbSignature) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; PBYTE pbTempBuff = NULL; // temp alloc for merge of cross buffer bytes (sized to BlockLength)
ULONG cbTempBuff = 0; ULONG ulScanIndex = 0; // scan along the SecBuffers
ULONG cbScanDataBytesUsed = 0; // number of bytes used in ulScanIndex's SecBuffer
ULONG cbScanDataBytesLeft = 0; // number of bytes remaining in ulScanIndex's SecBuffer
DWORD dwBytesEncrypt = 0; ULONG cbBytesNeeded = 0; PBYTE pbSecBuff = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Entering\n"));
ASSERT(cbBlocklength > 1); ASSERT(cbSignature > SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE); // check to make sure that Signature inlcudes padding plus HMAC
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(cbSignature);
// Allocate memory to store cross data buffer bytes
pbTempBuff = (PBYTE)DigestAllocateMemory(cbBlocklength); if (!pbTempBuff) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt:out of memory\n")); Status = SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; goto CleanUp; }
// pulIndex points to the current data buffer with pcbDataBytesUsed already processed
// Start reading in bytes to fill TempBuff up to BlockLength. Normally the next buffer in sequence (data or padding)
// will have enough bytes to cover filling up the TempBuffer, but someone could send in a tiny buffer and cause
// 3 or more buffers to have to be utilized
ulScanIndex = *pulIndex; // set a marker to where to start processing
cbScanDataBytesUsed = *pcbDataBytesUsed;
// Since we were called, there must be left over bytes in SecBuffer to process
ASSERT(cbScanDataBytesUsed < pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer); while ((cbTempBuff != cbBlocklength) && (ulScanIndex < pSecBuff->cBuffers)) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Link buffer has %lu bytes - needs %lu. Scan Buffers\n", cbTempBuff, cbBlocklength)); if ((pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].BufferType != SECBUFFER_DATA) || (!pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer)) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Scan skip SecBuffer Index %lu\n", ulScanIndex)); ulScanIndex++; // Inspect the next SecBuffer
cbScanDataBytesUsed = 0; continue; // restart while loop
}
// How many bytes can we process in this buffer
cbScanDataBytesLeft = pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer - cbScanDataBytesUsed;
// copy over the bytes into the temp location
cbBytesNeeded = cbBlocklength - cbTempBuff;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Temp buffer needs %lu bytes, SecBuffer has %lu bytes\n", cbBytesNeeded, cbScanDataBytesLeft)); pbSecBuff = (PBYTE)pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].pvBuffer;
if (cbScanDataBytesLeft < cbBytesNeeded) { // Can not fill up with only this buffer - need more data buffers
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Can not fill Link with Index %lu. Need more data\n", ulScanIndex)); memcpy((pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), (pbSecBuff + cbScanDataBytesUsed), cbScanDataBytesLeft); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbScanDataBytesLeft; ulScanIndex++; // move to next SecBuffer and for possible data
cbScanDataBytesUsed = 0; } else { // We can fill up the reset of the Temp link Buffer with Scan SecBuffer
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Can fill Link with Index %lu\n", ulScanIndex)); ASSERT(cbScanDataBytesUsed == 0); // this should be a new buffer to be processed
memcpy((pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), pbSecBuff, cbBytesNeeded); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbBytesNeeded; ASSERT(cbTempBuff == cbBlocklength); // will exit while loop now that buffer is full
cbScanDataBytesUsed = cbBytesNeeded; // show number of bytes already processed in new SecBuffer
} }
if (cbTempBuff < cbBlocklength) { // processesed all of the data SecBuffers - now use the padding in the Signature buffer
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Link buffer has %lu bytes - needs %lu. Use padding.\n", cbTempBuff, cbBlocklength)); ASSERT(ulScanIndex == pSecBuff->cBuffers); // should have exhausted all of the SecBuffers
cbBytesNeeded = cbBlocklength - cbTempBuff;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Need %lu bytes from Signature buffer\n", cbBytesNeeded)); memcpy((pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), pbSignature, cbBytesNeeded); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbBytesNeeded; cbScanDataBytesUsed = cbBytesNeeded; }
// We now should have a full link buffer to encrypt
ASSERT(cbTempBuff == cbBlocklength); dwBytesEncrypt = cbBlocklength; if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbTempBuff, &dwBytesEncrypt, cbBlocklength)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt:CryptEncrypt link buffer failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; } DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: encrypted link buffer\n"));
// Now place data back into proper locations - perform same operations as above but put data back
