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/*++
Copyright (c) 2001 Microsoft Corporation
Module Name:
ntlmsspv2.c
Abstract:
NTLM v2 specific modules
Author:
Larry Zhu (LZhu) 29-August-2001
Environment: User Mode
Revision History:
--*/
#ifdef MAC
#ifdef SSP_TARGET_CARBON
#include <Carbon/Carbon.h>
#endif
#include <ntlmsspv2.h>
#include <ntlmsspi.h>
#include <ntlmssp.h>
#include <ntstatus.h>
#include <winerror.h>
#include <crypt.h>
#include "debug.h"
#include "macunicode.h"
#endif //MAC
SECURITY_STATUS SspNtStatusToSecStatus( IN NTSTATUS NtStatus, IN SECURITY_STATUS DefaultStatus ) /*++
Routine Description:
Convert an NtStatus code to the corresponding Security status code. For particular errors that are required to be returned as is (for setup code) don't map the errors.
Arguments:
NtStatus - NT status to convert DefaultStatus - default security status if NtStatus is not mapped
Return Value:
Returns security status code.
--*/
{ SECURITY_STATUS SecStatus;
//
// Check for security status and let them through
//
if (HRESULT_FACILITY(NtStatus) == FACILITY_SECURITY) { return (NtStatus); }
switch (NtStatus) { case STATUS_SUCCESS: SecStatus = SEC_E_OK; break;
case STATUS_NO_MEMORY: case STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES: SecStatus = SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; break;
case STATUS_NETLOGON_NOT_STARTED: case STATUS_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_NOT_FOUND: case STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS: case STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN: case STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_PATH: case STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE: case STATUS_TRUSTED_RELATIONSHIP_FAILURE: case STATUS_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE:
SecStatus = SEC_E_NO_AUTHENTICATING_AUTHORITY; break;
case STATUS_NO_SUCH_LOGON_SESSION: SecStatus = SEC_E_UNKNOWN_CREDENTIALS; break;
case STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER: case STATUS_PARTIAL_COPY: SecStatus = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; break;
case STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD: SecStatus = SEC_E_NOT_OWNER; break;
case STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE: SecStatus = SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE; break;
case STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: SecStatus = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
case STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED: SecStatus = SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION; break;
case STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND: case STATUS_NO_TRUST_SAM_ACCOUNT: SecStatus = SEC_E_TARGET_UNKNOWN; break;
case STATUS_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT: case STATUS_NOLOGON_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT: case STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT: case STATUS_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FAILURE: SecStatus = NtStatus; break;
case STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE: case STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER: case STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED: case STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION: case STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT: case STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD: case STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED: case STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED: case STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE: case STATUS_LOGON_TYPE_NOT_GRANTED: SecStatus = SEC_E_LOGON_DENIED; break;
case STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG: case STATUS_ILL_FORMED_PASSWORD:
SecStatus = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; break;
case STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC: SecStatus = SEC_E_TIME_SKEW; break;
case STATUS_SHUTDOWN_IN_PROGRESS: SecStatus = SEC_E_SHUTDOWN_IN_PROGRESS; break;
case STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR: SecStatus = SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR; ASSERT(FALSE); break;
default:
SecStatus = DefaultStatus; break; }
return (SecStatus); }
NTSTATUS SspInitUnicodeStringNoAlloc( IN PCSTR pszSource, IN OUT UNICODE_STRING* pDestination )
/*++
Routine Description:
Initialize unicode string. This routine does not allocate memory.
Arguments:
pszSource - source string pDestination - unicode string
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ #ifndef __MACSSP__
STRING OemString;
RtlInitString(&OemString, pszSource);
return SspOemStringToUnicodeString(pDestination, &OemString, FALSE); #else
UniCharArrayPtr unicodeString = NULL; OSStatus Status = noErr; Status = MacSspCStringToUnicode(pszSource, &pDestination->Length, &unicodeString); if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { _fmemcpy(pDestination->Buffer, unicodeString, pDestination->Length); } return(Status); #endif
}
VOID SspFreeStringEx( IN OUT STRING* pString ) /*++
Routine Description:
Free string.
Arguments:
pString - string to free
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ if (pString->MaximumLength && pString->Buffer) { SspFree(pString->Buffer);
pString->MaximumLength = pString->Length = 0; pString->Buffer = NULL; } }
VOID SspFreeUnicodeString( IN OUT UNICODE_STRING* pUnicodeString )
/*++
Routine Description:
Free unicode string.
Arguments:
pUnicodeString - unicode string to free
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ SspFreeStringEx((STRING *) pUnicodeString); }
#ifdef MAC
VOID SspSwapUnicodeString( IN OUT UNICODE_STRING* pString ) /*++
Routine Description:
Reverse the alignment of each word in the unicode string. Needed for Macintosh only.
Arguments:
pString - The string to modify.
Return Value:
None
--*/ { if (pString->Length) { //
//For mac's we need to reverse each word in the unicode string.
