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windows-server-2003/base/ntos/se/sepaudit.c

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/*++
Copyright (c) 1989 Microsoft Corporation
Module Name:
sepaudit.c
Abstract:
This Module implements the audit and alarm procedures that are
private to the security component.
Author:
Robert Reichel (robertre) September 10, 1991
Environment:
Kernel Mode
Revision History:
--*/
#include "pch.h"
#pragma hdrstop
#include <msaudite.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef ALLOC_PRAGMA
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtPrivilegeObjectAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtPrivilegedServiceAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtOpenObjectForDeleteAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtCloseObjectAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtObjectReferenceAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepQueryNameString)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepQueryTypeString)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditProcessCreation)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditHandleDuplication)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditProcessExit)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditSystemTimeChange)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtGenerateDiscardAudit)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeLocateProcessImageName)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeInitializeProcessAuditName)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAuditAssignPrimaryToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditLPCInvalidUse)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeAuditHardLinkCreation)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeOperationAuditAlarm)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeDetailedAuditingWithToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext)
#endif
#define SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, Index, Sid ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeSid; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = SeLengthSid( (Sid) ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Address = (Sid); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, Index, String ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeString; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = \
sizeof(UNICODE_STRING)+(String)->Length; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Address = (String); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, Index, String ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeFileSpec; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = \
sizeof(UNICODE_STRING)+(String)->Length; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Address = (String); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, Index, Ulong ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeUlong; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( (Ulong) ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0] = (ULONG)(Ulong); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, Index, Ulong ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeHexUlong; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( (Ulong) ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0] = (ULONG)(Ulong); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, Index, Ptr ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypePtr; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( ULONG_PTR ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0] = (ULONG_PTR)(Ptr); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, Index ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeNoLogonId; \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, Index, LogonId ) \
{ \
LUID * TmpLuid; \
\
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeLogonId; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( (LogonId) ); \
TmpLuid = (LUID *)(&(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0]); \
*TmpLuid = (LogonId); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, Index, AccessMask, ObjectTypeIndex ) \
{ \
ASSERT( (ObjectTypeIndex < Index) && L"SepSetParmTypeAccessMask" ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeAccessMask;\
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( ACCESS_MASK );\
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0] = (AccessMask); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[1] = (ObjectTypeIndex); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypePrivileges( AuditParameters, Index, Privileges ) \
{ \
ASSERT( Privileges->PrivilegeCount <= SEP_MAX_PRIVILEGE_COUNT ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypePrivs; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = SepPrivilegeSetSize( (Privileges) ); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Address = (Privileges); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeObjectTypes( AuditParameters, Index, ObjectTypes, ObjectTypeCount, ObjectTypeIndex ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeObjectTypes; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( SE_ADT_OBJECT_TYPE ) * (ObjectTypeCount);\
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Address = (ObjectTypes); \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[1] = (ObjectTypeIndex); \
}
#define SepSetParmTypeTime( AuditParameters, Index, Time ) \
{ \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Type = SeAdtParmTypeTime; \
(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Length = sizeof( (Time) ); \
*((PLARGE_INTEGER)(&(AuditParameters).Parameters[(Index)].Data[0])) = Time; \
}
BOOLEAN
FASTCALL
SeDetailedAuditingWithToken(
IN PACCESS_TOKEN AccessToken OPTIONAL
)
/*++
Routine Description
This routine computes whether or not a detailed tracking audit should be
generated for a given token or context. If no token is passed then the
current effective token will be captured.
The caller is responsible for referencing and dereferencing AccessToken.
Arguments
AccessToken - token for which to query audit policy
Return Value
BOOLEAN.
--*/
{
PTOKEN Token;
ULONG Mask;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT LocalSecurityContext;
BOOLEAN AuditThisEvent;
PAGED_CODE();
if (SepTokenPolicyCounter[AuditCategoryDetailedTracking] == 0) {
return SeAuditingState[AuditCategoryDetailedTracking].AuditOnSuccess;
}
//
// If no token was passed in and there exists tokens in the system with
// detailed tracking per user policy settings then capture the context.
