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860 lines
26 KiB
860 lines
26 KiB
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// Copyright (c) 1996-2002 Microsoft Corporation
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Microsoft Windows
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//
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// File: sharenum.cxx
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//
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// Contents: The CShareEnumerator class implementation.
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//
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// Classes: CShareEnumerator
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//
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// History: 28-Jan-98 MikeHill Created
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//
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// Notes:
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#include "pch.cxx"
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#pragma hdrstop
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#include "trklib.hxx"
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::Initialize
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//
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// Synopsis: Initializes this enumeration by calling
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// NetShareEnum.
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//
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// Arguments: [IDL_handle] (in)
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// The RPC binding handle to the client on whom's
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// behalf we're acting.
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//
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// [ptszMachineName] (in)
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// The machine on which shares are to be enumerated.
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// If this value is NULL, the local machine is assumed.
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//
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//
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// Returns: None.
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//
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// Raises: On error.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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VOID
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CShareEnumerator::Initialize( RPC_BINDING_HANDLE IDL_handle, const TCHAR *ptszMachineName )
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{
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NET_API_STATUS netstatus;
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NETRESOURCE netresourceMachine;
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DWORD dwTotalEntries;
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TrkAssert( !_fInitialized );
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// Start with a clean state
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_ClearCache();
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_iCurrentEntry = static_cast<ULONG>(-1);
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_fInitialized = TRUE;
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_IDL_handle = IDL_handle;
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// Keep the machine name, retrieving it if necessary.
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_tcscpy( _tszMachineName, TEXT("\\\\") );
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if( NULL != ptszMachineName )
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_tcscpy( &_tszMachineName[2], ptszMachineName );
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else
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{
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DWORD cbMachineName = sizeof(_tszMachineName) - 2;
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if( !GetComputerName( &_tszMachineName[2], &cbMachineName ))
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TrkRaiseLastError();
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}
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// Start the enumeration. We'll simply get all the share information
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// at once, instead of using a resume handle and making repeated RPC
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// calls to the Server service.
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netstatus = NetShareEnum( (TCHAR*) ptszMachineName, // Server (we must de-const it)
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502, // Info level
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(LPBYTE*) &_prgshare_info, // Return buffer
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MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH, // Get everything
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&_cEntries, // Entries read
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&dwTotalEntries, // Total entries avail
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NULL ); // Resume handle
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if( STATUS_SUCCESS != netstatus )
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TrkRaiseWin32Error( HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(netstatus) );
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TrkAssert( _cEntries == dwTotalEntries );
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return;
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::UnInitialize
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//
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// Synopsis: Free any resources.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: None.
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//
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// Raises: No
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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VOID
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CShareEnumerator::UnInitialize()
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{
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if( _fInitialized )
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{
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if( NULL != _prgshare_info )
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NetApiBufferFree( _prgshare_info );
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InitLocals();
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}
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CTrkRpcConfig::UnInitialize();
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::_ClearCache
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//
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// Synopsis: Clear the data members of the CShareEnumerator
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// which are cached information about the current share.
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// (This is done in preparation to move on to the next
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// share in the enumeration.)
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: None.
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//
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// Raises: No
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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VOID
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CShareEnumerator::_ClearCache()
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{
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// Clear the cached information about the
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// current share.
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_cchSharePath = (ULONG) -1;
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_ulMerit = 0;
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_enumHiddenState = HS_UNKNOWN;
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::Next
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//
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// Synopsis: Moves the enumerator on to the next share in the
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// the enumeration.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: TRUE if there was another element in the enumeration,
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// FALSE if there are no more shares to enumerate.
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//
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// Raises: No.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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BOOL
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CShareEnumerator::Next()
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{
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TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
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if( _iCurrentEntry + 1 < _cEntries )
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{
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_ClearCache();
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_iCurrentEntry++;
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return( TRUE );
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}
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else
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return( FALSE );
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::CoversDrivePath
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//
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// Synopsis: Determines if the current share in the enumeration
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// "covers" a given drive path. E.g., a share to
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// "c:\docs" covers the drive path "c:\docs\mydoc.doc".
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//
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// Arguments: [ptszDrivePath]
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// The drive-based path to check for coverage.
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//
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// Returns: TRUE if the current share covers the given path,
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// FALSE otherwise.