//
USHORT i; for (i = 0; i < (pString->Length/sizeof(USHORT)); i++) { swapshort(pString->Buffer[i]); } } }
#endif
NTSTATUS SsprHandleNtlmv2ChallengeMessage( IN SSP_CREDENTIAL* pCredential, IN ULONG cbChallengeMessage, IN CHALLENGE_MESSAGE* pChallengeMessage, IN OUT ULONG* pNegotiateFlags, IN OUT ULONG* pcbAuthenticateMessage, OUT AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE* pAuthenticateMessage, OUT USER_SESSION_KEY* pContextSessionKey )
/*++
Routine Description:
Handle challenge message and generate authentication message and context session key
Arguments:
pCredential - client credentials cbChallengeMessage - challenge message size pChallengeMessage - challenge message pNegotiateFlags - negotiate flags pcbAuthenticateMessage - size of authentication message pAuthenticateMessage - authentication message pContextSessionKey - context session key
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS NtStatus = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
ULONG cbAuthenticateMessage = 0; UCHAR* pWhere = NULL; BOOLEAN DoUnicode = TRUE;
//
// use a scratch buffer to avoid memory allocation in bootssp
//
CHAR ScrtachBuff[sizeof(MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE) + sizeof(DWORD) + NTLMV2_RESPONSE_LENGTH] = {0};
STRING LmChallengeResponse = {0}; STRING NtChallengeResponse = {0}; STRING DatagramSessionKey = {0};
USHORT Ntlmv2ResponseSize = 0; MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE* pNtlmv2Response = NULL; LM_SESSION_KEY LanmanSessionKey; UNICODE_STRING TargetInfo = {0}; UCHAR DatagramKey[sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)] ={0}; USER_SESSION_KEY NtUserSessionKey;
//
// use pre-allocated buffers to avoid memory allocation in bootssp
//
// to be consistent with LSA/SSPI, allow DNS names in szDomainName and
// szWorkstation
//
CHAR szUserName[(UNLEN + 4) * sizeof(WCHAR)] = {0}; CHAR szDomainName[(DNSLEN + 4) * sizeof(WCHAR)] = {0}; CHAR szWorkstation[(DNSLEN + 4) * sizeof(WCHAR)] = {0};
//
// responses to return to the caller
//
LM_RESPONSE LmResponse; NT_RESPONSE NtResponse; USER_SESSION_KEY ContextSessionKey; ULONG NegotiateFlags = 0; #ifdef MAC
STRING UserName; STRING DomainName; STRING Workstation; UserName.Length = 0; UserName.MaximumLength = sizeof(szUserName); UserName.Buffer = szUserName; DomainName.Length = 0; DomainName.MaximumLength = sizeof(szDomainName); DomainName.Buffer = szDomainName; Workstation.Length = 0; Workstation.MaximumLength = sizeof(szWorkstation); Workstation.Buffer = szWorkstation; #else
STRING UserName = {0, sizeof(szUserName), szUserName}; STRING DomainName = {0, sizeof(szDomainName), szDomainName}; STRING Workstation = {0, sizeof(szWorkstation), szWorkstation}; #endif
_fmemset(&LmResponse, 0, sizeof(LmResponse)); _fmemset(&NtResponse, 0, sizeof(NtResponse)); _fmemset(&LanmanSessionKey, 0, sizeof(LanmanSessionKey)); _fmemset(&NtUserSessionKey, 0, sizeof(NtUserSessionKey)); _fmemset(&ContextSessionKey, 0, sizeof(ContextSessionKey));
if (!pCredential || !pChallengeMessage || !pNegotiateFlags || !pcbAuthenticateMessage || !pContextSessionKey) { return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; }
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Entering SsprHandleNtlmv2ChallengeMessage\n"));
NegotiateFlags = *pNegotiateFlags;
NtStatus = SspInitUnicodeStringNoAlloc(pCredential->Username, (UNICODE_STRING *) &UserName);
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = SspInitUnicodeStringNoAlloc(pCredential->Domain, (UNICODE_STRING *) &DomainName); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = SspInitUnicodeStringNoAlloc(pCredential->Workstation, (UNICODE_STRING *) &Workstation); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = !_fstrcmp(NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, (char *) pChallengeMessage->Signature) && pChallengeMessage->MessageType == NtLmChallenge ? STATUS_SUCCESS : STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { if (pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) { NegotiateFlags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE; NegotiateFlags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM; DoUnicode = TRUE; } else if (pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM) { NegotiateFlags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM; NegotiateFlags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE; DoUnicode = FALSE; } else { NtStatus = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { if (!DoUnicode) { //
// username will be upcased in SspCalculateNtlmv2Owf
//
SspUpcaseUnicodeString((UNICODE_STRING *) &DomainName); SspUpcaseUnicodeString((UNICODE_STRING *) &Workstation); }
if (pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) { NegotiateFlags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO; } else { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO); }
if (pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) { NegotiateFlags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY; } else // (!(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2))
{ NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2); }
if (!(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM)) { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM); }
if (!(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)) { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH); }
if (!(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)) { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY); }
if ((NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM) && (NegotiateFlags & (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN |NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL))) { NegotiateFlags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH; }
if (!(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)) { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56); }
if ((pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128) == 0) { NegotiateFlags &= ~(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128); }
if (pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN) { NegotiateFlags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN; } else { NegotiateFlags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN; }
NtStatus = SspConvertRelativeToAbsolute( pChallengeMessage, cbChallengeMessage, &pChallengeMessage->TargetInfo, DoUnicode, TRUE, // NULL target info OK
(STRING *) &TargetInfo ); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { Ntlmv2ResponseSize = sizeof(MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE) + TargetInfo.Length;
NtStatus = Ntlmv2ResponseSize <= sizeof(ScrtachBuff) ? STATUS_SUCCESS : STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { // C_ASSERT(sizeof(MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE) == sizeof(LM_RESPONSE));
pNtlmv2Response = (MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE *) ScrtachBuff;
NtStatus = SspLm20GetNtlmv2ChallengeResponse( pCredential->NtPassword, (UNICODE_STRING *) &UserName, (UNICODE_STRING *) &DomainName, &TargetInfo, pChallengeMessage->Challenge, pNtlmv2Response, (MSV1_0_LMV2_RESPONSE *) &LmResponse, &NtUserSessionKey, &LanmanSessionKey ); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtChallengeResponse.Buffer = (CHAR *) pNtlmv2Response; NtChallengeResponse.Length = Ntlmv2ResponseSize; LmChallengeResponse.Buffer = (CHAR *) &LmResponse; LmChallengeResponse.Length = sizeof(LmResponse);
//
// prepare to send encrypted randomly generated session key
//
DatagramSessionKey.Buffer = (CHAR *) DatagramKey; DatagramSessionKey.Length = DatagramSessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
//
// Generate the session key, or encrypt the previosly generated random
// one, from various bits of info. Fill in session key if needed.