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(AccessToken)) {
Token = (PTOKEN)AccessToken;
} else {
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &LocalSecurityContext );
Token = EffectiveToken( &LocalSecurityContext );
}
//
// Audit if the token specifies success auditing (there is not a detailed tracking failure concept)
// or if global audit policy specifies detailed tracking auditing and this token is not excluded.
//
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.DetailedTracking;
if ( (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_SUCCESS_INCLUDE) ||
(SeAuditingState[AuditCategoryDetailedTracking].AuditOnSuccess && (0 == (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_SUCCESS_EXCLUDE))) ) {
AuditThisEvent = TRUE;
} else {
AuditThisEvent = FALSE;
}
if (AccessToken == NULL) {
//
// if AccessToken is NULL then we had to capture the context. Release
// it.
//
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &LocalSecurityContext );
}
return AuditThisEvent;
}
//
// ISSUE-2002/03/07-kumarp : the semantics of AccessGranted/AccessDenied
// is confusing. The function should really get success/failure flag as param
// to return the right setting.
//
// Further, these functions should be rearranged so that the inner-most
// function is SepAdtAuditThisEventWithToken and everything else ends up
// calling it with right parameters
//
// Longhorn bug# 595575
//
BOOLEAN
SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext(
IN POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE Category,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted,
IN BOOLEAN AccessDenied,
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext OPTIONAL
)
/*++
Routine Description
Determines if an audit should be generated based upon current policy
settings and the per user audit policy set in the effective token of
the context. If no context is passed in then the current context is
captured and examined.
Arguments
Category - the category for which we determine whether or not
to generate an audit
AccessGranted - whether or not access was granted
AccessDenied - whether or not access was denied
SubjectSecurityContext - the context to query for per user settings
Return Value
BOOLEAN.
--*/
{
ULONG Mask;
PTOKEN Token;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT LocalSecurityContext;
PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT pLocalSecurityContext;
BOOLEAN AuditThisEvent = FALSE;
PAGED_CODE();
ASSERT((!(AccessGranted && AccessDenied)) && "SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext");
if ((SeAuditingState[Category].AuditOnSuccess && AccessGranted) ||
(SeAuditingState[Category].AuditOnFailure && AccessDenied)) {
AuditThisEvent = TRUE;
} else {
AuditThisEvent = FALSE;
}
if (SepTokenPolicyCounter[Category] == 0) {
return AuditThisEvent;
}
//
// We cannot decide quickly whether or not to audit (there exist tokens
// with per user policy settings), so continue with
// examining the token's policy.
//
if (!ARGUMENT_PRESENT(SubjectSecurityContext)) {
pLocalSecurityContext = &LocalSecurityContext;
SeCaptureSubjectContext( pLocalSecurityContext );
} else {
pLocalSecurityContext = SubjectSecurityContext;
}
Token = EffectiveToken( pLocalSecurityContext );
//
// Now we have to check the token audit mask because the token may
// override the policy and say 'do not audit,' even though the array claims we
// must (or vice versa)
//
switch (Category) {
case AuditCategorySystem:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.System;
break;
case AuditCategoryLogon:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.Logon;
break;
case AuditCategoryObjectAccess:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.ObjectAccess;
break;
case AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.PrivilegeUse;
break;
case AuditCategoryDetailedTracking:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.DetailedTracking;
break;
case AuditCategoryPolicyChange:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.PolicyChange;
break;
case AuditCategoryAccountManagement:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.AccountManagement;
break;
case AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.DirectoryServiceAccess;
break;
case AuditCategoryAccountLogon:
Mask = Token->AuditPolicy.PolicyElements.AccountLogon;
break;
default:
ASSERT(FALSE && "Illegal audit category");
Mask = 0;
break;
}
if (Mask) {
//
// If granted and the token is marked for success_include OR
// if not granted and token is marked for failure_include then
// audit the event.
//
if (( AccessGranted && (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_SUCCESS_INCLUDE) ) ||
( AccessDenied && (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_FAILURE_INCLUDE) )) {
AuditThisEvent = TRUE;
}
//
// If granted and the token is marked for success_exclude OR
// if not granted and token is marked for failure_exclude then
// do not audit the event.
