//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
//  Microsoft Windows
//
//  Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation, 1990 - 1999
//
//  File:       util.hxx
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------

/* --------------------------------------------------------------------
Internal Header File for RPC Runtime Library
-------------------------------------------------------------------- */

#ifndef __UTIL_HXX__
#define __UTIL_HXX__

#ifndef __SYSINC_H__
#error Needs sysinc.h
#endif

START_C_EXTERN

#ifndef ARGUMENT_PRESENT
#define ARGUMENT_PRESENT(Argument) (Argument != 0)
#endif // ARGUMENT_PRESENT

#ifdef NULL
#undef NULL
#endif

#define NULL (0)
#define Nil 0

#ifdef TRUE
#undef TRUE
#endif

#ifdef FALSE
#undef FALSE
#endif

#define _NOT_COVERED_        (0)

#define FALSE (0)
#define TRUE (1)

//
// Expose the external logging hook on all builds.
//
#define RPC_ENABLE_WMI_TRACE
#define RPC_ERROR_LOGGING

#ifdef DBG
//#define RPC_ENABLE_TEST_HOOKS
#ifndef RPC_LOGGING
#define RPC_LOGGING
#endif
#endif

unsigned long
SomeLongValue (
    );

unsigned short
SomeShortValue (
    );

unsigned short
AnotherShortValue (
    );

unsigned char
SomeCharacterValue (
    );

extern int
RpcpCheckHeap (
    void
    );

int
IsMgmtIfUuid(
   UUID PAPI * Uuid
   );

END_C_EXTERN

void
PerformGarbageCollection (
    void
    );

BOOL
GarbageCollectionNeeded (
    IN BOOL fOneTimeCleanup,
    IN unsigned long GarbageCollectInterval
    );

RPC_STATUS CreateGarbageCollectionThread (
    void
    );

RPC_STATUS
EnableIdleConnectionCleanup (
    void
    );

RPC_STATUS
EnableIdleLrpcSContextsCleanup (
    void
    );

void
GetMaxRpcSizeAndThreadPoolParameters (
    void
    );

#ifdef RPC_DELAYED_INITIALIZATION
extern int RpcHasBeenInitialized;

extern RPC_STATUS
PerformRpcInitialization (
    void
    );

#define InitializeIfNecessary() \
    if ( RpcHasBeenInitialized == 0 ) \
        { \
        RPC_STATUS RpcStatus; \
        \
        RpcStatus = PerformRpcInitialization(); \
        if ( RpcStatus != RPC_S_OK ) \
            return(RpcStatus); \
        }


#define AssertRpcInitialized() ASSERT( RpcHasBeenInitialized != 0 )

#else /* RPC_DELAYED_INITIALIZATION */

#define InitializeIfNecessary()
#define AssertRpcInitialized()
#define PerformRpcInitialization()

#endif /* RPC_DELAYED_INITIALIZATION */

RPC_CHAR *
DuplicateString (
    IN const RPC_CHAR PAPI * String
    );

PSID
DuplicateSID (
    IN const PSID Sid
    );

// trick the compiler into statically initializing SID with two SubAuthorities
typedef struct _RPC_SID2 {
   UCHAR Revision;
   UCHAR SubAuthorityCount;
   SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY IdentifierAuthority;
   ULONG SubAuthority[2];
} RPC_SID2;

extern const SID LocalSystem;
extern const SID LocalService;
extern const SID NetworkService;
extern const RPC_SID2 Admin1;

RPC_STATUS
RpcpLookupAccountName (
    IN RPC_CHAR *ServerPrincipalName,
    IN OUT BOOL *fCache,
    OUT PSID *Sid
    );

RPC_STATUS
RpcpLookupAccountNameDirect (
    IN RPC_CHAR *ServerPrincipalName,
    OUT PSID *Sid
    );

RPC_STATUS
RpcpLookupAccountSid (
    IN PSID Sid,
    OUT RPC_CHAR **ServerPrincipalName
    );

#ifdef UNICODE
extern RPC_STATUS
AnsiToUnicodeString (
    IN unsigned char * String,
    OUT UNICODE_STRING * UnicodeString
    );
extern unsigned char *
UnicodeToAnsiString (
    IN RPC_CHAR * WideCharString,
    OUT RPC_STATUS * RpcStatus
    );
#endif // UNICODE

void
DestroyContextHandlesForGuard (
    IN PVOID Context,
    IN BOOL RundownContextHandle,
    IN void *CtxGuard
    );