//
NtStatus = SspMakeSessionKeys( NegotiateFlags, &LmChallengeResponse, &NtUserSessionKey, &LanmanSessionKey, &DatagramSessionKey, &ContextSessionKey ); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus) && !DoUnicode) { NtStatus = SspUpcaseUnicodeStringToOemString((UNICODE_STRING *) &DomainName, &DomainName);
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = SspUpcaseUnicodeStringToOemString((UNICODE_STRING *) &UserName, &UserName); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = SspUpcaseUnicodeStringToOemString((UNICODE_STRING *) &Workstation, &Workstation); } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { cbAuthenticateMessage = sizeof(*pAuthenticateMessage) + LmChallengeResponse.Length + NtChallengeResponse.Length + DomainName.Length + UserName.Length + Workstation.Length + DatagramSessionKey.Length;
NtStatus = cbAuthenticateMessage <= *pcbAuthenticateMessage ? STATUS_SUCCESS : STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
if (NtStatus == STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { *pcbAuthenticateMessage = cbAuthenticateMessage; } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { _fmemset(pAuthenticateMessage, 0, cbAuthenticateMessage);
//
// Build the authenticate message
//
StringCbCopy( (char *)pAuthenticateMessage->Signature, sizeof(pAuthenticateMessage->Signature), NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE );
pAuthenticateMessage->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
pWhere = (UCHAR *) (pAuthenticateMessage + 1);
//
// Copy the strings needing 2 byte alignment.
//
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, &DomainName, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->DomainName );
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, &UserName, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->UserName );
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, &Workstation, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->Workstation );
//
// Copy the strings not needing special alignment.
//
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, (STRING *) &LmChallengeResponse, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->LmChallengeResponse );
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, (STRING *) &NtChallengeResponse, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->NtChallengeResponse );
SspCopyStringAsString32( pAuthenticateMessage, (STRING *) &DatagramSessionKey, &pWhere, &pAuthenticateMessage->SessionKey );
pAuthenticateMessage->NegotiateFlags = NegotiateFlags;
*pcbAuthenticateMessage = cbAuthenticateMessage; *pContextSessionKey = ContextSessionKey; *pNegotiateFlags = NegotiateFlags; }
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Leaving SsprHandleNtlmv2ChallengeMessage %#x\n", NtStatus));
return NtStatus; }
NTSTATUS SspGenerateChallenge( UCHAR ChallengeFromClient[MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH] )
/*++
Routine Description:
Generate a challenge.
Arguments:
ChallengeFromClient - challenge from client
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS NtStatus; MD5_CTX Md5Context; FILETIME CurTime; ULONG ulRandom;
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspGenerateChallenge\n"));
#ifdef USE_CONSTANT_CHALLENGE
_fmemset(ChallengeFromClient, 0, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
#endif
ulRandom = rand(); _fmemcpy(ChallengeFromClient, &ulRandom, sizeof(ULONG)); ulRandom = rand(); _fmemcpy(ChallengeFromClient + sizeof(ULONG), &ulRandom, sizeof(ULONG));
NtStatus = SspGetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&CurTime);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { return NtStatus; }
MD5Init(&Md5Context); MD5Update(&Md5Context, ChallengeFromClient, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)&CurTime, sizeof(CurTime)); MD5Final(&Md5Context);
//
// only take the first half of the MD5 hash
//
_fmemcpy(ChallengeFromClient, Md5Context.digest, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return NtStatus; }
NTSTATUS SspConvertRelativeToAbsolute( IN VOID* pMessageBase, IN ULONG cbMessageSize, IN STRING32* pStringToRelocate, IN BOOLEAN AlignToWchar, IN BOOLEAN AllowNullString, OUT STRING* pOutputString )
/*++
Routine Description:
Convert relative string to absolute string
Arguments:
pMessageBase - message base cbMessageSize - mssage size pStringToRelocate - relative string AlignToWchar - align to wide char AllowNullString - allow null string pOutputString - output string
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ ULONG Offset;
//
// If the buffer is allowed to be null,
// check that special case.
//
if (AllowNullString && (pStringToRelocate->Length == 0)) { pOutputString->MaximumLength = pOutputString->Length = pStringToRelocate->Length; pOutputString->Buffer = NULL; return STATUS_SUCCESS; }
//
// Ensure the string in entirely within the message.
//
Offset = (ULONG)pStringToRelocate->Buffer;
if (Offset >= cbMessageSize || Offset + pStringToRelocate->Length > cbMessageSize) { return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; }
//
// Ensure the buffer is properly aligned.
//
if (AlignToWchar && (!COUNT_IS_ALIGNED(Offset, ALIGN_WCHAR) || !COUNT_IS_ALIGNED(pStringToRelocate->Length, ALIGN_WCHAR))) { return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; }
//
// Finally make the pointer absolute.
//
pOutputString->Buffer = (CHAR*)(pMessageBase) + Offset; pOutputString->MaximumLength = pOutputString->Length = pStringToRelocate->Length ;
return STATUS_SUCCESS; }
NTSTATUS SspUpcaseUnicodeStringToOemString( IN UNICODE_STRING* pUnicodeString, OUT STRING* pOemString )
/*++
Routine Description:
Upcase unicode string and convert it to oem string.
Arguments:
pUnicodeString - uncide string pOemString - OEM string
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ ULONG i;
//
// use a scratch buffer: the strings we encounter are among
// username/domainname/workstationname, hence the length are
// UNLEN maximum
//
CHAR Buffer[2 * (UNLEN + 4)] = {0}; #ifndef MAC
STRING OemString = {0, sizeof(Buffer), Buffer}; #else
STRING OemString; OemString.Length = 0; OemString.MaximumLength = sizeof(Buffer); OemString.Buffer = Buffer; #endif
if (OemString.MaximumLength < pUnicodeString->Length) { return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; }
//
// upcase the unicode string and put it into OemString
//
OemString.Length = pUnicodeString->Length;
for (i = 0; i < pUnicodeString->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); i++) { ((UNICODE_STRING*)(&OemString))->Buffer[i] = RtlUpcaseUnicodeChar(pUnicodeString->Buffer[i]); }
return SspUnicodeStringToOemString((STRING*)(pUnicodeString), (UNICODE_STRING*)(&OemString), FALSE); }
VOID SspUpcaseUnicodeString( IN OUT UNICODE_STRING* pUnicodeString )
/*++
Routine Description:
Upcase unicode string, modifying string in place.