//
else if (( AccessGranted && (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_SUCCESS_EXCLUDE) ) ||
( AccessDenied && (Mask & TOKEN_AUDIT_FAILURE_EXCLUDE) )) {
AuditThisEvent = FALSE;
}
}
if (!ARGUMENT_PRESENT(SubjectSecurityContext)) {
SeReleaseSubjectContext( pLocalSecurityContext );
}
return AuditThisEvent;
}
BOOLEAN
SepAdtPrivilegeObjectAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName OPTIONAL,
IN PVOID HandleId,
IN PTOKEN ClientToken OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN PrimaryToken,
IN PVOID ProcessId,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET CapturedPrivileges,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Implements NtPrivilegeObjectAuditAlarm after parameters have been
captured.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when an
attempt is made to perform privileged operations on a protected
subsystem object after the object is already opened. This routine may
result in several messages being generated and sent to Port objects.
This may result in a significant latency before returning. Design of
routines that must call this routine must take this potential latency
into account. This may have an impact on the approach taken for data
structure mutex locking, for example.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[3] - New handle ID
Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
Parameter[5] - Subject's primary authentication ID
Parameter[6] - Subject's client authentication ID
Parameter[7] - Privileges used for open
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object.
ClientToken - Optionally provides a pointer to the client token
(only if the caller is currently impersonating)
PrimaryToken - Provides a pointer to the caller's primary token.
DesiredAccess - The desired access mask. This mask must have been
previously mapped to contain no generic accesses.
CapturedPrivileges - The set of privileges required for the requested
operation. Those privileges that were held by the subject are
marked using the UsedForAccess flag of the attributes
associated with each privilege.
AccessGranted - Indicates whether the requested access was granted or
not. A value of TRUE indicates the access was granted. A value of
FALSE indicates the access was not granted.
Return value:
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PSID CapturedUserSid;
LUID ClientAuthenticationId;
LUID PrimaryAuthenticationId;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER( DesiredAccess );
//
// Determine if we are auditing the use of privileges
//
if ( SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse, AccessGranted, !AccessGranted, NULL ) &&
SepFilterPrivilegeAudits( CapturedPrivileges )) {
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( ClientToken );
} else {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( PrimaryToken );
}
if ( RtlEqualSid( SeLocalSystemSid, CapturedUserSid )) {
return (FALSE);
}
PrimaryAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( PrimaryToken );
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_PRIVILEGE_USE;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_PRIVILEGED_OBJECT;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
if ( AccessGranted ) {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedUserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Subsystem name (if available)
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedSubsystemName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - New handle ID
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, HandleId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - Subject's primary authentication ID
//
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PrimaryAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[6] - Subject's client authentication ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
ClientAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( ClientToken );
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ClientAuthenticationId );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[7] - Privileges used for open
//
//
// Longhorn-ISSUE-2002/02/21-kumarp : remove the NULL check after fixing bug# 551545
//
if ( (CapturedPrivileges != NULL) && (CapturedPrivileges->PrivilegeCount > 0) ) {
SepSetParmTypePrivileges( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedPrivileges );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
return ( TRUE );
}
return ( FALSE );
}
VOID
SepAdtPrivilegedServiceAuditAlarm (
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedServiceName,
IN PTOKEN ClientToken OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN PrimaryToken,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET CapturedPrivileges,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine is the active part of NtPrivilegedServiceAuditAlarm.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when an
attempt is made to perform privileged system service operations. This
routine may result in several messages being generated and sent to Port
objects. This may result in a significant latency before returning.
Design of routines that must call this routine must take this potential
latency into account. This may have an impact on the approach taken
for data structure mutex locking, for example.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - object server (same as Subsystem name)
Parameter[3] - Subject's primary authentication ID
Parameter[4] - Subject's client authentication ID
Parameter[5] - Privileges used for open
Arguments:
SubjectSecurityContext - The subject security context representing
the caller of the system service.
SubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the subsystem
calling the routine.
ServiceName - Supplies a name of the privileged subsystem service. For
example, "RESET RUNTIME LOCAL SECURITY" might be specified
by a Local Security Authority service used to update the local
security policy database.