// forward definition
class ContextCollection;

RPC_STATUS
NDRSContextInitializeCollection (
    IN ContextCollection **ContextCollectionPlaceholder
    );

#if DBG
void
RpcpInterfaceForCallDoesNotUseStrict (
    IN RPC_BINDING_HANDLE BindingHandle
    );
#endif

inline unsigned short
RpcpByteSwapShort (unsigned short Value)
{
   return (RtlUshortByteSwap(Value));
}

inline unsigned long
RpcpByteSwapLong (unsigned long Value)
{

    return (RtlUlongByteSwap(Value));
}

typedef union tagFastCopyLUIDAccess
{
    LUID Luid;
    __int64 FastAccess;
} FastCopyLUIDAccess;

inline void FastCopyLUIDAligned (LUID *TargetLUID, const LUID *SourceLUID)
{
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveSourceLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)SourceLUID;
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveTargetLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)TargetLUID;

#if defined(_WIN64)
    ASSERT((((ULONG_PTR)EffectiveSourceLUID) % 8) == 0);
    ASSERT((((ULONG_PTR)EffectiveTargetLUID) % 8) == 0);
#endif

    EffectiveTargetLUID->FastAccess = EffectiveSourceLUID->FastAccess;
}

inline void FastCopyLUID (LUID *TargetLUID, LUID *SourceLUID)
{
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveSourceLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)SourceLUID;
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveTargetLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)TargetLUID;

#if !defined(_WIN64)
    FastCopyLUIDAligned(TargetLUID, SourceLUID);
#else
    TargetLUID->HighPart = SourceLUID->HighPart;
    TargetLUID->LowPart = SourceLUID->LowPart;
#endif
}

// returns non-zero if equal
inline BOOL FastCompareLUIDAligned (const LUID *TargetLUID, const LUID *SourceLUID)
{
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveSourceLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)SourceLUID;
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveTargetLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)TargetLUID;

#if defined(_WIN64)
    ASSERT((((ULONG_PTR)EffectiveSourceLUID) % 8) == 0);
    ASSERT((((ULONG_PTR)EffectiveTargetLUID) % 8) == 0);
#endif

    return (EffectiveTargetLUID->FastAccess == EffectiveSourceLUID->FastAccess);
}

inline BOOL FastCompareLUID (LUID *TargetLUID, LUID *SourceLUID)
{
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveSourceLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)SourceLUID;
    FastCopyLUIDAccess *EffectiveTargetLUID = (FastCopyLUIDAccess *)TargetLUID;

#if !defined(_WIN64)
    return FastCompareLUIDAligned(TargetLUID, SourceLUID);
#else
    return ((TargetLUID->HighPart == SourceLUID->HighPart)
            && (TargetLUID->LowPart == SourceLUID->LowPart));
#endif
}

// zeroes out everything b/n the two fields, including the first field,
// but excluding the second
#define RPCP_ZERO_OUT_STRUCT_RANGE(Type, Instance, Field1, Field2)    \
    RpcpMemorySet(((char *)(Instance)) + FIELD_OFFSET(Type, Field1), 0, FIELD_OFFSET(Type, Field2) - FIELD_OFFSET(Type, Field1))

// zeroes out everything from a field to the end including the field
#define RPCP_ZERO_OUT_STRUCT_TAIL(Type, Instance, Field)    \
    RpcpMemorySet(((char *)(Instance)) + FIELD_OFFSET(Type, Field), 0, sizeof(Type) - FIELD_OFFSET(Type, Field))

PUNICODE_STRING
FastGetImageBaseNameUnicodeString (
    void
    );

const RPC_CHAR *
FastGetImageBaseName (
    void
    );

//
// System features - constant after InitializeIfNecessary.
//
// Just contants on non-NT systems
//

extern DWORD gPageSize;
extern DWORD gThreadTimeout;
extern UINT  gNumberOfProcessors;
extern DWORD gMaxRpcSize;
extern DWORD gProrateStart;
extern DWORD gProrateMax;
extern DWORD gProrateFactor;
extern BOOL  gfServerPlatform;
extern ULONGLONG gPhysicalMemorySize;  // in megabytes

extern DWORD gProcessStartTime;