Arguments:
pUnicodeString - string
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ ULONG i;
for (i = 0; i < pUnicodeString->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); i++) { pUnicodeString->Buffer[i] = RtlUpcaseUnicodeChar(pUnicodeString->Buffer[i]); } }
NTSTATUS SspGetSystemTimeAsFileTime( OUT FILETIME* pSystemTimeAsFileTime )
/*++
Routine Description:
Get system time as FILETIME
Arguments:
pSystemTimeAsFileTime system time as FILETIME
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ #if !defined(USE_CONSTANT_CHALLENGE) && defined(MAC)
DWORD dwTime; ULONGLONG time64 = 0; MACFILETIME MacFileTime; #endif
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspGetSystemTimeAsFileTime\n"));
#ifdef USE_CONSTANT_CHALLENGE
_fmemset(pSystemTimeAsFileTime, 0, sizeof(*pSystemTimeAsFileTime));
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
#else
#ifndef MAC
return BlGetSystemTimeAsFileTime(pSystemTimeAsFileTime); #else
//
//The following is from the MacOffice folks. I know is just works...
//
GetDateTime(&dwTime); time64 = dwTime; time64 -= SspMacSecondsFromGMT(); time64 += WINDOWS_MAC_TIME_DIFFERENCE_IN_SECONDS; time64 *= NUM_100ns_PER_SECOND; //
//Get time in FILETIME format.
//
_fmemcpy(&MacFileTime, &time64, sizeof(time64)); pSystemTimeAsFileTime->dwLowDateTime = MacFileTime.dwLowDateTime; pSystemTimeAsFileTime->dwHighDateTime = MacFileTime.dwHighDateTime; swaplong(pSystemTimeAsFileTime->dwLowDateTime); swaplong(pSystemTimeAsFileTime->dwHighDateTime);
return STATUS_SUCCESS; #endif
#endif
}
NTSTATUS SspLm20GetNtlmv2ChallengeResponse( IN NT_OWF_PASSWORD* pNtOwfPassword, IN UNICODE_STRING* pUserName, IN UNICODE_STRING* pLogonDomainName, IN UNICODE_STRING* pTargetInfo, IN UCHAR ChallengeToClient[MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH], OUT MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE* pNtlmv2Response, OUT MSV1_0_LMV2_RESPONSE* pLmv2Response, OUT USER_SESSION_KEY* pNtUserSessionKey, OUT LM_SESSION_KEY* pLmSessionKey )
/*++
Routine Description:
Get NTLMv2 response and session keys. This route fills in time stamps and challenge from client.
Arguments:
pNtOwfPassword - NT OWF pUserName - user name pLogonDomainName - logon domain name pTargetInfo - target info ChallengeToClient - challenge to client pNtlmv2Response - NTLM v2 response pLmv2Response - LM v2 response pNtUserSessionKey - NT user session key pLmSessionKey - LM session key
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS NtStatus;
SspPrint((SSP_API, "Entering SspLm20GetNtlmv2ChallengeResponse\n")); //
// fill in version numbers, timestamp, and client's challenge
//
pNtlmv2Response->RespType = 1; pNtlmv2Response->HiRespType = 1; pNtlmv2Response->Flags = 0; pNtlmv2Response->MsgWord = 0;
NtStatus = SspGetSystemTimeAsFileTime((FILETIME*)(&pNtlmv2Response->TimeStamp));
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { NtStatus = SspGenerateChallenge(pNtlmv2Response->ChallengeFromClient); }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { _fmemcpy(pNtlmv2Response->Buffer, pTargetInfo->Buffer, pTargetInfo->Length);
//
// Calculate Ntlmv2 response, filling in response field
//
SspGetNtlmv2Response( pNtOwfPassword, pUserName, pLogonDomainName, pTargetInfo->Length, ChallengeToClient, pNtlmv2Response, pNtUserSessionKey, pLmSessionKey );
//
// Use same challenge to compute the LMV2 response
//
_fmemcpy(pLmv2Response->ChallengeFromClient, pNtlmv2Response->ChallengeFromClient, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
//
// Calculate LMV2 response
//
SspGetLmv2Response( pNtOwfPassword, pUserName, pLogonDomainName, ChallengeToClient, pLmv2Response->ChallengeFromClient, pLmv2Response->Response ); }
SspPrint((SSP_API, "Leaving SspLm20GetNtlmv2ChallengeResponse %#x\n", NtStatus));
return NtStatus; }
VOID SspGetNtlmv2Response( IN NT_OWF_PASSWORD* pNtOwfPassword, IN UNICODE_STRING* pUserName, IN UNICODE_STRING* pLogonDomainName, IN ULONG TargetInfoLength, IN UCHAR ChallengeToClient[MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH], IN OUT MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE* pNtlmv2Response, OUT USER_SESSION_KEY* pNtUserSessionKey, OUT LM_SESSION_KEY* pLmSessionKey ) /*++
Routine Description:
Get NTLM v2 response.
Arguments:
pNtOwfPassword - NT OWF pUserName - user name pLogonDomainName - logon domain name TargetInfoLength - target info length ChallengeToClient - challenge to client pNtlmv2Response - NTLM v2 response response - response pNtUserSessionKey - NT user session key pLmSessionKey - LM session key
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ HMACMD5_CTX HMACMD5Context; UCHAR Ntlmv2Owf[MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH];
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspGetLmv2Response\n")); //
// get Ntlmv2 OWF
//
SspCalculateNtlmv2Owf( pNtOwfPassword, pUserName, pLogonDomainName, Ntlmv2Owf ); //
// Calculate Ntlmv2 Response
// HMAC(Ntlmv2Owf, (NS, V, HV, T, NC, S))
//
HMACMD5Init( &HMACMD5Context, Ntlmv2Owf, MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, ChallengeToClient, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, &pNtlmv2Response->RespType, (MSV1_0_NTLMV2_INPUT_LENGTH + TargetInfoLength) );
HMACMD5Final( &HMACMD5Context, pNtlmv2Response->Response );
//
// now compute the session keys
// HMAC(Kr, R)
//
HMACMD5Init( &HMACMD5Context, Ntlmv2Owf, MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, pNtlmv2Response->Response, MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Final( &HMACMD5Context, (UCHAR*)(pNtUserSessionKey) );
_fmemcpy(pLmSessionKey, pNtUserSessionKey, sizeof(LM_SESSION_KEY)); }
VOID SspCopyStringAsString32( IN VOID* pMessageBuffer, IN STRING* pInString, IN OUT UCHAR** ppWhere, OUT STRING32* pOutString32 )
/*++
Routine Description:
Copy string as STRING32
Arguments:
pMessageBuffer - STRING32 base pInString - input STRING ppWhere - next empty spot in pMessageBuffer pOutString32 - output STRING32
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ //
// Copy the data to the Buffer
//
if (pInString->Buffer != NULL) { _fmemcpy(*ppWhere, pInString->Buffer, pInString->Length); }
//
// Build a descriptor to the newly copied data
//
pOutString32->Length = pOutString32->MaximumLength = pInString->Length; pOutString32->Buffer = (ULONG)(*ppWhere - (UCHAR*)(pMessageBuffer));
//
// Update Where to point past the copied data
//
*ppWhere += pInString->Length; }
VOID SspCalculateNtlmv2Owf( IN NT_OWF_PASSWORD* pNtOwfPassword, IN UNICODE_STRING* pUserName, IN UNICODE_STRING* pLogonDomainName, OUT UCHAR Ntlmv2Owf[MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH] ) /*++
Routine Description:
Calculate Ntlm v2 OWF, salted with username and logon domain name
Arguments:
pNtOwfPassword - NT OWF pUserName - user name pLogonDomainName - logon domain name Ntlmv2Owf - NTLM v2 OWF
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ HMACMD5_CTX HMACMD5Context;
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspCalculateNtlmv2Owf\n"));
SspUpcaseUnicodeString(pUserName);
//
//For Macintosh computers, we need to change the alignment
//of the unicode strings so it matches windows alignment.