ClientToken - Optionally provides a pointer to the client token
(only if the caller is currently impersonating)
PrimaryToken - Provides a pointer to the caller's primary token.
Privileges - Points to a set of privileges required to perform the
privileged operation. Those privileges that were held by the
subject are marked using the UsedForAccess flag of the
attributes associated with each privilege.
AccessGranted - Indicates whether the requested access was granted or
not. A value of TRUE indicates the access was granted. A value of
FALSE indicates the access was not granted.
Return value:
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PSID CapturedUserSid;
LUID ClientAuthenticationId;
LUID PrimaryAuthenticationId;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
//
// Determine if we are auditing privileged services
//
if ( !(SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse, AccessGranted, !AccessGranted, SubjectSecurityContext ) &&
SepFilterPrivilegeAudits( CapturedPrivileges ))) {
return;
}
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( ClientToken );
} else {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( PrimaryToken );
}
PrimaryAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( PrimaryToken );
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_PRIVILEGE_USE;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_PRIVILEGED_SERVICE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
if ( AccessGranted ) {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedUserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Server
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - Service name (if available)
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedServiceName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedServiceName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - Subject's primary authentication ID
//
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PrimaryAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Subject's client authentication ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
ClientAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( ClientToken );
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ClientAuthenticationId );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - Privileges used for open
//
//
// Longhorn-ISSUE-2002/02/21-kumarp : remove the NULL check after fixing bug# 551690
//
if ( (CapturedPrivileges != NULL) && (CapturedPrivileges->PrivilegeCount > 0) ) {
SepSetParmTypePrivileges( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedPrivileges );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
}
BOOLEAN
SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName,
IN PVOID *HandleId OPTIONAL,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedObjectTypeName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedObjectName OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN ClientToken OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN PrimaryToken,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN ACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
IN PLUID OperationId,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET CapturedPrivileges OPTIONAL,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted,
IN HANDLE ProcessID,
IN POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE AuditType,
IN PIOBJECT_TYPE_LIST ObjectTypeList OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG ObjectTypeListLength,
IN PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccessArray OPTIONAL
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Implements NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm after parameters have been captured.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when an
attempt is made to access an existing protected subsystem object or
create a new one. This routine may result in several messages being
generated and sent to Port objects. This may result in a significant
latency before returning. Design of routines that must call this
routine must take this potential latency into account. This may have
an impact on the approach taken for data structure mutex locking, for
example. This API requires the caller have SeTcbPrivilege privilege.
The test for this privilege is always against the primary token of the
calling process, not the impersonation token of the thread.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - Server name (if available)
Parameter[3] - Object Type Name
Parameter[4] - Object Name
Parameter[5] - New handle ID
Parameter[6] - Subject's process id
Parameter[7] - Subject's image file name
Parameter[8] - Subject's primary authentication ID
Parameter[9] - Subject's client authentication ID
Parameter[10] - DesiredAccess mask
Parameter[11] - Privileges used for open
Parameter[12] - Guid/Level/AccessMask of objects/property sets/properties accesses.
Parameter[13] - Number of restricted SIDs in the token
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object. If the access attempt was not successful (AccessGranted is
FALSE), then this parameter is ignored.
CapturedObjectTypeName - Supplies the name of the type of object being
accessed.
CapturedObjectName - Supplies the name of the object the client
accessed or attempted to access.
CapturedSecurityDescriptor - A pointer to the security descriptor of
the object being accessed.
ClientToken - Optionally provides a pointer to the client token
(only if the caller is currently impersonating)
PrimaryToken - Provides a pointer to the caller's primary token.
DesiredAccess - The desired access mask. This mask must have been
previously mapped to contain no generic accesses.
GrantedAccess - The mask of accesses that were actually granted.
CapturedPrivileges - Optionally points to a set of privileges that were
required for the access attempt. Those privileges that were held
by the subject are marked using the UsedForAccess flag of the
attributes associated with each privilege.
ObjectCreation - A boolean flag indicating whether the access will
result in a new object being created if granted. A value of TRUE
indicates an object will be created, FALSE indicates an existing
object will be opened.