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//
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// Raises: No
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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BOOL
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CShareEnumerator::CoversDrivePath( const TCHAR *ptszDrivePath )
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{
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TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
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TrkAssert( TEXT(':') == ptszDrivePath[1] );
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// Does the current share path cover the file? It does if it compares
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// successfully with the local path, up to the entire length of the
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// share path.
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if( _IsValidShare()
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&&
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QueryCCHSharePath() <= _tcslen(ptszDrivePath)
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&&
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!_tcsnicmp( GetSharePath(), ptszDrivePath, QueryCCHSharePath() )
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)
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return TRUE;
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else
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return FALSE;
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::_IsHiddenShare
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//
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// Synopsis: Determines if the current share is "hidden"
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// (i.e., the share name ends in a '$').
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//
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// The first time this method is called, the share
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// named is checked for hidden-ness. The result is
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// cached for subsequent calls.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: TRUE if the current share is hidden,
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// FALSE if it is visible.
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//
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// Raises: On error.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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BOOL
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CShareEnumerator::_IsHiddenShare()
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{
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TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
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TrkAssert( _IsValidShare() );
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TrkAssert( NULL != GetShareName() );
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TrkAssert( TEXT('\0') != GetShareName()[0] );
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if( _enumHiddenState == HS_UNKNOWN )
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{
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_enumHiddenState = TEXT('$') == GetShareName()[ _tcslen(GetShareName()) - 1 ]
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? HS_HIDDEN
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: HS_VISIBLE;
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}
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return( HS_HIDDEN == _enumHiddenState );
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::_IsAdminShare
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//
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// Synopsis: Determines if the current share is Admin share.
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// Admin shares are automatically created by the Server
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// service during initialization. They're hard-coded
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// to be A$, B$, C$, etc., for each of the drives,
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// and ADMIN$ for the %windir% directory.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: TRUE if the current share is an auto-generated admin share,
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// FALSE otherwise.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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BOOL
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CShareEnumerator::_IsAdminShare()
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{
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TCHAR tcDriveLetter;
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TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
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TrkAssert( _IsValidShare() );
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TrkAssert( NULL != GetShareName() );
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TrkAssert( TEXT('\0') != GetShareName()[0] );
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tcDriveLetter = TrkCharUpper( GetShareName()[0] );
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// Check for the admin share characteristics.
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if( 2 == _tcslen(GetShareName())
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&&
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TEXT('$') == GetShareName()[ 1 ]
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&&
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TEXT('A') <= tcDriveLetter
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&&
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TEXT('Z') >= tcDriveLetter
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)
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{
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return( TRUE ); // It's a drive share
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}
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else if( !_tcsicmp( TEXT("admin$"), GetShareName() ))
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return( TRUE ); // It's the %windir% share
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else
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return( FALSE );
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}
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//+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Method: _IsValidShare
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//
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// Synopsis: Returns True if the current share is valid. A share
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// valid it if it is in the form "<drive letter>:\\". E.g.
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// "IPC$" isn't a valid share.
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//
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// Arguments: None
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//
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// Returns: None
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//
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//+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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inline BOOL
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CShareEnumerator::_IsValidShare()
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{
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TCHAR tcFirstChar;
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// There should be a path, and it should be at least 3 characters
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// (e.g. "D:\")
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if( NULL == GetSharePath() || 3 > QueryCCHSharePath() )
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return FALSE;
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tcFirstChar = TrkCharUpper( GetSharePath()[0] );
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// Make sure that the share path begins with "<Drive>:\\".
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if( TEXT('A') <= tcFirstChar && tcFirstChar <= TEXT('Z')
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&&
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TEXT(':') == GetSharePath()[1]
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&&
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TEXT('\\') == GetSharePath()[2]
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)
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{
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return( TRUE );
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}
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else
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return( FALSE );
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::GetMerit
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//
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// Synopsis: Returns the linear (ULONG) merit of the current path.
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// The greater this merit value, the more useful the share
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// is. This is calculated on the first call to this method,
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// and cached for use in subsequent calls.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: None.
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//
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// Raises: On error.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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ULONG
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CShareEnumerator::GetMerit()
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{
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TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
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// The merit of a share is the bitwise-OR of the share's
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// enumAccessLevel, its hidden-ness, and the length of
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// the covered path.