ulScanIndex = *pulIndex; // set a marker to where to start processing
cbScanDataBytesUsed = *pcbDataBytesUsed; cbTempBuff = 0; // we have placed zero bytes back into SecBuffers
// Since we were called, there must be left over bytes in SecBuffer to process
ASSERT(cbScanDataBytesUsed < pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer); while ((cbTempBuff != cbBlocklength) && (ulScanIndex < pSecBuff->cBuffers)) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: (put)Link buffer has %lu bytes - needs %lu. Scan Buffers\n", cbTempBuff, cbBlocklength)); if ((pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].BufferType != SECBUFFER_DATA) || (!pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer)) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: (put)Scan skip SecBuffer Index %lu\n", ulScanIndex)); ulScanIndex++; // Inspect the next SecBuffer
cbScanDataBytesUsed = 0; continue; // restart while loop
}
// How many bytes can we process in this buffer
cbScanDataBytesLeft = pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].cbBuffer - cbScanDataBytesUsed;
// copy over the bytes into the temp location
cbBytesNeeded = cbBlocklength - cbTempBuff;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: (put)Temp buffer needs %lu bytes, SecBuffer has %lu bytes\n", cbBytesNeeded, cbScanDataBytesLeft)); pbSecBuff = (PBYTE)pSecBuff->pBuffers[ulScanIndex].pvBuffer;
if (cbScanDataBytesLeft < cbBytesNeeded) { // Can not fill up with only this buffer - need more data buffers
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Can not place Link into Index %lu. Need more data\n", ulScanIndex)); memcpy((pbSecBuff + cbScanDataBytesUsed), (pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), cbScanDataBytesLeft); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbScanDataBytesLeft; ulScanIndex++; // move to next SecBuffer and for possible data
cbScanDataBytesUsed = 0; } else { // We can fill up the reset of the Temp link Buffer with Scan SecBuffer
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Can place Link into Index %lu\n", ulScanIndex)); ASSERT(cbScanDataBytesUsed == 0); // this should be a new buffer to be processed
memcpy(pbSecBuff, (pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), cbBytesNeeded); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbBytesNeeded; ASSERT(cbTempBuff == cbBlocklength); // will exit while loop now that buffer is full
cbScanDataBytesUsed = cbBytesNeeded; // show number of bytes already processed in new SecBuffer
} }
if (cbTempBuff < cbBlocklength) { // processesed all of the data SecBuffers - now use the padding in the Signature buffer
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Link buffer has %lu bytes - needs %lu. Place into padding.\n", cbTempBuff, cbBlocklength)); ASSERT(ulScanIndex == pSecBuff->cBuffers); // should have exhausted all of the SecBuffers
cbBytesNeeded = cbBlocklength - cbTempBuff;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Put %lu bytes into Signature buffer (should be padding bytes)\n", cbBytesNeeded)); memcpy(pbSignature, (pbTempBuff + cbTempBuff), cbBytesNeeded); cbTempBuff = cbTempBuff + cbBytesNeeded; cbScanDataBytesUsed = cbBytesNeeded; }
// Update current Index and number of DataBytesUsed
// If ulScanIndex is equal to the number of SecBuffers, then we used padding to complete link
*pulIndex = ulScanIndex; // set a marker to where finished link processing
*pcbDataBytesUsed = cbScanDataBytesUsed;
CleanUp:
if (pbTempBuff) { DigestFreeMemory(pbTempBuff); pbTempBuff = NULL; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "LinkBuffersToEncrypt: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DecryptData
//
// Synopsis: Decrypt a data buffer
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN hKey -- symmetric key to utilize
// IN cbData -- number of data bytes to encrypt
// IN pbData -- pointer to data bytes to encrypt
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY DecryptData( IN HCRYPTKEY hKey, IN ULONG cbData, IN OUT UCHAR *pbData ) { ULONG cb = cbData; NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ULONG iTempLen = 20; #endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DecryptData: Entering %lu bytes at 0x%x\n", cbData, pbData));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if (cbData < iTempLen) { iTempLen = cbData; } BinToHex(pbData, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Encrypted Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, cbData, szTemp)); }
iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if (cbData < iTempLen) { iTempLen = cbData; } BinToHex((pbData + cbData - iTempLen), iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Encrypted end of buffer (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, cbData, szTemp)); } #endif
// import the simpleblob to get a handle to the symmetric key
if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &cb)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DecryptData:CryptCreateHash() failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; }
#if DBG