// The local machine's name.
extern RPC_CHAR *gLocalComputerName;
// The length of the name in TCHAR's including the terminating NULL.
extern DWORD gLocalComputerNameLength;

//
// RPC Verifier settings
//

extern BOOL gfAppVerifierEnabled;
extern BOOL gfRPCVerifierEnabled;

// Corruption patterns:
// ZeroOut - memory is zeroed-out
// Negate - 0xff pattern is written
// BitFlip - a random bit is flipped
// IncDec - a byte is incremented or decremented
// Randomize - a random byte is written
// One of the above patterns is used at random
enum tCorruptionPattern {ZeroOut, Negate, BitFlip, IncDec, Randomize, AllPatterns=100};

// When choosing a random corruption pattern to apply, we will pick one from this range.
#define MIN_CORRUPTION_PATTERN_ID (0)
#define MAX_CORRUPTION_PATTERN_ID (4)

// Corruption can be of a fixed or random size.
enum tCorruptionSizeType {FixedSize, RandomSize};

// Corruption may be spacially localized or randomized.
// When it is localized, a sub-sequence of the buffer will be corrupted.
// When it is randomized, random elements of the buffer will be corrupted.
enum tCorruptionDistributionType {LocalizedDistribution, RandomizedDistribution};

//
// All of the RPC verifier settings are contained in a single
// structure.  We will allocate and initialize it iff
// the RPC verifier is enabled.
//
typedef struct _tRpcVerifierSettings
    {
    // Fault injecting ImpersonateClient calls

    BOOL fFaultInjectImpersonateClient;

    // Proabilities are integers 1-10000. 10000 is p=1.
    unsigned int ProbFaultInjectImpersonateClient;
    // Delay in seconds before the start of fault injection.
    unsigned int DelayFaultInjectImpersonateClient;

    // Corruption injecting the data

    BOOL fCorruptionInjectServerReceives;
    BOOL fCorruptionInjectClientReceives;

    // Proabilities of corruption are integers 1-10000. 10000 is p=1.
    unsigned int ProbRpcHeaderCorruption;
    unsigned int ProbDataCorruption;
    unsigned int ProbSecureDataCorruption;

    tCorruptionPattern CorruptionPattern;

    tCorruptionSizeType CorruptionSizeType;

    // For Fixed size - set the size of the corruption in bytes
    // For Random size - set the maximum size of the corruption.
    // Actual size may be between 1 and gCorruptionSize
    unsigned int CorruptionSize;

    tCorruptionDistributionType CorruptionDistributionType;

    unsigned int ProbBufferTruncation;
    unsigned int MaxBufferTruncationSize;

    // Fault injecting transport failures.

    BOOL fFaultInjectTransports;
    unsigned int ProbFaultInjectTransports;

    // Injecting pauses into calls to external APIs

    BOOL fPauseInjectExternalAPIs;
    unsigned int ProbPauseInjectExternalAPIs;
    unsigned int PauseInjectExternalAPIsMaxWait;

    // Initialized to True if the process is running under a high-priv account.
    // This is used to detect if privileges are being leaked.
    BOOL IsHighPrivilege;

    // Optionally supressing app verifier breaks on bad RPC practictices.
    BOOL fSupressAppVerifierBreaks;

    // Causes RPC to switch to the allocation off a read-only paged heap.
    // Each allocation off the heap is guarded by a read-only page.  This
    // catches AV's but still allows NDR to walk of the end of buffers a little.
    BOOL fReadonlyPagedHeap;

} tRpcVerifierSettings;

extern tRpcVerifierSettings *pRpcVerifierSettings;

//
// Macros for some common conditions and states.
//

extern BOOL gfRpcVerifierCorruptionExpected;

#define gfRpcVerifierCorruptionInjectClientReceives \
        ( \
        gfRPCVerifierEnabled && \
        pRpcVerifierSettings->fCorruptionInjectClientReceives \
        )

#define gfRpcVerifierCorruptionInjectServerReceives \
        ( \
        gfRPCVerifierEnabled && \
        pRpcVerifierSettings->fCorruptionInjectServerReceives \
        )

#define gfRpcVerifierSupressAppVerifierBreaks (pRpcVerifierSettings->fSupressAppVerifierBreaks)

#define gfRPCVerifierEnabledWithBreaks (gfRPCVerifierEnabled && !gfRpcVerifierSupressAppVerifierBreaks)