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//
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// Shorter paths are more mertious than longer paths
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// (because they cover more of the volume), so we subtract
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// the path length from the max-value; thus giving shorter
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// paths more weight.
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if( 0 == _ulMerit && _IsValidShare() )
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{
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_ulMerit = ( _GetAccessLevel() )
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( SPC_MAX_COVERAGE - QueryCCHSharePath() )
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( _IsHiddenShare() ? HS_HIDDEN : HS_VISIBLE );
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}
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TrkLog(( TRKDBG_MEND, TEXT("Score %d for %s (%s)"),
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_ulMerit,
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_prgshare_info[ _iCurrentEntry ].shi502_netname,
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_prgshare_info[ _iCurrentEntry ].shi502_path ));
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return( _ulMerit );
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}
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static void SDAllocHelper( BYTE **ppb, ULONG cbCurrent, ULONG cbRequired )
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{
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if( cbRequired <= cbCurrent )
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return;
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*ppb = new BYTE[ cbRequired ];
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if( NULL == *ppb )
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{
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TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Failed alloc in SDAllocHelper")));
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TrkRaiseWin32Error( ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY );
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}
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return;
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}
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void
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CShareEnumerator::_AbsoluteSDHelper( const PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSDRelative,
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *ppSDAbs, ULONG *pcbSDAbs,
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PACL *ppDaclAbs, ULONG *pcbDaclAbs,
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PACL *ppSaclAbs, ULONG *pcbSaclAbs,
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PSID *ppSidOwnerAbs, ULONG *pcbSidOwnerAbs,
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PSID *ppSidGroupAbs, ULONG *pcbSidGroupAbs )
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{
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ULONG cbSDAbs = *pcbSDAbs;
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ULONG cbDaclAbs = *pcbDaclAbs;
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ULONG cbSaclAbs = *pcbSaclAbs;
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ULONG cbSidOwnerAbs = *pcbSidOwnerAbs;
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ULONG cbSidGroupAbs = *pcbSidGroupAbs;
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for( int i = 0; i < 2; i++ )
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{
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if( !MakeAbsoluteSD( pSDRelative,
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*ppSDAbs, pcbSDAbs,
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*ppDaclAbs, pcbDaclAbs,
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*ppSaclAbs, pcbSaclAbs,
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*ppSidOwnerAbs, pcbSidOwnerAbs,
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*ppSidGroupAbs, pcbSidGroupAbs ))
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{
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if( i > 0 || ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER != GetLastError() )
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{
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TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't make absolute SD")));
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TrkRaiseLastError( );
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}
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TrkLog(( TRKDBG_MEND, TEXT("Realloc _AbsoluteSDHelper") ));
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SDAllocHelper( (BYTE**) ppSDAbs, cbSDAbs, *pcbSDAbs );
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SDAllocHelper( (BYTE**) ppDaclAbs, cbDaclAbs, *pcbDaclAbs );
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SDAllocHelper( (BYTE**) ppSaclAbs, cbSaclAbs, *pcbSaclAbs );
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SDAllocHelper( (BYTE**) ppSidOwnerAbs, cbSidOwnerAbs, *pcbSidOwnerAbs );
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SDAllocHelper( (BYTE**) ppSidGroupAbs, cbSidGroupAbs, *pcbSidGroupAbs );
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}
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}
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}
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//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// Function: CShareEnumerator::_GetAccessLevel
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//
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// Synopsis: Determines the "access level" of the current share.
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// The definition of an access level is provided by
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// the enumAccessLevels enumeration in PShareMerit.
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//
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// Once calculated, this access level is not cached for
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// subsequent calls, because this method is only called
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// by GetMerit, which provides its own cacheing.
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//
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// *** Note: This is a temporary solution. This should
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// be replaced with a solution that simply checks security
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// on the share, without actually attempting to open the
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// file.
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//
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// Arguments: None.
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//
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// Returns: An access level in the form of an enumAccessLevels.
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//
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// Raises: On error.