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Decrypted number of bytes %lu\n", cb));
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if (cb < iTempLen) { iTempLen = cb; } BinToHex(pbData, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Decrypted Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, cbData, szTemp)); }
iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if (cb < iTempLen) { iTempLen = cb; } BinToHex((pbData + cb - iTempLen), iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Decrypted end of buffer (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, cbData, szTemp)); } #endif
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DecryptData: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY CalculateSASLHMAC( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN BOOL fSign, IN PSTRING pstrSignKeyConst, IN DWORD dwSeqNum, // Sequence number to process
IN PBYTE pData, // location of data to HMAC
IN ULONG cbData, // How many bytes of data to process
OUT PSASL_MAC_BLOCK pMacBlock) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = NULL; HCRYPTKEY hCryptKey = NULL; HMAC_INFO hmacinfo = {0};
BYTE bKiHashData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
DWORD cbKiHashData = 0; // Size of Message integrity keys
BYTE bHMACData[HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; DWORD cbHMACData = 0;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ULONG iTempLen = 20; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); #endif
ASSERT(pMacBlock);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Entering\n")); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Processing %d bytes in data block\n", cbData));
// Clear the output
ZeroMemory(pMacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
// Initialize local variables
ZeroMemory(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); ZeroMemory(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// Always do an integrety calculation on the input data
// We should have clear text data at this stage
if (!dwSeqNum) { if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pContext->bSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if (pstrSignKeyConst->Length) { if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pstrSignKeyConst->Buffer, pstrSignKeyConst->Length, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } }
cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bKiHashData, &cbKiHashData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL;
ASSERT(cbKiHashData == MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// save the key for later sign/verify use
if (fSign == TRUE) { memcpy(pContext->bKiSignHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } else { memcpy(pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); }
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Calculated Ki hash is %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
} else { // retrieve it from the saved context info
if (fSign == TRUE) { memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiSignHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } else { memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; #if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Ki retrieved from context is %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Ready to start the HMAC calculation\n"));
// We now have Kic or Kis depending on if we are running as server or client
// Now calculate the SASL_MAC_BLOCK structure to compare or set for message
pMacBlock->wMsgType = htons(1); pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber = htonl(dwSeqNum); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: SeqNumber is %ld\n", dwSeqNum));
// Need to create the symmetric key from the cleartext shared secret
// Specified CALC_RC4 since we need to provide a valid encrypt type for import key
// not actually utilized when we do the HMAC which is simply a hash function
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(CALG_RC4, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, bKiHashData, NULL, &hCryptKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Error in CreateSymmetricKey Status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv, CALG_HMAC, hCryptKey, 0, &hHash ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
hmacinfo.HashAlgid = CALG_MD5; // Use MD5 as the hashing function for the HMAC
hmacinfo.cbOuterString = 0; // use default 64 byte outerstring
hmacinfo.cbInnerString = 0; // use default 64 byte innerstring
if ( !CryptSetHashParam( hHash, HP_HMAC_INFO, (PBYTE)&hmacinfo, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptSetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } // Prepend SeqNum to the data stream to perform HMAC on
// Need to form the network order version first
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber, sizeof(DWORD), szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC component SeqNum %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber, sizeof(DWORD), 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
// Now HMAC the data to protect