//
#ifdef MAC
SspSwapUnicodeString(pUserName); SspSwapUnicodeString(pLogonDomainName); #endif
//
// Calculate Ntlmv2 OWF -- HMAC(MD4(P), (UserName, LogonDomainName))
//
HMACMD5Init( &HMACMD5Context, (UCHAR *) pNtOwfPassword, sizeof(*pNtOwfPassword) );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, (UCHAR *) pUserName->Buffer, pUserName->Length );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, (UCHAR *) pLogonDomainName->Buffer, pLogonDomainName->Length );
HMACMD5Final( &HMACMD5Context, Ntlmv2Owf );
//
//For Macintosh, we need to set the alignment back to the
//host alignment in case the strings need to be manipulated
//in the future.
//
#ifdef MAC
SspSwapUnicodeString(pUserName); SspSwapUnicodeString(pLogonDomainName); #endif
}
VOID SspGetLmv2Response( IN NT_OWF_PASSWORD* pNtOwfPassword, IN UNICODE_STRING* pUserName, IN UNICODE_STRING* pLogonDomainName, IN UCHAR ChallengeToClient[MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH], IN UCHAR ChallengeFromClient[MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH], OUT UCHAR Response[MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE_LENGTH] )
/*++
Routine Description:
Get LMv2 response
Arguments:
pNtOwfPassword - NT OWF pUserName - user name pLogonDomainName - logon domain name ChallengeToClient - challenge to client pLmv2Response - Lm v2 response Routine - response
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ HMACMD5_CTX HMACMD5Context; UCHAR Ntlmv2Owf[MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH];
C_ASSERT(MD5DIGESTLEN == MSV1_0_NTLMV2_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspGetLmv2Response\n"));
//
// get Ntlmv2 OWF
//
SspCalculateNtlmv2Owf( pNtOwfPassword, pUserName, pLogonDomainName, Ntlmv2Owf );
//
// Calculate Ntlmv2 Response
// HMAC(Ntlmv2Owf, (NS, V, HV, T, NC, S))
//
HMACMD5Init( &HMACMD5Context, Ntlmv2Owf, MSV1_0_NTLMV2_OWF_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, ChallengeToClient, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, ChallengeFromClient, MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH );
HMACMD5Final( &HMACMD5Context, Response );
return; }
NTSTATUS SspMakeSessionKeys( IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN STRING* pLmChallengeResponse, IN USER_SESSION_KEY* pNtUserSessionKey, // from the DC or GetChalResp
IN LM_SESSION_KEY* pLanmanSessionKey, // from the DC of GetChalResp
OUT STRING* pDatagramSessionKey, // this is the session key sent over wire
OUT USER_SESSION_KEY* pContextSessionKey // session key in context
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Make NTLMv2 context session key and DatagramSessionKey.
Arguments:
NegotiateFlags - negotiate flags pLmChallengeResponse - LM challenge response pNtUserSessionKey - NtUserSessionKey pLanmanSessionKey - LanmanSessionKey pDatagramSessionKey - DatagramSessionKey pContextSessionKey - NTLMv2 conext session key
Return Value:
NTSTATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS NtStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; UCHAR pLocalSessionKey[sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)] = {0};
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Entering SspMakeSessionKeys\n"));
if (!(NegotiateFlags & (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN| NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL))) { _fmemcpy(pContextSessionKey, pNtUserSessionKey, sizeof(pLocalSessionKey)); return STATUS_SUCCESS; }
if (NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) { _fmemcpy(pLocalSessionKey, pNtUserSessionKey, sizeof(pLocalSessionKey)); } else if(NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY) { LM_OWF_PASSWORD LmKey; LM_RESPONSE LmResponseKey;
BYTE pTemporaryResponse[LM_RESPONSE_LENGTH] = {0};
if (pLmChallengeResponse->Length > LM_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; }
_fmemcpy(pTemporaryResponse, pLmChallengeResponse->Buffer, pLmChallengeResponse->Length);
_fmemcpy(&LmKey, pLanmanSessionKey, sizeof(LM_SESSION_KEY));
_fmemset((UCHAR*)(&LmKey) + sizeof(LM_SESSION_KEY), NTLMSSP_KEY_SALT, LM_OWF_PASSWORD_LENGTH - sizeof(LM_SESSION_KEY) );
NtStatus = CalculateLmResponse( (LM_CHALLENGE *) pTemporaryResponse, &LmKey, &LmResponseKey );
if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { return NtStatus; }
_fmemcpy(pLocalSessionKey, &LmResponseKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); } else { _fmemcpy(pLocalSessionKey, pNtUserSessionKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); }
if (NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) { struct RC4_KEYSTRUCT Rc4Key;
rc4_key( &Rc4Key, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), pLocalSessionKey );
if (pDatagramSessionKey == NULL) { rc4( &Rc4Key, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), (UCHAR*) pContextSessionKey ); } else { pDatagramSessionKey->Length = pDatagramSessionKey->MaximumLength = sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY);
_fmemcpy(pDatagramSessionKey->Buffer, pContextSessionKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
rc4( &Rc4Key, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), (UCHAR*)(pDatagramSessionKey->Buffer) ); } } else { _fmemcpy(pContextSessionKey, pLocalSessionKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); }
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Leaving SspMakeSessionKeys %#x\n", NtStatus));
return NtStatus; }
VOID SspMakeNtlmv2SKeys( IN USER_SESSION_KEY* pUserSessionKey, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN ULONG SendNonce, IN ULONG RecvNonce, OUT NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys )
/*++
Routine Description:
Derive all NTLMv2 session keys
Arguments:
pUserSessionKey - NTLMv2 user session key NegotiateFlags - negotiate flags SendNonce - send message sequence number RecvNonce - receive message sequence number pNtlmv2Keys - derived NTLMv2 session keys
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ MD5_CTX Md5Context;
C_ASSERT(MD5DIGESTLEN == sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "SspMakeSessionKeys\n"));