AccessGranted - Indicates whether the requested access was granted or
not. A value of TRUE indicates the access was granted. A value of
FALSE indicates the access was not granted.
GenerateOnClose - Points to a boolean that is set by the audit
generation routine and must be passed to NtCloseObjectAuditAlarm()
when the object handle is closed.
GenerateAudit - Indicates if we should generate an audit for this operation.
GenerateAlarm - Indicates if we should generate an alarm for this operation.
AuditType - Specifies the type of audit to be generated. Valid values
are: AuditCategoryObjectAccess and AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess.
ObjectTypeList - Supplies a list of GUIDs representing the object (and
sub-objects) being accessed.
ObjectTypeListLength - Specifies the number of elements in the ObjectTypeList.
GrantedAccessArray - If non NULL, specifies an array of access mask granted
to each object in ObjectTypeList.
Return Value:
Returns TRUE if audit is generated, FALSE otherwise.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
ULONG ObjectTypeIndex;
PSID CapturedUserSid;
LUID PrimaryAuthenticationId = { 0 };
LUID ClientAuthenticationId = { 0 };
PSE_ADT_OBJECT_TYPE AdtObjectTypeBuffer = NULL;
PEPROCESS Process = NULL;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
NTSTATUS Status;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
//
// ignore this failure
//
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( ClientToken );
ClientAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( ClientToken );
} else {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( PrimaryToken );
}
PrimaryAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( PrimaryToken );
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
ASSERT( ( AuditType == AuditCategoryObjectAccess ) ||
( AuditType == AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess ) );
if (AuditType == AuditCategoryObjectAccess) {
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DS_ACCESS;
}
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_OPEN_HANDLE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
if ( AccessGranted ) {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
}
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedUserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Object Server (if available)
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedSubsystemName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - Object Type Name
//
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedObjectTypeName )) {
//
// We have to have an ObjectTypeName for the audit to succeed.
//
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedObjectTypeName );
ObjectTypeIndex = AuditParameters.ParameterCount;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Object Name
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedObjectName )) {
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedObjectName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - New handle ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( HandleId )) {
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, *HandleId );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( OperationId )) {
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (*OperationId).HighPart );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (*OperationId).LowPart );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
} else {
AuditParameters.ParameterCount += 2;
}
//
// Parameter[6] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessID );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[7] - Subject's Image Name
//
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
//
// Parameter[8] - Subject's primary authentication ID
//
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PrimaryAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[9] - Subject's client authentication ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ClientAuthenticationId );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[10] - DesiredAccess mask
//
if ( AccessGranted ) {
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, GrantedAccess, ObjectTypeIndex );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, DesiredAccess, ObjectTypeIndex );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[11] - Privileges used for open
//
if ( (CapturedPrivileges != NULL) && (CapturedPrivileges->PrivilegeCount > 0) ) {
SepSetParmTypePrivileges( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedPrivileges );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[12] - ObjectTypes of Audited objects/parameter sets/parameters
//
if ( ObjectTypeListLength != 0 ) {
ULONG GuidCount;
ULONG i;
USHORT FlagMask = AccessGranted ? OBJECT_SUCCESS_AUDIT : OBJECT_FAILURE_AUDIT;
//
// Count the number of GUIDs to audit.
//
GuidCount = 0;
for ( i=0; i<ObjectTypeListLength; i++ ) {
if ( i == 0 ) {
GuidCount++;
} else if ( ObjectTypeList[i].Flags & FlagMask ) {
GuidCount ++;
}
}
//
// If there are any Guids to audit,
// copy them into a locally allocated buffer.
//
if ( GuidCount > 0 ) {
AdtObjectTypeBuffer = ExAllocatePoolWithTag( PagedPool, GuidCount * sizeof(SE_ADT_OBJECT_TYPE), 'pAeS' );
//
// If the buffer can be allocated,
// fill it in.
// If not,
// generate a truncated audit.
//
if ( AdtObjectTypeBuffer != NULL ) {
//
// Copy the GUIDs and optional access masks to the buffer.