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); if (cbData < iTempLen) { iTempLen = cbData; } BinToHex(pData, iTempLen, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC component Data (%dof%d bytes) %s\n", iTempLen, cbData, szTemp)); } #endif
if (cbData) { if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, pData, cbData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } }
cbHMACData = HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bHMACData, &cbHMACData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC hash length %d bytes\n", cbHMACData)); ASSERT(cbHMACData == HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey ); hCryptKey = NULL;
CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL;
// We now have the HMAC so form up the MAC block for SASL
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
if (cbHMACData != HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE) { // This should never happen
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 result length incorrect\n")); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 is %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
memcpy(pMacBlock->hmacMD5, bHMACData, SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE);
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)pMacBlock, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 block is %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
CleanUp:
// Release Key resources
if (hCryptKey) { CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey ); hCryptKey = NULL; } // Release Hash resources
if (hHash) { CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY CalculateKc( IN PBYTE pbSessionKey, IN USHORT cbHA1n, IN PSTRING pstrSealKeyConst, IN PBYTE pHashData) // MD5 hash for Kc
{ NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = NULL;
DWORD cbKcHashData = 0; // Size of Message integrity keys
ASSERT(cbHA1n <= MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); ASSERT(cbHA1n > 0);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Entering\n"));
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Binary SessionKey %s\n", szTemp)); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: cbHA1n %d\n", cbHA1n)); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: SealKeyConst %Z\n", pstrSealKeyConst)); #endif
// Clear the output
ZeroMemory(pHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// Kc = MD5( {H(A1)[0...cbHA1n], ConstantString}) take only the first cbHA1n bytes of H(A1)
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pbSessionKey, cbHA1n, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if (pstrSealKeyConst->Length) { if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pstrSealKeyConst->Buffer, pstrSealKeyConst->Length, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } }
cbKcHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash, HP_HASHVAL, pHashData, &cbKcHashData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateKc: readback hash with %d bytes\n", cbKcHashData));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(pHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateKc: Kc hash is %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
CleanUp:
// Release Hash resources
if (hHash) { CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
BYTE DESParityTable[] = {0x00,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02,0x03, 0x01,0x02,0x02,0x03,0x02,0x03,0x03,0x04};
//
// set the parity on the DES key - ODD parity
// NOTE : must be called before deskey
// key must be cbKey number of bytes
// routine from RSA lib
//
void SetDESParity( PBYTE pbKey, DWORD cbKey ) { DWORD i;
for (i=0;i<cbKey;i++) { if (!((DESParityTable[pbKey[i]>>4] + DESParityTable[pbKey[i]&0x0F]) % 2)) pbKey[i] = pbKey[i] ^ 0x01; } }
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: addDESParity
//
// Synopsis: This routine is called for DES plaintext keys to add in Odd parity bits
// Input of 7 bytes will be expanded to 8bytes with parity
// Input of 14 bytes will be expanded to 14 bytes
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN pbSrckey -- buffer with key to expand
// IN cbKey -- size of input non-parity expanded key
// OUT pbOutputkey -- buffer with key to expand
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS AddDESParity( IN PBYTE pbSrcKey, IN DWORD cbSrcKey, OUT PBYTE pbDstKey, OUT PDWORD pcbDstKey ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ASSERT(pbSrcKey); ASSERT(pbDstKey); ASSERT(pcbDstKey);
ZeroMemory(pbDstKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
if ((cbSrcKey != 7) && (cbSrcKey != 14)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "AddDESParity: wrong input size buffer\n")); Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto CleanUp; }
pbDstKey[0] = pbSrcKey[0]; pbDstKey[1] = (pbSrcKey[1] >> 1) | ((pbSrcKey[0] & 0x01) << 7); pbDstKey[2] = (pbSrcKey[2] >> 2) | ((pbSrcKey[1] & 0x03) << 6); pbDstKey[3] = (pbSrcKey[3] >> 3) | ((pbSrcKey[2] & 0x07) << 5); pbDstKey[4] = (pbSrcKey[4] >> 4) | ((pbSrcKey[3] & 0x0F) << 4); pbDstKey[5] = (pbSrcKey[5] >> 5) | ((pbSrcKey[4] & 0x1F) << 3); pbDstKey[6] = (pbSrcKey[6] >> 6) | ((pbSrcKey[5] & 0x3F) << 2); pbDstKey[7] = (pbSrcKey[6] << 1);