if (NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128) { pNtlmv2Keys->KeyLen = 16; } else if (NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56) { pNtlmv2Keys->KeyLen = 7; } else { pNtlmv2Keys->KeyLen = 5; }
//
// make client to server encryption key
//
MD5Init(&Md5Context); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(pUserSessionKey), pNtlmv2Keys->KeyLen); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(CSSEALMAGIC), sizeof(CSSEALMAGIC)); MD5Final(&Md5Context);
_fmemcpy(&pNtlmv2Keys->SealSessionKey, Md5Context.digest, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
//
// make server to client encryption key
//
MD5Init(&Md5Context); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(pUserSessionKey), pNtlmv2Keys->KeyLen); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(SCSEALMAGIC), sizeof(SCSEALMAGIC)); MD5Final(&Md5Context);
_fmemcpy(&pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealSessionKey, Md5Context.digest, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
//
// make client to server signing key -- always 128 bits!
//
MD5Init(&Md5Context); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(pUserSessionKey), sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(CSSIGNMAGIC), sizeof(CSSIGNMAGIC)); MD5Final(&Md5Context);
_fmemcpy(&pNtlmv2Keys->SignSessionKey, Md5Context.digest, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
//
// make server to client signing key
//
MD5Init(&Md5Context); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(pUserSessionKey), sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); MD5Update(&Md5Context, (UCHAR*)(SCSIGNMAGIC), sizeof(SCSIGNMAGIC)); MD5Final(&Md5Context);
_fmemcpy(&pNtlmv2Keys->VerifySessionKey, Md5Context.digest, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
//
// set pointers to different key schedule and nonce for each direction
// key schedule will be filled in later...
//
pNtlmv2Keys->pSealRc4Sched = &pNtlmv2Keys->SealRc4Sched; pNtlmv2Keys->pUnsealRc4Sched = &pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealRc4Sched; pNtlmv2Keys->pSendNonce = &pNtlmv2Keys->SendNonce; pNtlmv2Keys->pRecvNonce = &pNtlmv2Keys->RecvNonce;
pNtlmv2Keys->SendNonce = SendNonce; pNtlmv2Keys->RecvNonce = RecvNonce; rc4_key(&pNtlmv2Keys->SealRc4Sched, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), (UCHAR*)(&pNtlmv2Keys->SealSessionKey)); rc4_key(&pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealRc4Sched, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), (UCHAR*)(&pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealSessionKey)); }
NTSTATUS SspSignSealHelper( IN NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN eSignSealOp Op, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, IN OUT SecBufferDesc* pMessage, OUT NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE* pSig, OUT NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE** ppSig )
/*++
Routine Description:
Helper function for signing/sealing/unsealing/verifying.
Arguments:
pNtlmv2Keys - key materials NegotiateFlags - negotiate Flags Op - which operation to performance MessageSeqNo - message sequence number pMessage - message buffer descriptor pSig - result signature ppSig - address of the signature token in message buffer descriptor pMessage
Return Value:
SECURITY_STATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS NtStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HMACMD5_CTX HMACMD5Context; UCHAR TempSig[MD5DIGESTLEN]; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE Sig; int Signature; ULONG i; PUCHAR pKey = NULL; // ptr to key to use for encryption
PUCHAR pSignKey = NULL; // ptr to key to use for signing
PULONG pNonce = NULL; // ptr to nonce to use
struct RC4_KEYSTRUCT* pRc4Sched = NULL; // ptr to key schedule to use
NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE AlignedSig; // aligned copy of input sig data
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Entering SspSignSealHelper NegotiateFlags %#x, eSignSealOp %d\n", NegotiateFlags, Op));
Signature = -1; for (i = 0; i < pMessage->cBuffers; i++) { if ((pMessage->pBuffers[i].BufferType & 0xFF) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN) { Signature = i; break; } }
if (Signature == -1) { NtStatus = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { if (pMessage->pBuffers[Signature].cbBuffer < sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE)) { NtStatus = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { *ppSig = (NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE*)(pMessage->pBuffers[Signature].pvBuffer);
_fmemcpy(&AlignedSig, *ppSig, sizeof(AlignedSig));
//
// If sequence detect wasn't requested, put on an empty security token.
// Don't do the check if Seal/Unseal is called
//
if (!(NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) && (Op == eSign || Op == eVerify)) { _fmemset(pSig, 0, sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE)); pSig->Version = NTLM_SIGN_VERSION; NtStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS; } }
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { switch (Op) { case eSeal: pSignKey = pNtlmv2Keys->SignSessionKey; // if NTLM2
pKey = pNtlmv2Keys->SealSessionKey; pRc4Sched = pNtlmv2Keys->pSealRc4Sched; pNonce = pNtlmv2Keys->pSendNonce; break; case eUnseal: pSignKey = pNtlmv2Keys->VerifySessionKey; // if NTLM2
pKey = pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealSessionKey; pRc4Sched = pNtlmv2Keys->pUnsealRc4Sched; pNonce = pNtlmv2Keys->pRecvNonce; break; case eSign: pSignKey = pNtlmv2Keys->SignSessionKey; // if NTLM2
pKey = pNtlmv2Keys->SealSessionKey; // might be used to encrypt the signature
pRc4Sched = pNtlmv2Keys->pSealRc4Sched; pNonce = pNtlmv2Keys->pSendNonce; break; case eVerify: pSignKey = pNtlmv2Keys->VerifySessionKey; // if NTLM2
pKey = pNtlmv2Keys->UnsealSessionKey; // might be used to decrypt the signature
pRc4Sched = pNtlmv2Keys->pUnsealRc4Sched; pNonce = pNtlmv2Keys->pRecvNonce; break; default: NtStatus = (STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL); break; } }
//
// Either we can supply the sequence number, or the application can supply
// the message sequence number.