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//
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//--------------------------------------------------------------------
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PShareMerit::enumAccessLevels
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CShareEnumerator::_GetAccessLevel()
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{
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enumAccessLevels AccessLevel = AL_NO_ACCESS;
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static const int StackBufferSizes = 256;
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TCHAR tszUNCPath[ MAX_PATH + 1 ];
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HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
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int iAttempt;
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DWORD rgAccess[] = { GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, // => AL_READWRITE_ACCESS
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GENERIC_READ, // => AL_READ_ACCESS
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GENERIC_WRITE }; // => AL_WRITE_ACCESS
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HANDLE hAccessToken;
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BOOL fAccessToken = FALSE;
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RPC_STATUS rpc_status;
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DWORD dwStatus;
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DWORD cbActual;
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BOOL fImpersonating = FALSE;
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BYTE rgbTokenUser[StackBufferSizes];
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ULONG cbTokenUser = sizeof(rgbTokenUser);
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TOKEN_USER *pTokenUser = (TOKEN_USER*) rgbTokenUser;
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BYTE rgbTokenGroups[ 4 * StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbTokenGroups = sizeof(rgbTokenGroups);
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TOKEN_GROUPS *pTokenGroups = (TOKEN_GROUPS*) rgbTokenGroups;
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BYTE rgbSDAbs[ StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbSDAbs = sizeof(rgbSDAbs);
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSDAbs = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) rgbSDAbs;
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BYTE rgbDaclAbs[ StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbDaclAbs = sizeof(rgbDaclAbs);
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PACL pDaclAbs = (PACL) rgbDaclAbs;
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BYTE rgbSaclAbs[ StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbSaclAbs = sizeof(rgbSaclAbs);
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PACL pSaclAbs = (PACL) rgbSaclAbs;
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BYTE rgbSidOwnerAbs[ StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbSidOwnerAbs = sizeof(rgbSidOwnerAbs);
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PSID pSidOwnerAbs = (PSID) rgbSidOwnerAbs;
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BYTE rgbSidGroupAbs[ StackBufferSizes ];
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ULONG cbSidGroupAbs = sizeof(rgbSidGroupAbs);
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PSID pSidGroupAbs = (PSID) rgbSidGroupAbs;
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GENERIC_MAPPING Generic_Mapping = { FILE_GENERIC_READ, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE, FILE_ALL_ACCESS };
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PRIVILEGE_SET rgPrivilegeSet[ 10 ];
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ULONG cbPrivilegeSet = sizeof(rgPrivilegeSet);
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PRIVILEGE_SET *pPrivilegeSet = rgPrivilegeSet;
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DWORD dwGrantedAccess;
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BOOL fAccessStatus;
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CSID csidAdministrators;
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CSecDescriptor csdAdministrators;
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psdCheck = NULL;
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// If there is no security descriptor and this isn't an admin share,
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// it means that Everyone has 'full control'.
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if( NULL == _prgshare_info[ _iCurrentEntry ].shi502_security_descriptor && !_IsAdminShare() )
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return( AL_FULL_ACCESS );
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// Otherwise, we'll look at the share's DACL ...
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__try
|
|
{
|
|
// Impersonate the client
|
|
TrkAssert( NULL != _IDL_handle );
|
|
|
|
if( RpcSecurityEnabled() )
|
|
{
|
|
rpc_status = RpcImpersonateClient( _IDL_handle );
|
|
if( S_OK != rpc_status )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't impersonate client")));
|
|
TrkRaiseWin32Error( rpc_status );
|
|
}
|
|
fImpersonating = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if( !ImpersonateSelf( SecurityImpersonation ) )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't impersonate self")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
fImpersonating = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the client's access token
|
|
|
|
if( !OpenThreadToken( GetCurrentThread(),
|
|
TOKEN_READ, //TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS,
|
|
TRUE, // Open as self
|
|
&hAccessToken ))
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Failed OpenThreadToken")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
fAccessToken = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
// Get the client's owner SID
|
|
|
|
for( int i = 0; i < 2; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
if( !GetTokenInformation( hAccessToken,
|
|
TokenUser,
|
|
(LPVOID) pTokenUser,
|
|
cbTokenUser,
|
|
&cbActual ))
|
|
{
|
|
if( i > 0 || ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER != GetLastError() )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Failed GetTokenInformation (TokenUser)")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TrkLog(( TRKDBG_MEND, TEXT("Realloc pTokenUser") ));
|
|
cbTokenUser = cbActual;
|
|
pTokenUser = (TOKEN_USER*) new BYTE[ cbTokenUser ];
|
|
if( NULL == pTokenUser )
|
|
TrkRaiseWin32Error( ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the client's group SID
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
if( !GetTokenInformation( hAccessToken,
|
|
TokenGroups,
|
|
(LPVOID) pTokenGroups,
|
|
cbTokenGroups,
|
|
&cbActual ))
|
|
{
|
|
if( i > 0 || ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER != GetLastError() )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Failed GetTokenInformation (TokenGroups)")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TrkLog(( TRKDBG_MEND, TEXT("Realloc pTokenGroups") ));
|
|
cbTokenGroups = cbActual;
|
|
pTokenGroups = (TOKEN_GROUPS*) new BYTE[ cbTokenGroups ];
|
|
if( NULL == pTokenGroups )
|
|
TrkRaiseWin32Error( ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get a pointer to the security descriptor we want to check against.