SetDESParity(pbDstKey, 8); *pcbDstKey = 8;
// Now check if need to expand the 14 bytes into the full 16 byte buffer
if (cbSrcKey == 14) { pbDstKey[0 + 8] = pbSrcKey[0 + 7]; pbDstKey[1 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[1 + 7] >> 1) | ((pbSrcKey[0 + 7] & 0x01) << 7); pbDstKey[2 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[2 + 7] >> 2) | ((pbSrcKey[1 + 7] & 0x03) << 6); pbDstKey[3 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[3 + 7] >> 3) | ((pbSrcKey[2 + 7] & 0x07) << 5); pbDstKey[4 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[4 + 7] >> 4) | ((pbSrcKey[3 + 7] & 0x0F) << 4); pbDstKey[5 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[5 + 7] >> 5) | ((pbSrcKey[4 + 7] & 0x1F) << 3); pbDstKey[6 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[6 + 7] >> 6) | ((pbSrcKey[5 + 7] & 0x3F) << 2); pbDstKey[7 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[6 + 7] << 1); SetDESParity(pbDstKey + 8, 8); *pcbDstKey = 16; }
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbSrcKey, (UINT)cbSrcKey, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "AddDESParity: Key no-parity : %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(pbDstKey, (UINT)*pcbDstKey, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "AddDESParity: Key expanded with parity : %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
CleanUp:
return Status; }
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: CalculateDataCount
//
// Synopsis: Determine the number of data bytes to process in the SecBuffers
//
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS CalculateDataCount( IN PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, OUT PULONG pulData ) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; USHORT Index = 0; ULONG ulcb = 0; // number of bytes in the actual message
ASSERT(pulData); ASSERT(pSecBuff);
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA) { ulcb = ulcb + pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index].cbBuffer; } }
*pulData = ulcb;
return(Status); }
// Multiple Data buffers in SecBuffer version of CalculateSASLHMAC
// This was added to allow LDAP server to do gather-scatter processing
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY CalculateSASLHMACMulti( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN BOOL fSign, IN PSTRING pstrSignKeyConst, IN DWORD dwSeqNum, // Sequence number to process
IN PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff, // location of data buffers to HMAC
OUT PSASL_MAC_BLOCK pMacBlock) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = NULL; HCRYPTKEY hCryptKey = NULL; HMAC_INFO hmacinfo = {0};
BYTE bKiHashData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
DWORD cbKiHashData = 0; // Size of Message integrity keys
BYTE bHMACData[HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; DWORD cbHMACData = 0;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE]; ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); #endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Entering\n"));
// Clear the output
ZeroMemory(pMacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
// Initialize local variables
ZeroMemory(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); ZeroMemory(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// Always do an integrety calculation on the input data
// We should have clear text data at this stage
if (!dwSeqNum) { if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pContext->bSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
if (pstrSignKeyConst->Length) { if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)pstrSignKeyConst->Buffer, pstrSignKeyConst->Length, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } }
cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bKiHashData, &cbKiHashData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL;
ASSERT(cbKiHashData == MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// save the key for later sign/verify use
if (fSign == TRUE) { memcpy(pContext->bKiSignHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } else { memcpy(pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); }
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Calculated Ki hash is %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
} else { // retrieve it from the saved context info
if (fSign == TRUE) { memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiSignHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } else { memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE); } cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; #if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Ki retrieved from context is %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Ready to start the HMAC calculation\n"));
// We now have Kic or Kis depending on if we are running as server or client
// Now calculate the SASL_MAC_BLOCK structure to compare or set for message