// When defined, this macro builds a private with corruption injection for lrpc.
//#define RPC_LRPC_CORRUPTION

//
// RPC Verifier utility functions
//

// Generates a boolean with P(True)=Prob/10000.
inline BOOL
RndBool(
    unsigned int Prob
    );

// The buffer types passed to the corruption injection routine.
enum tBufferType {ServerReceive, ClientReceive};

// Injects corruption into a buffer
extern void
CorruptionInject(
    tBufferType BufferType,
    unsigned int *pBufferLength,
    void **pBuffer
    );

extern void
PrintCurrentStackTrace(
    unsigned int FramesToSkip,
    unsigned int Size
    );

extern void
PrintUUID(
    GUID *guid
    );

#define RPC_VERIFIER_PRINT_OFFENDING_STACK(FramesToSkip, FramesToPrint) \
    DbgPrint("RPC: Offending Stack:\n"); \
    PrintCurrentStackTrace(FramesToSkip, FramesToPrint); \
    DbgPrint("RPC: To determine the symbolic stack, do an \"ln\" on the above addresses in the context of the faulting process.\n\n")

//
// Macros used to print app verifier warnings.
//

#define RPC_VERIFIER_UNSECURE_IF_REMOTELY_ACCESSIBLE (0x10)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_DISABLING_SELECTIVE_BINDING (0x20)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_WEAK_SECURITY_FOR_REMOTE_CALL (0x30)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_UNSAFE_PROTOCOL (0x40)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_UNSAFE_FEATURE (0x50)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_NO_LOCAL_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION (0x60)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_REGISTERING_NONROBUST_IF (0x70)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_ARGUMENTS_IGNORED (0x80)
#define RPC_VERIFIER_PRIVILEGE_LEAK (0x90)

#define RPC_VERIFIER_WARNING_MSG(Msg, WarningType) \
        VERIFIER_STOP(APPLICATION_VERIFIER_RPC_ERROR | APPLICATION_VERIFIER_NO_BREAK, \
                      Msg, WarningType, "RpcWarningType", 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL); \

//
// RPC Verifier debuging macros
//

// Macro used to assert when corruption injection is not enabled.
// This allows us to run with corruption injection on checked builds without
// triggering the asserts that catch corruption.
#if DBG
#define CORRUPTION_ASSERT(cond) \
if (!gfRpcVerifierCorruptionExpected) \
    { \
    ASSERT(cond); \
    }
#else // DBG
#define CORRUPTION_ASSERT(cond) ((void) 0)
#endif // DBG

// Set when building a private with verifier
// debugging spew.
//#define VERIFIER_DBG

#ifdef VERIFIER_DBG
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_0(s) DbgPrint(s)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_1(s, x1) DbgPrint(s, x1)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_2(s, x1, x2) DbgPrint(s, x1, x2)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_3(s, x1, x2, x3) DbgPrint(s, x1, x2, x3)
#else
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_0(x) ((void) 0)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_1(s, x1) ((void) 0)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_2(s, x1, x2) ((void) 0)
#define VERIFIER_DBG_PRINT_3(s, x1, x2, x3) ((void) 0)
#endif

//
// Per-interface security check exemptions.
//

// The flags for various security checks that may be disabled for an interface:

// Registering an interface that is remotely acessible without a security callback
// and without RPC_IF_ALLOW_SECURE_ONLY flag.
#define ALLOW_UNSECURE_REMOTE_ACCESS    0x00000001
// An interface may be called remotely by without RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY
#define ALLOW_UNENCRYPTED_REMOTE_ACCESS 0x00000002
// An interface may be called remotely by without mutual authentication.
#define ALLOW_NO_MUTUAL_AUTH_REMOTE_ACCESS 0x00000004

#define ALLOW_EVERYTHING 0xffffffff

// Determines whether a security check is disabled for a given interface.
extern BOOL
IsInterfaceExempt (
    IN GUID *IfUuid,
    IN DWORD CheckFlag
    );

//
// Detecting unsafe protseqs.
//

// Determines whether a given protseq is unsafe.
extern BOOL
IsProtseqUnsafe (
    IN RPC_CHAR *ProtocolSequence
    );