|
|
|
|
if( _IsAdminShare() )
|
|
{
|
|
// For admin shares, we don't get a security descriptor in _prgshare_info
|
|
// from the NetShareEnum call. But, we know what the ACLs on admin shares
|
|
// should be, so we'll craft up an SD.
|
|
|
|
csidAdministrators.Initialize( CSID::CSID_NT_AUTHORITY, SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID,
|
|
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS );
|
|
|
|
csdAdministrators.Initialize();
|
|
csdAdministrators.AddAce( CSecDescriptor::ACL_IS_DACL, CSecDescriptor::AT_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
FILE_ALL_ACCESS, csidAdministrators );
|
|
|
|
psdCheck = csdAdministrators;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// Convert the share's Security Descriptor into absolute form.
|
|
|
|
_AbsoluteSDHelper( _prgshare_info[ _iCurrentEntry ].shi502_security_descriptor,
|
|
&pSDAbs, &cbSDAbs,
|
|
&pDaclAbs, &cbDaclAbs,
|
|
&pSaclAbs, &cbSaclAbs,
|
|
&pSidOwnerAbs, &cbSidOwnerAbs,
|
|
&pSidGroupAbs, &cbSidGroupAbs );
|
|
|
|
psdCheck = pSDAbs;
|
|
}
|
|
// The appropriate security descriptor is now in 'psdCheck'
|
|
|
|
// Put the client's owner SID in the Security Descriptor.
|
|
|
|
if( !SetSecurityDescriptorOwner( psdCheck,
|
|
pTokenUser->User.Sid,
|
|
FALSE ))
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't add user to SD")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Put the client's group SID in the Security Descriptor.
|
|
// (Perf) Why? I think it's because GetEffectiveRightsFromAcl wasn't working,
|
|
// so we had to use AccessCheck. But to use that call I think we had to pass
|
|
// in an SD with an owner/group, and the one returned from shi502_security_descriptor
|
|
// didn't have them.
|
|
|
|
if( !SetSecurityDescriptorGroup( psdCheck,
|
|
pTokenGroups->Groups->Sid,
|
|
FALSE ))
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't add group to SD")));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We have to stop impersonating in order to make the AccessCheck call.
|
|
|
|
fImpersonating = FALSE;
|
|
if( RpcSecurityEnabled() )
|
|
RpcRevertToSelf();
|
|
else
|
|
RevertToSelf();
|
|
|
|
// Check the access that this user has to this share. If this returns
|
|
// false, it means that NtAccessCheck returned an error. If this returns
|
|
// true, but fAccessStatus is false, it means that NtAccessCheck succeeded,
|
|
// but it returned an error in its RealStatus parameter. In either case,
|
|
// we need to check GetLastError.