pMacBlock->wMsgType = htons(1); pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber = htonl(dwSeqNum); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: SeqNumber is %ld\n", dwSeqNum));
// Need to create the symmetric key from the cleartext shared secret
// Specified CALC_RC4 since we need to provide a valid encrypt type for import key
// not actually utilized when we do the HMAC which is simply a hash function
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(CALG_RC4, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, bKiHashData, NULL, &hCryptKey); if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Error in CreateSymmetricKey Status 0x%x\n", Status)); goto CleanUp; }
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv, CALG_HMAC, hCryptKey, 0, &hHash ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
hmacinfo.HashAlgid = CALG_MD5; // Use MD5 as the hashing function for the HMAC
hmacinfo.cbOuterString = 0; // use default 64 byte outerstring
hmacinfo.cbInnerString = 0; // use default 64 byte innerstring
if ( !CryptSetHashParam( hHash, HP_HMAC_INFO, (PBYTE)&hmacinfo, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC CryptSetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } // Prepend SeqNum to the data stream to perform HMAC on
// Need to form the network order version first
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber, sizeof(DWORD), szTemp); if (szTemp) { DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC component SeqNum %s\n", szTemp)); } #endif
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (const unsigned char *)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber, sizeof(DWORD), 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
// Now HMAC the data to protect
// Now scan the SecBuffers for Data buffers to process
for (ULONG Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ ) { if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA) { if (pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index].cbBuffer && pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index].pvBuffer) { if ( !CryptHashData( hHash, (PBYTE)pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index].pvBuffer, pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index].cbBuffer, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; } } } }
cbHMACData = HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE; if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bHMACData, &cbHMACData, 0 ) ) { DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError())); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC hash length %d bytes\n", cbHMACData)); ASSERT(cbHMACData == HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey ); hCryptKey = NULL;
CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL;
// We now have the HMAC so form up the MAC block for SASL
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
if (cbHMACData != HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE) { // This should never happen
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC-MD5 result length incorrect\n")); Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED; goto CleanUp; }
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC-MD5 is %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
memcpy(pMacBlock->hmacMD5, bHMACData, SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE);
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE); BinToHex((PUCHAR)pMacBlock, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp); DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: HMAC-MD5 block is %s\n", szTemp)); #endif
CleanUp:
// Release Key resources
if (hCryptKey) { CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey ); hCryptKey = NULL; } // Release Hash resources
if (hHash) { CryptDestroyHash( hHash ); hHash = NULL; }
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMACMulti: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
// Compare the directive values passed in from client on ChallengeResponse to make
// sure that they are the same for subsequent ChallengeResponses
NTSTATUS SEC_ENTRY DigestUserCompareDirectives( IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext, IN PDIGEST_PARAMETER pDigest) { NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; int iAuth = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserCompareDirectives: Entering\n"));
for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++) { switch (iAuth) { case MD5_AUTH_USERNAME: case MD5_AUTH_REALM: case MD5_AUTH_NONCE: case MD5_AUTH_CNONCE: if (!RtlEqualString(&(pContext->strParam[iAuth]), &(pDigest->refstrParam[iAuth]), FALSE)) { Status = SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE; DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserCompareDirectives: Directive value %d mismatch status 0x%x\n", iAuth, Status)); goto CleanUp;
} } }
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserCompareDirectives: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status); }
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