//
// Paged BCache settings
//

enum BCacheMode {
    BCacheModeCached, // Allocations go through the cache.
    BCacheModeDirect // Allocations go directly to the heap.
    };

// set to one of the constants above
extern BCacheMode gBCacheMode;

// if non-zero, we may be in lsa. This is maybe, because
// conclusive check is too expensive, and the only
// way we use this flag is to avoid some optimizations
// that can result in deadlock in lsa.
extern BOOL fMaybeLsa;

//
// Security support functions
//

extern RPC_STATUS
IsCurrentUserAdmin(
    void
    );


//
// constants for LogEvent(),
//
#define SU_HANDLE   'h'
#define SU_CCONN    'n'
#define SU_SCONN    'N'
#define SU_CASSOC   'a'
#define SU_SASSOC   'A'
#define SU_CCALL    'c'
#define SU_SCALL    'C'
#define SU_PACKET   'p'
#define SU_CENDPOINT    'e'
#define SU_ENGINE   'E'
#define SU_ASSOC    '.'
#define SU_MUTEX    'm'
#define SU_STABLE   'T'
#define SU_ADDRESS  'D'
#define SU_HEAP     'H'
#define SU_BCACHE   'b'
#define SU_REFOBJ   'r'
#define SU_THREAD   't'
#define SU_TRANS_CONN   'o'
#define SU_EVENT    'v'
#define SU_EXCEPT   'x'
#define SU_CTXHANDLE    'l'
#define SU_EEINFO   'I'
#define SU_GC       'G'
#define SU_IF       'i'
#define SU_SECCRED  'S'
#define SU_HTTPv2   '2'
#define SU_CORRUPT  'O'

#define EV_CREATE   'C'
#define EV_DELETE   'D'
#define EV_START    'c'
#define EV_STOP     'd'
#define EV_INC      '+'
#define EV_DEC      '-'
#define EV_PROC     'p'
#define EV_ACK      'a'
#define EV_CALLBACK 'L'
#define EV_NOTIFY   'N'
#define EV_APC      'A'
#define EV_STATUS   'S'
#define EV_DISASSOC 'x'
#define EV_STATE    '='
#define EV_POP      'P'
#define EV_PUSH     'Q'
#define EV_PKT_IN   'k'
#define EV_PKT_OUT  'K'
#define EV_BUFFER_IN   'b'
#define EV_BUFFER_OUT  'B'
#define EV_BUFFER_FAIL 'X'
#define EV_ABORT  'R'
#define EV_SET      's'

// for debugging.  A packet can be dropped or delayed.
//
#define EV_DROP     '*'
#define EV_DELAY    '#'

#define EV_PRUNE    'p'

// SU_SCONN: a call is being transferred to another connection during auto-reconnect.
//
#define EV_TRANSFER 'T'

// SU_CASSOC: the dynamic endpoint has been resolved into a real endpoint
//
#define EV_RESOLVED 'r'

// SU_ENGINE: window size and selective-ack bits from a FACK or NOCALL
//
#define EV_WINDOW 'w'

// SU_SCALL: the call was removed from the connection's active list
#define EV_REMOVED  'm'

// SU_SCALL: Cleanup() was called with refcount > 0
#define EV_CLEANUP  ','

#define EV_BHCOPY   'O'

#define EV_ALLOCATE 't'
#define EV_OPER     'o'

//
//
#define EV_SEC_INIT1   'i'
#define EV_SEC_INIT3   'I'
#define EV_SEC_ACCEPT1 'j'
#define EV_SEC_ACCEPT3 'J'

#define IN_CHANNEL_STATE    (UlongToPtr(0))
#define OUT_CHANNEL_STATE   (UlongToPtr(1))

#define MAX_RPC_EVENT 4096
#define STACKTRACE_DEPTH 4
   
// The RPC event log and the size of the RPC event log.
// When the RPC verifier is enabled we will re-allocate the log and extend its size.
extern struct RPC_EVENT *RpcEvents;
extern long EventArrayLength;

struct RPC_EVENT
{
    DWORD           Thread;
    DWORD           Time;
    unsigned char   Subject;
    unsigned char   Verb;

    void *          SubjectPointer;
    void *          ObjectPointer;
    ULONG_PTR       Data;
    void *          EventStackTrace[STACKTRACE_DEPTH];
};

