windows-server-2003/ds/security/protocols/msv_sspi/credderi.c

/*++

Copyright (c) 1987-1998  Microsoft Corporation

Module Name:

    credderi.c

Abstract:

    Interface to credential derivation facility.

Author:

    Scott Field (sfield)    14-Jan-1998

Environment:

    User mode only.
    Contains NT-specific code.
    Requires ANSI C extensions: slash-slash comments, long external names.

Revision History:

--*/

#include "msp.h"
#include "nlp.h"

#include <sha.h>

#define HMAC_K_PADSIZE      (64)


//
// Prototype for credential derivation routines.
//

VOID
DeriveWithHMAC_SHA1(
    IN      PBYTE   pbKeyMaterial,
    IN      DWORD   cbKeyMaterial,
    IN      PBYTE   pbData,
    IN      DWORD   cbData,
    IN OUT  BYTE    rgbHMAC[A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]   // output buffer
    );



NTSTATUS
MspNtDeriveCredential(
    IN PLSA_CLIENT_REQUEST ClientRequest,
    IN PVOID ProtocolSubmitBuffer,
    IN PVOID ClientBufferBase,
    IN ULONG SubmitBufferSize,
    OUT PVOID *ProtocolReturnBuffer,
    OUT PULONG ReturnBufferSize,
    OUT PNTSTATUS ProtocolStatus
    )

/*++

Routine Description:

    This routine is the dispatch routine for LsaCallAuthenticationPackage()
    with a message type of MsV1_0DeriveCredential.

Arguments:

    The arguments to this routine are identical to those of LsaApCallPackage.
    Only the special attributes of these parameters as they apply to
    this routine are mentioned here.

Return Value:

    STATUS_SUCCESS - Indicates the service completed successfully.

    STATUS_QUOTA_EXCEEDED -  This error indicates that the logon
        could not be completed because the client does not have
        sufficient quota to allocate the return buffer.


--*/

{
    NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    PMSV1_0_DERIVECRED_REQUEST DeriveCredRequest;
    PMSV1_0_DERIVECRED_RESPONSE DeriveCredResponse;
    CLIENT_BUFFER_DESC ClientBufferDesc;

    PMSV1_0_PRIMARY_CREDENTIAL Credential = NULL;

    PBYTE pbOwf;
    ULONG cbOwf;

    NlpInitClientBuffer( &ClientBufferDesc, ClientRequest );
    *ProtocolStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;

    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ClientBufferBase);

    //
    // Ensure the specified Submit Buffer is of reasonable size and
    // relocate all of the pointers to be relative to the LSA allocated
    // buffer.
    //

    if ( SubmitBufferSize < sizeof(MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_REQUEST) ) {
        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
        goto Cleanup;
    }

    DeriveCredRequest = (PMSV1_0_DERIVECRED_REQUEST) ProtocolSubmitBuffer;

    //
    // validate supported derive types.
    //


    if( DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredType != MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_TYPE_SHA1 &&
        DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredType != MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_TYPE_SHA1_V2 )
    {
        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
        goto Cleanup;
    }

    //
    // caller must pass in mixing bits into submit buffer.
    //

    if( DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredInfoLength == 0 ) {
        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
        goto Cleanup;
    }

    //
    // Make sure the buffer fits in the supplied size
    //

    if ( (DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredInfoLength + sizeof(MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_REQUEST))
            > SubmitBufferSize )
    {
        Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
        goto Cleanup;
    }


    //
    // Get the OWF password for this session.
    //

    Status = NlpGetPrimaryCredential( &DeriveCredRequest->LogonId, &Credential, NULL );

    if ( !NT_SUCCESS( Status ) ) {
        goto Cleanup;
    }


    //
    // Allocate a buffer to return to the caller.
    //

    *ReturnBufferSize = sizeof(MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_RESPONSE) +
                        A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN;

    Status = NlpAllocateClientBuffer( &ClientBufferDesc,
                                      *ReturnBufferSize,
                                      *ReturnBufferSize );


    if ( !NT_SUCCESS( Status ) ) {
        goto Cleanup;
    }

    ZeroMemory( ClientBufferDesc.MsvBuffer, *ReturnBufferSize );
    DeriveCredResponse = (PMSV1_0_DERIVECRED_RESPONSE) ClientBufferDesc.MsvBuffer;