//
GuidCount = 0;
for ( i=0; i<ObjectTypeListLength; i++ ) {
if ( ( i > 0 ) && !( ObjectTypeList[i].Flags & FlagMask ) ) {
continue;
} else {
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].ObjectType = ObjectTypeList[i].ObjectType;
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].Level = ObjectTypeList[i].Level;
if ( i == 0 ) {
//
// Always copy the GUID representing the object itself.
// Mark it as a such to avoid including it in the audit.
//
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].Flags = SE_ADT_OBJECT_ONLY;
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].AccessMask = 0;
} else {
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].Flags = 0;
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT(GrantedAccessArray) && AccessGranted ) {
AdtObjectTypeBuffer[GuidCount].AccessMask = GrantedAccessArray[i];
}
}
GuidCount ++;
}
}
//
// Store the Object Types.
//
SepSetParmTypeObjectTypes( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, AdtObjectTypeBuffer, GuidCount, ObjectTypeIndex );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_OPEN_HANDLE_OBJECT_TYPE;
}
}
}
//
// Parameter[13] - Restricted Sids in token
//
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PrimaryToken->RestrictedSidCount );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
//
// Parameter[14] - AccessMask in hex
//
if ( AccessGranted ) {
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, GrantedAccess );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, DesiredAccess );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
//
// Audit it.
//
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
Cleanup:
if ( AdtObjectTypeBuffer != NULL ) {
ExFreePool( AdtObjectTypeBuffer );
}
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
return( NT_SUCCESS(Status) );
}
BOOLEAN
SepAdtOpenObjectForDeleteAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName,
IN PVOID *HandleId OPTIONAL,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedObjectTypeName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedObjectName OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN ClientToken OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN PrimaryToken,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN ACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
IN PLUID OperationId,
IN PPRIVILEGE_SET CapturedPrivileges OPTIONAL,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted,
IN HANDLE ProcessID
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Implements SeOpenObjectForDeleteAuditAlarm after parameters have been
captured.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when an
attempt is made to access an existing protected subsystem object or
create a new one. This routine may result in several messages being
generated and sent to Port objects. This may result in a significant
latency before returning. Design of routines that must call this
routine must take this potential latency into account. This may have
an impact on the approach taken for data structure mutex locking, for
example. This API requires the caller have SeTcbPrivilege privilege.
The test for this privilege is always against the primary token of the
calling process, not the impersonation token of the thread.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - Server name (if available)
Parameter[3] - Object Type Name
Parameter[4] - Object Name
Parameter[5] - New handle ID
Parameter[6] - Subject's process id
Parameter[7] - Subject's primary authentication ID
Parameter[8] - Subject's client authentication ID
Parameter[9] - DesiredAccess mask
Parameter[10] - Privileges used for open
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object. If the access attempt was not successful (AccessGranted is
FALSE), then this parameter is ignored.
CapturedObjectTypeName - Supplies the name of the type of object being
accessed.
CapturedObjectName - Supplies the name of the object the client
accessed or attempted to access.
CapturedSecurityDescriptor - A pointer to the security descriptor of
the object being accessed.
ClientToken - Optionally provides a pointer to the client token
(only if the caller is currently impersonating)
PrimaryToken - Provides a pointer to the caller's primary token.
DesiredAccess - The desired access mask. This mask must have been
previously mapped to contain no generic accesses.
GrantedAccess - The mask of accesses that were actually granted.
CapturedPrivileges - Optionally points to a set of privileges that were
required for the access attempt. Those privileges that were held
by the subject are marked using the UsedForAccess flag of the
attributes associated with each privilege.
ObjectCreation - A boolean flag indicating whether the access will
result in a new object being created if granted. A value of TRUE
indicates an object will be created, FALSE indicates an existing
object will be opened.
AccessGranted - Indicates whether the requested access was granted or
not. A value of TRUE indicates the access was granted. A value of
FALSE indicates the access was not granted.
GenerateOnClose - Points to a boolean that is set by the audit
generation routine and must be passed to NtCloseObjectAuditAlarm()
when the object handle is closed.
GenerateAudit - Indicates if we should generate an audit for this operation.
GenerateAlarm - Indicates if we should generate an alarm for this operation.