extern void
TrulyLogEvent(
    IN unsigned char Subject,
    IN unsigned char Verb,
    IN void *        SubjectPointer,
    IN void *        ObjectPointer = 0,
    IN ULONG_PTR     Data          = 0,
    IN BOOL       fCaptureStackTrace = 0,
    IN int    AdditionalFramesToSkip = 0
    );
#ifdef RPC_LOGGING

extern BOOL fEnableLog;

inline void
LogEvent(
    IN unsigned char Subject,
    IN unsigned char Verb,
    IN void *        SubjectPointer,
    IN void *        ObjectPointer = 0,
    IN ULONG_PTR     Data          = 0,
    IN BOOL          fCaptureStackTrace = 0,
    IN int           AdditionalFramesToSkip = 0
    )
{
    if (fEnableLog)
        {
        TrulyLogEvent( Subject,
                       Verb,
                       SubjectPointer,
                       ObjectPointer,
                       Data,
                       fCaptureStackTrace,
                       AdditionalFramesToSkip
                       );
        }
}

#else

inline void
LogEvent(
    IN unsigned char Subject,
    IN unsigned char Verb,
    IN void *        SubjectPointer,
    IN void *        ObjectPointer = 0,
    IN ULONG_PTR     Data          = 0,
    IN BOOL       fCaptureStackTrace = 0,
    IN int    AdditionalFramesToSkip = 0
    )
{
#if DBG
    TrulyLogEvent(Subject, Verb, SubjectPointer, ObjectPointer, Data, fCaptureStackTrace,
        AdditionalFramesToSkip);
#endif
}

#endif

//
// LogError will produce an event even on normal retail builds.
//
#ifdef RPC_ERROR_LOGGING

inline void
LogError(
    IN unsigned char Subject,
    IN unsigned char Verb,
    IN void *        SubjectPointer,
    IN void *        ObjectPointer = 0,
    IN ULONG_PTR     Data          = 0,
    IN BOOL          fCaptureStackTrace = 0,
    IN int           AdditionalFramesToSkip = 0
    )
{
    TrulyLogEvent( Subject,
                   Verb,
                   SubjectPointer,
                   ObjectPointer,
                   Data,
                   fCaptureStackTrace,
                   AdditionalFramesToSkip
                   );
}

#else

inline void
LogError(
    IN unsigned char Subject,
    IN unsigned char Verb,
    IN void *        SubjectPointer,
    IN void *        ObjectPointer = 0,
    IN ULONG_PTR     Data          = 0,
    IN BOOL       fCaptureStackTrace = 0,
    IN int    AdditionalFramesToSkip = 0
    )
{
#if DBG
    TrulyLogEvent(Subject, Verb, SubjectPointer, ObjectPointer, Data, fCaptureStackTrace,
        AdditionalFramesToSkip);
#endif
}

#endif

#ifdef STATS
extern DWORD g_dwStat1;
extern DWORD g_dwStat2;
extern DWORD g_dwStat3;
extern DWORD g_dwStat4;

inline void GetStats(DWORD *pdwStat1, DWORD *pdwStat2, DWORD *pdwStat3, DWORD *pdwStat4)
{
    *pdwStat1 = g_dwStat1;
    *pdwStat2 = g_dwStat2;
    *pdwStat3 = g_dwStat3;
    *pdwStat4 = g_dwStat4;
}

inline void SetStat1(DWORD dwStat)
{
    g_dwStat1 = dwStat;
}

inline void SetStat2(DWORD dwStat)
{
    g_dwStat2 = dwStat;
}

inline void SetStat3(DWORD dwStat)
{
    g_dwStat3 = dwStat;
}

inline void SetStat4(DWORD dwStat)
{
    g_dwStat4 = dwStat;
}

inline void IncStat1(void)
{
    InterlockedIncrement((long *) &g_dwStat1);
}

inline void DecStat1(void)
{
    InterlockedDecrement((long *) &g_dwStat1);
}

inline void Stat1Add(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat1, val);
}

inline void Stat1Sub(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat1, -val);
}

inline void IncStat2(void)
{
    InterlockedIncrement((long *) &g_dwStat2);
}

inline void DecStat2(void)
{
    InterlockedDecrement((long *) &g_dwStat2);
}

inline void Stat2Add(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat2, val);
}

inline void Stat2Sub(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat2, -val);
}

inline void IncStat3(void)
{
    InterlockedIncrement((long *) &g_dwStat3);
}

inline void DecStat3(void)
{
    InterlockedDecrement((long *) &g_dwStat3);
}

inline void Stat3Add(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat3, val);
}

inline void Stat3Sub(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat3, -val);
}

inline void IncStat4(void)
{
    InterlockedIncrement((long *) &g_dwStat4);
}

inline void DecStat4(void)
{
    InterlockedDecrement((long *) &g_dwStat4);
}

inline void Stat4Add(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat4, val);
}

inline void Stat4Sub(long val)
{
    InterlockedExchangeAdd((long *) &g_dwStat4, -val);
}