    //
    // Fill in the return buffer.
    //

    DeriveCredResponse->MessageType = MsV1_0DeriveCredential;
    DeriveCredResponse->DeriveCredInfoLength = A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN;

    pbOwf = NULL;
    cbOwf = 0;

    if( DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredType == MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_TYPE_SHA1_V2 )
    {
        //
        // explicitly requested derivation based on ShaOwfPassword.
        //

        if( Credential->ShaPasswordPresent )
        {
            pbOwf = (PBYTE) &(Credential->ShaOwfPassword);  // key material is SHA OWF
            cbOwf = sizeof( SHA_OWF_PASSWORD );
        }
    }
    else if( DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredType == MSV1_0_DERIVECRED_TYPE_SHA1 )
    {
        //
        // explicitly requested derivation based on NtOwfPassword.
        //

        if( Credential->NtPasswordPresent )
        {
            pbOwf = (PBYTE) &(Credential->NtOwfPassword);   // key material is NT OWF
            cbOwf = sizeof( NT_OWF_PASSWORD );
        }
    }

    if( pbOwf == NULL )
    {
        Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
        goto Cleanup;
    }


    //
    // derive credential from HMAC_SHA1 crypto primitive
    // (the only supported crypto primitive at the moment)
    //

    DeriveWithHMAC_SHA1(
                pbOwf,
                cbOwf,
                DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredSubmitBuffer,
                DeriveCredRequest->DeriveCredInfoLength,
                DeriveCredResponse->DeriveCredReturnBuffer
                );


    //
    // Flush the buffer to the client's address space.
    //

    Status = NlpFlushClientBuffer( &ClientBufferDesc,
                                   ProtocolReturnBuffer );


Cleanup:

    if ( Credential != NULL ) {
        ZeroMemory( Credential, sizeof(*Credential) );
        (*Lsa.FreeLsaHeap)( Credential );
    }

    if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
        NlpFreeClientBuffer( &ClientBufferDesc );
    }

    return(Status);
}

VOID
DeriveWithHMAC_SHA1(
    IN      PBYTE   pbKeyMaterial,              // input key material
    IN      DWORD   cbKeyMaterial,
    IN      PBYTE   pbData,                     // input mixing data
    IN      DWORD   cbData,
    IN OUT  BYTE    rgbHMAC[A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]   // output buffer
    )
{
    unsigned __int64 rgbKipad[ HMAC_K_PADSIZE/sizeof(unsigned __int64) ];
    unsigned __int64 rgbKopad[ HMAC_K_PADSIZE/sizeof(unsigned __int64) ];
    A_SHA_CTX sSHAHash;
    DWORD dwBlock;

    // truncate
    if( cbKeyMaterial > HMAC_K_PADSIZE )
    {
        cbKeyMaterial = HMAC_K_PADSIZE;
    }

    ZeroMemory(rgbKipad, sizeof(rgbKipad));
    ZeroMemory(rgbKopad, sizeof(rgbKopad));

    CopyMemory(rgbKipad, pbKeyMaterial, cbKeyMaterial);
    CopyMemory(rgbKopad, pbKeyMaterial, cbKeyMaterial);

    // Kipad, Kopad are padded sMacKey. Now XOR across...
    for( dwBlock = 0; dwBlock < (HMAC_K_PADSIZE/sizeof(unsigned __int64)) ; dwBlock++ )
    {
        rgbKipad[dwBlock] ^= 0x3636363636363636;
        rgbKopad[dwBlock] ^= 0x5C5C5C5C5C5C5C5C;
    }

    // prepend Kipad to data, Hash to get H1
    A_SHAInit(&sSHAHash);
    A_SHAUpdate(&sSHAHash, (PBYTE)rgbKipad, sizeof(rgbKipad));
    A_SHAUpdate(&sSHAHash, pbData, cbData);


    // Finish off the hash
    A_SHAFinal(&sSHAHash, rgbHMAC);

    // prepend Kopad to H1, hash to get HMAC
    // note: done in place to avoid buffer copies

    // final hash: output value into passed-in buffer
    A_SHAInit(&sSHAHash);
    A_SHAUpdate(&sSHAHash, (PBYTE)rgbKopad, sizeof(rgbKopad));
    A_SHAUpdate(&sSHAHash, rgbHMAC, A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
    A_SHAFinal(&sSHAHash, rgbHMAC);

    RtlSecureZeroMemory( rgbKipad, sizeof(rgbKipad) );
    RtlSecureZeroMemory( rgbKopad, sizeof(rgbKopad) );
    RtlSecureZeroMemory( &sSHAHash, sizeof(sSHAHash) );

    return;
}