//
if (NT_SUCCESS(NtStatus)) { Sig.Version = NTLM_SIGN_VERSION;
if ((NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_APP_SEQ) == 0) { Sig.Nonce = *pNonce; // use our sequence number
(*pNonce) += 1; } else { if (Op == eSeal || Op == eSign || MessageSeqNo != 0) { Sig.Nonce = MessageSeqNo; } else { Sig.Nonce = AlignedSig.Nonce; }
//
// if using RC4, must rekey for each packet RC4 is used for seal,
// unseal; and for encrypting the HMAC hash if key exchange was
// negotiated (we use just HMAC if no key exchange, so that a good
// signing option exists with no RC4 encryption needed)
//
if (Op == eSeal || Op == eUnseal || NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) { MD5_CTX Md5ContextReKey; C_ASSERT(MD5DIGESTLEN == sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
MD5Init(&Md5ContextReKey); MD5Update(&Md5ContextReKey, pKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY)); MD5Update(&Md5ContextReKey, (unsigned char*)&Sig.Nonce, sizeof(Sig.Nonce)); MD5Final(&Md5ContextReKey); rc4_key(pRc4Sched, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY), Md5ContextReKey.digest); } }
//
// using HMAC hash, init it with the key
//
HMACMD5Init(&HMACMD5Context, pSignKey, sizeof(USER_SESSION_KEY));
//
// include the message sequence number
//
HMACMD5Update(&HMACMD5Context, (unsigned char*)&Sig.Nonce, sizeof(Sig.Nonce));
for (i = 0; i < pMessage->cBuffers; i++) { if (((pMessage->pBuffers[i].BufferType & 0xFF) == SECBUFFER_DATA) && (pMessage->pBuffers[i].cbBuffer != 0)) { //
// decrypt (before checksum...) if it's not READ_ONLY
//
if ((Op == eUnseal) && !(pMessage->pBuffers[i].BufferType & SECBUFFER_READONLY)) { rc4( pRc4Sched, pMessage->pBuffers[i].cbBuffer, (UCHAR*)(pMessage->pBuffers[i].pvBuffer) ); }
HMACMD5Update( &HMACMD5Context, (UCHAR*)(pMessage->pBuffers[i].pvBuffer), pMessage->pBuffers[i].cbBuffer );
//
// Encrypt if its not READ_ONLY
//
if ((Op == eSeal) && !(pMessage->pBuffers[i].BufferType & SECBUFFER_READONLY)) { rc4( pRc4Sched, pMessage->pBuffers[i].cbBuffer, (UCHAR*)(pMessage->pBuffers[i].pvBuffer) ); } } }
HMACMD5Final(&HMACMD5Context, TempSig);
//
// use RandomPad and Checksum fields for 8 bytes of MD5 hash
//
_fmemcpy(&Sig.RandomPad, TempSig, 8);
//
// if we're using crypto for KEY_EXCH, may as well use it for signing too
//
if (NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) { rc4( pRc4Sched, 8, (UCHAR*)(&Sig.RandomPad) ); }
_fmemcpy(pSig, &Sig, sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE)); }
SspPrint((SSP_NTLMV2, "Leaving SspSignSealHelper %#x\n", NtStatus));
return STATUS_SUCCESS; }
SECURITY_STATUS SspNtlmv2MakeSignature( IN NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN ULONG fQOP, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, IN OUT SecBufferDesc* pMessage )
/*++
Routine Description:
Make signature of a message
Arguments:
pNtlmv2Keys - key materials NegotiateFlags - negotiate Flags fQOP - quality of protection MessageSeqNo - message Sequence Number pMessage - message buffer descriptor
Return Value:
SECURITY_STATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE Sig; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE *pSig;
Status = SspSignSealHelper( pNtlmv2Keys, NegotiateFlags, eSign, MessageSeqNo, pMessage, &Sig, &pSig );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { _fmemcpy(pSig, &Sig, sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE)); }
return SspNtStatusToSecStatus(Status, SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR); }
SECURITY_STATUS SspNtlmv2VerifySignature( IN NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, IN OUT SecBufferDesc* pMessage, OUT ULONG* pfQOP )
/*++
Routine Description:
Verify signature of a message
Arguments:
pNtlmv2Keys - key materials NegotiateFlags - negotiate Flags MessageSeqNo - message Sequence Number pMessage - message buffer descriptor pfQOP - quality of protection
Return Value:
SECURITY_STATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE Sig; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE* pSig; // pointer to buffer with sig in it
NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE AlignedSig; // Aligned sig buffer.
Status = SspSignSealHelper( pNtlmv2Keys, NegotiateFlags, eVerify, MessageSeqNo, pMessage, &Sig, &pSig );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { _fmemcpy(&AlignedSig, pSig, sizeof(AlignedSig));
if (AlignedSig.Version != NTLM_SIGN_VERSION) { return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; }
//
// validate the signature...
//
if (AlignedSig.CheckSum != Sig.CheckSum) { return SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; }
//
// with MD5 sig, this now matters!
//
if (AlignedSig.RandomPad != Sig.RandomPad) { return SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; }
if (AlignedSig.Nonce != Sig.Nonce) { return SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; } }
return SspNtStatusToSecStatus(Status, SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR); }
SECURITY_STATUS SspNtlmv2SealMessage( IN NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN ULONG fQOP, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, IN OUT SecBufferDesc* pMessage )
/*++
Routine Description:
Seal a message
Arguments:
pNtlmv2Keys - key materials NegotiateFlags - negotiate Flags fQOP - quality of protection MessageSeqNo - message Sequence Number pMessage - message buffer descriptor
Return Value:
SECURITY_STATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE Sig; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE* pSig; // pointer to buffer where sig goes
ULONG i;
Status = SspSignSealHelper( pNtlmv2Keys, NegotiateFlags, eSeal, MessageSeqNo, pMessage, &Sig, &pSig );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { _fmemcpy(pSig, &Sig, sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE));
//
// for gss style sign/seal, strip the padding as RC4 requires none.