Return Value:
Returns TRUE if audit is generated, FALSE otherwise.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
ULONG ObjectTypeIndex;
PSID CapturedUserSid;
LUID PrimaryAuthenticationId;
LUID ClientAuthenticationId;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( ClientToken );
} else {
CapturedUserSid = SepTokenUserSid( PrimaryToken );
}
PrimaryAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( PrimaryToken );
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_OPEN_OBJECT_FOR_DELETE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
if ( AccessGranted ) {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
}
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedUserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Object Server (if available)
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedSubsystemName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - Object Type Name
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedObjectTypeName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedObjectTypeName );
}
ObjectTypeIndex = AuditParameters.ParameterCount;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Object Name
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedObjectName )) {
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedObjectName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - New handle ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( HandleId )) {
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, *HandleId );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( OperationId )) {
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (*OperationId).HighPart );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (*OperationId).LowPart );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
} else {
AuditParameters.ParameterCount += 2;
}
//
// Parameter[6] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessID );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[7] - Subject's primary authentication ID
//
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PrimaryAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[8] - Subject's client authentication ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
ClientAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( ClientToken );
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ClientAuthenticationId );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[9] - DesiredAccess mask
//
if ( AccessGranted ) {
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, GrantedAccess, ObjectTypeIndex );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, DesiredAccess, ObjectTypeIndex );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[10] - Privileges used for open
//
if ( (CapturedPrivileges != NULL) && (CapturedPrivileges->PrivilegeCount > 0) ) {
SepSetParmTypePrivileges( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedPrivileges );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[11] - DesiredAccess mask in hex
//
if ( AccessGranted ) {
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, GrantedAccess );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, DesiredAccess );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
return( TRUE );
}
VOID
SepAdtCloseObjectAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName,
IN PVOID HandleId,
IN PSID UserSid
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine implements NtCloseObjectAuditAlarm after parameters have
been captured.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when a handle
to a protected subsystem object is deleted. This routine may result in
several messages being generated and sent to Port objects. This may
result in a significant latency before returning. Design of routines
that must call this routine must take this potential latency into
account. This may have an impact on the approach taken for data
structure mutex locking, for example.
This API requires the caller have SeTcbPrivilege privilege. The test
for this privilege is always against the primary token of the calling
process, allowing the caller to be impersonating a client during the
call with no ill effects. It is assumed that this privilege has been
tested at a higher level.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - object server name (same as subsystem name)
Parameter[3] - New handle ID
Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
Parameter[5] - Image file name
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object.
Object - The address of the object being closed
UserSid - The Sid identifying the current caller.
Return value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
HANDLE ProcessId;
PEPROCESS Process = NULL;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
NTSTATUS Status;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
if ( SepAuditOptions.DoNotAuditCloseObjectEvents ) {
return;
}
if ( SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryObjectAccess, TRUE, FALSE, NULL ) ) {
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_CLOSE_HANDLE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Object server name (if available)
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedSubsystemName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - New handle ID
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, HandleId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - Subject's Image Name
//
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
}
}
VOID
SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName,
IN PVOID HandleId,
IN PSID UserSid
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine implements NtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm after parameters have
been captured.
This routine is used to generate audit and alarm messages when an object
in a protected subsystem object is deleted. This routine may result in
several messages being generated and sent to Port objects. This may
result in a significant latency before returning. Design of routines
that must call this routine must take this potential latency into
account. This may have an impact on the approach taken for data
structure mutex locking, for example.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
Parameter[2] - Object server (same as Subsystem name)
Parameter[3] - Handle ID
Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
Parameter[5] - Subject's process image name
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object.
Object - The address of the object being closed
UserSid - The Sid identifying the current caller.
Return value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
HANDLE ProcessId;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
PEPROCESS Process = NULL;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
PAGED_CODE();
if ( SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryObjectAccess, TRUE, FALSE, NULL ) ) {
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_DELETE_OBJECT;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - Subsystem name (if available)
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CapturedSubsystemName );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - New handle ID
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, HandleId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
//
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( PsGetCurrentProcess() );
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - Subject's Image Name
//
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount ++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if (ImageFileName != &NullString) {
ExFreePool(ImageFileName);
}
}
}
VOID
SeOperationAuditAlarm (
IN PUNICODE_STRING CapturedSubsystemName OPTIONAL,
IN PVOID HandleId,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeName,
IN ACCESS_MASK AuditMask,
IN PSID UserSid OPTIONAL
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine generates an "operation-based" audit.