#else
inline void GetStats(DWORD *pdwStat1, DWORD *pdwStat2, DWORD *pdwStat3, DWORD *pdwStat4)
{
}

inline void SetStat1(DWORD dwStat)
{
}

inline void SetStat2(DWORD dwStat)
{
}

inline void SetStat3(DWORD dwStat)
{
}

inline void SetStat4(DWORD dwStat)
{
}

inline void IncStat1(void)
{
}

inline void DecStat1(void)
{
}

inline void Stat1Add(long val)
{
}

inline void Stat1Sub(long val)
{
}

inline void IncStat2(void)
{
}

inline void DecStat2(void)
{
}

inline void Stat2Add(long val)
{
}

inline void Stat2Sub(long val)
{
}

inline void IncStat3(void)
{
}

inline void DecStat3(void)
{
}

inline void Stat3Add(long val)
{
}

inline void Stat3Sub(long val)
{
}

inline void IncStat4(void)
{
}

inline void DecStat4(void)
{
}

inline void Stat4Add(long val)
{
}

inline void Stat4Sub(long val)
{
}

#endif

//
// test hook data.  The stuff that would logically live in UTIL.CXX is actually in DGCLNT.CXX
// due to trouble linking the BVT programs.
//
typedef unsigned long RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID;

typedef void (RPC_TEST_HOOK_FN_RAW)( RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID id, PVOID subject, PVOID object );

typedef RPC_TEST_HOOK_FN_RAW * RPC_TEST_HOOK_FN;

RPCRTAPI
DWORD
RPC_ENTRY
I_RpcSetTestHook(
    RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID id,
    RPC_TEST_HOOK_FN fn
    );

void
ForceCallTestHook(
    RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID id,
    PVOID            subject,
    PVOID            object
    );

//
// ranges for the major field:
//
//  common:     001-099
//  dg:         100-199
//  co:         200-299
//  lrpc:       300-399
//  transports: 400-499
//  reserved:   500-32767
//
#define MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( major, minor ) ( ((major) << 16) | (minor) )

#define TH_RPC_BASE       1
#define TH_DG_BASE      100
#define TH_CO_BASE      200
#define TH_LRPC_BASE    300
#define TH_TRANS_BASE   400


//
// protocol-independent hook IDs.
//

// member functions of SECURITY_CONTEXT and SECURITY_CREDENTIALS
//
#define TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER   (TH_RPC_BASE+1)

//
// Each of these hooks is passed the security context and a pStatus pointer.
// If the hook makes *pStatus nonzero, that becomes the return code from the
// member function.
//
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_SIGN    MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 1)
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_VERIFY  MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 2)
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_ACCEPT1 MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 3)
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_ACCEPT3 MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 4)
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_INIT1   MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 5)
#define TH_SECURITY_FN_INIT3   MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 6)

#define TH_RPC_SECURITY_SERVER_CONTEXT_CREATED MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 7)
#define TH_RPC_SECURITY_CLIENT_CONTEXT_CREATED MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID( TH_SECURITY_PROVIDER, 8)

// subject = pointer to RPC event structure
// object = 0
//
#define TH_RPC_LOG_EVENT       MAKE_TEST_HOOK_ID(TH_RPC_BASE+2, 1)


inline void
CallTestHook(
    RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID id,
    PVOID            subject = 0,
    PVOID            object  = 0
    )
{
#ifdef RPC_ENABLE_TEST_HOOKS

    ForceCallTestHook( id, subject, object );

#endif
}

#ifdef RPC_ENABLE_TEST_HOOKS

RPC_TEST_HOOK_FN
GetTestHook(
    RPC_TEST_HOOK_ID id
    );

#endif

#endif /* __UTIL_HXX__ */