// (in fact, we rely on this to simplify the size computation in
// DecryptMessage). if we support some other block cipher, need to rev
// the NTLM_ token version to make blocksize
//
for (i = 0; i < pMessage->cBuffers; i++) { if ((pMessage->pBuffers[i].BufferType & 0xFF) == SECBUFFER_PADDING) { //
// no padding required!
//
pMessage->pBuffers[i].cbBuffer = 0; break; } } }
return SspNtStatusToSecStatus(Status, SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR); }
SECURITY_STATUS SspNtlmv2UnsealMessage( IN NTLMV2_DERIVED_SKEYS* pNtlmv2Keys, IN ULONG NegotiateFlags, IN ULONG MessageSeqNo, IN OUT SecBufferDesc* pMessage, OUT ULONG* pfQOP )
/*++
Routine Description:
Unseal a message
Arguments:
pNtlmv2Keys - key materials NegotiateFlags - negotiate Flags MessageSeqNo - message Sequence Number pMessage - message buffer descriptor pfQOP - quality of protection
Return Value:
SECURITY_STATUS
--*/
{ NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE Sig; NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE* pSig; // pointer to buffer where sig goes
NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE AlignedSig; // aligned buffer.
SecBufferDesc* pMessageBuffers = pMessage; ULONG Index; SecBuffer* pSignatureBuffer = NULL; SecBuffer* pStreamBuffer = NULL; SecBuffer* pDataBuffer = NULL; SecBufferDesc ProcessBuffers; SecBuffer wrap_bufs[2];
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pMessageBuffers->cBuffers; Index++) { if ((pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index].BufferType & ~SECBUFFER_ATTRMASK) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN) { pSignatureBuffer = &pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index]; } else if ((pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index].BufferType & ~SECBUFFER_ATTRMASK) == SECBUFFER_STREAM) { pStreamBuffer = &pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index]; } else if ((pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index].BufferType & ~SECBUFFER_ATTRMASK) == SECBUFFER_DATA) { pDataBuffer = &pMessageBuffers->pBuffers[Index]; } }
if (pStreamBuffer != NULL) { if (pSignatureBuffer != NULL) { return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; }
//
// for version 1 NTLM blobs, padding is never present, since RC4 is
// stream cipher
//
wrap_bufs[0].cbBuffer = sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE); wrap_bufs[1].cbBuffer = pStreamBuffer->cbBuffer - sizeof(NTLMSSP_MESSAGE_SIGNATURE);
if (pStreamBuffer->cbBuffer < wrap_bufs[0].cbBuffer) { return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; }
wrap_bufs[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; wrap_bufs[0].pvBuffer = pStreamBuffer->pvBuffer;
wrap_bufs[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA; wrap_bufs[1].pvBuffer = (PBYTE)wrap_bufs[0].pvBuffer + wrap_bufs[0].cbBuffer;
if (pDataBuffer == NULL) { return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; }
pDataBuffer->cbBuffer = wrap_bufs[1].cbBuffer; pDataBuffer->pvBuffer = wrap_bufs[1].pvBuffer;
ProcessBuffers.cBuffers = 2; ProcessBuffers.pBuffers = wrap_bufs; ProcessBuffers.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; } else { ProcessBuffers = *pMessageBuffers; }
Status = SspSignSealHelper( pNtlmv2Keys, NegotiateFlags, eUnseal, MessageSeqNo, &ProcessBuffers, &Sig, &pSig );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) { _fmemcpy(&AlignedSig, pSig, sizeof(AlignedSig));
if (AlignedSig.Version != NTLM_SIGN_VERSION) { return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN; }
//
// validate the signature...
//
if (AlignedSig.CheckSum != Sig.CheckSum) { return SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; }
if (AlignedSig.RandomPad != Sig.RandomPad) { return SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED; }
if (AlignedSig.Nonce != Sig.Nonce) { return SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; } }
return SspNtStatusToSecStatus(Status, SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR); }
#ifdef MAC
VOID SspSwapString32Bytes( IN STRING32* pString )
/*++
Routine Description:
Take a STRING32 struct and swap it's bytes (big and little endian).
Arguments:
pString - the STRING32 to swap
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ swapshort(pString->Length); swapshort(pString->MaximumLength); swaplong(pString->Buffer); }
VOID SspSwapChallengeMessageBytes( IN CHALLENGE_MESSAGE* pChallengeMessage ) /*++
Routine Description:
Make sure all the fields are in big endian format before parsing the fields. This routine is only usefull when this code is running on machines that align bigendian (ie. Macintosh computers).
Arguments:
pChallengeMessage - the challenge message to swap
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ if (pChallengeMessage) { swaplong(pChallengeMessage->NegotiateFlags); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pChallengeMessage->TargetName); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pChallengeMessage->TargetInfo); } }
VOID SspSwapAuthenticateMessageBytes( IN AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE* pAuthenticateMessage )
/*++
Routine Description:
Make sure all the fields are in little endian format before sending to a Windows server. This routine is only usefull when this code is running on machines that align bigendian (ie. Macintosh computers).
Arguments:
pAuthenticateMessage - the authentication message to swap
Return Value:
none
--*/
{ if (pAuthenticateMessage) { SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->LmChallengeResponse); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->NtChallengeResponse); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->DomainName); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->UserName); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->Workstation); SspSwapString32Bytes(&pAuthenticateMessage->SessionKey); swaplong(pAuthenticateMessage->NegotiateFlags); } }
LONG SspMacSecondsFromGMT(void)
/*++
Routine Description:
Get the numbers of seconds from GMT on Macintosh computers.
Arguments:
None.
Return Value:
LONG - seconds from GMT (in mac time format)
--*/
{ MachineLocation location; DWORD secondsFromGMT; ReadLocation(&location); secondsFromGMT = location.u.gmtDelta & 0x00FFFFFF; if (secondsFromGMT & 0x00800000) secondsFromGMT |= 0xFF000000; return secondsFromGMT; }
#endif
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