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
if( !AccessCheck( psdCheck,
|
|
hAccessToken, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &Generic_Mapping,
|
|
pPrivilegeSet, &cbPrivilegeSet,
|
|
&dwGrantedAccess, &fAccessStatus )
|
|
||
|
|
!fAccessStatus )
|
|
{
|
|
if( i > 0 || ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER != GetLastError() )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog((TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't perform AccessCheck for %s (%08x)"),
|
|
GetShareName(), HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(GetLastError()) ));
|
|
TrkRaiseLastError( );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TrkLog(( TRKDBG_MEND, TEXT("Realloc pPrivilegeSet") ));
|
|
pPrivilegeSet = (PRIVILEGE_SET*) new BYTE[ cbPrivilegeSet ];
|
|
if( NULL == pPrivilegeSet )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkLog(( TRKDBG_ERROR, TEXT("Couldn't alloc pPrivilegeSet") ));
|
|
TrkRaiseWin32Error( ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reduce this complete list of accesses to a synopsis
|
|
|
|
if( AreAllAccessesGranted( dwGrantedAccess, FILE_ALL_ACCESS ))
|
|
AccessLevel = AL_FULL_ACCESS;
|
|
else if( AreAllAccessesGranted( dwGrantedAccess, FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_WRITE ))
|
|
AccessLevel = AL_READ_WRITE_ACCESS;
|
|
else if( AreAllAccessesGranted( dwGrantedAccess, FILE_GENERIC_READ ))
|
|
AccessLevel = AL_READ_ACCESS;
|
|
else if( AreAllAccessesGranted( dwGrantedAccess, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE ))
|
|
AccessLevel = AL_WRITE_ACCESS;
|
|
else
|
|
AccessLevel = AL_NO_ACCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
__finally
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
csdAdministrators.UnInitialize();
|
|
csidAdministrators.UnInitialize();
|
|
|
|
if( fAccessToken )
|
|
CloseHandle( hAccessToken );
|
|
|
|
if( fImpersonating )
|
|
{
|
|
if( RpcSecurityEnabled() )
|
|
RpcRevertToSelf();
|
|
else
|
|
RevertToSelf();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( rgPrivilegeSet != pPrivilegeSet )
|
|
delete[] pPrivilegeSet;
|
|
|
|
if( rgbTokenUser != (BYTE*) pTokenUser )
|
|
delete[] pTokenUser;
|
|
if( rgbTokenGroups != (BYTE*) pTokenGroups )
|
|
delete[] pTokenGroups;
|
|
|
|
if( rgbSDAbs != (BYTE*) pSDAbs )
|
|
delete[] pSDAbs;
|
|
if( rgbDaclAbs != (BYTE*) pDaclAbs )
|
|
delete[] pDaclAbs;
|
|
if( rgbSaclAbs != (BYTE*) pSaclAbs )
|
|
delete[] pSaclAbs;
|
|
if( rgbSidOwnerAbs != (BYTE*) pSidOwnerAbs )
|
|
delete[] pSidOwnerAbs;
|
|
if( rgbSidGroupAbs != (BYTE*) pSidGroupAbs )
|
|
delete[] pSidGroupAbs;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( AccessLevel );
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
//
|
|
// Function: CShareEnumerator::GenerateUNCPath
|
|
//
|
|
// Synopsis: Generate a UNC path to the give drive-based path
|
|
// WRT to the current share.
|
|
//
|
|
// Arguments: [ptszUNCPath] (out)
|
|
// Filled with the generated UNC path. This
|
|
// is assumed to be at least MAX_PATH+1 characters.
|
|
//
|
|
// [ptszDrivePath] (in)
|
|
// The drive-based path to the file.
|
|
// E.g. "c:\my documents\wordfile.doc".
|
|
//
|
|
// Returns: FALSE if the current share doesn't cover the
|
|
// file, TRUE otherwise.
|
|
//
|
|
// Raises: On error.
|
|
//
|
|
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
BOOL
|
|
CShareEnumerator::GenerateUNCPath( TCHAR *ptszUNCPath, const TCHAR * ptszDrivePath )
|
|
{
|
|
TrkAssert( _fInitialized );
|
|
TrkAssert( TEXT(':') == ptszDrivePath[1] );
|
|
|
|
// Ensure that this share covers the drive-based path.
|
|
|
|
if( !CoversDrivePath( ptszDrivePath ))
|
|
return( FALSE );
|
|
|
|
// Start out the UNC name with the \\machine\share.
|
|
|
|
_tcscpy( ptszUNCPath, _tszMachineName );
|
|
_tcscat( ptszUNCPath, TEXT("\\") );
|
|
_tcscat( ptszUNCPath, GetShareName() );
|
|
_tcscat( ptszUNCPath, TEXT("\\") );
|
|
|
|
// Finish the UNC name with the portion of the
|
|
// volume path which is under the share path.
|
|
|
|
_tcscat( ptszUNCPath, &ptszDrivePath[ QueryCCHSharePath() ] );
|
|
|
|
return( TRUE );
|
|
}
|
|
|