This routine may result in several messages being generated and sent
to Port objects. This may result in a significant latency before
returning. Design of routines that must call this routine must take
this potential latency into account. This may have an impact on the
approach taken for data structure mutex locking, for example.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - Object server (same as Subsystem name)
Parameter[3] - Handle ID
Parameter[4] - object type name
Parameter[5] - Subject's process id
Parameter[6] - Subject's process image name
Parameter[7] - Audit mask
Arguments:
CapturedSubsystemName - Supplies a name string identifying the
subsystem calling the routine.
HandleId - A unique value representing the client's handle to the
object.
ObjectTypeName - The type of the object being accessed.
AuditMask - Mask of bits being audited.
UserSid - Optionally supplies the user sid.
Return value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
BOOLEAN AccessGranted = TRUE;
HANDLE ProcessId;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
ULONG ObjectTypeIndex;
PUNICODE_STRING SubsystemName;
NTSTATUS Status;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName = NULL;
PEPROCESS Process = NULL;
PAGED_CODE();
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
//
// If the user's SID was not passed, get it out of the current
// subject context
//
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( UserSid )) {
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( EffectiveToken( &SubjectSecurityContext ));
}
if ( !ARGUMENT_PRESENT( CapturedSubsystemName )) {
SubsystemName = (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName;
} else {
SubsystemName = CapturedSubsystemName;
}
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[2] - object server (same as subsystem name)
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[3] - New handle ID
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, HandleId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[4] - Object Type Name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ObjectTypeName );
ObjectTypeIndex = AuditParameters.ParameterCount;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[5] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[6] - Subject's process name
//
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[7] - Audit Mask
//
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, AuditMask, ObjectTypeIndex );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Parameter[8] - Access Mask (hex)
//
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, AuditMask );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
}
VOID
SepAdtObjectReferenceAuditAlarm(
IN PVOID Object,
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN BOOLEAN AccessGranted
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Note: the caller (SeObjectReferenceAuditAlarm) checks audit policy.
description-of-function.
This routine will create an SE_ADT_PARAMETERS array organized as follows:
Parameter[0] - User Sid
Parameter[1] - Subsystem name (if available)
Parameter[2] - Object Type Name
Parameter[3] - Object Name
Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
Parameter[5] - Subject's primary authentication ID
Parameter[6] - Subject's client authentication ID
Parameter[7] - DesiredAccess mask
Arguments:
Return Value:
return-value - Description of conditions needed to return value. - or -
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
ULONG ObjectTypeIndex;
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION ObjectNameInformation;
PUNICODE_STRING ObjectTypeInformation;
PSID UserSid;
LUID PrimaryAuthenticationId;
LUID ClientAuthenticationId;
PTOKEN ClientToken = (PTOKEN)SubjectSecurityContext->ClientToken;
PTOKEN PrimaryToken = (PTOKEN)SubjectSecurityContext->PrimaryToken;
PAGED_CODE();
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( ClientToken );
} else {
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( PrimaryToken );
}
PrimaryAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( PrimaryToken );
//
// A completely zero'd entry will be interpreted
// as a "null string" or not supplied parameter.
//
// Initializing the entire array up front will allow
// us to avoid filling in each not supplied entry.
//
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DETAILED_TRACKING;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_INDIRECT_REFERENCE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 9;
if ( AccessGranted ) {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
} else {
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
}
//
// Obtain the object name and object type name from the object.
//
ObjectNameInformation = SepQueryNameString( Object );
ObjectTypeInformation = SepQueryTypeString( Object );
//
// Parameter[0] - User Sid
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, 0, UserSid );
//
// Parameter[1] - Subsystem name
//
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, 1, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
//
// Parameter[2] - Object Type Name
//
if ( ObjectTypeInformation != NULL ) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, 2, ObjectTypeInformation );
}
ObjectTypeIndex = 2;
//
// Parameter[3] - Object Name
//
if ( ObjectNameInformation != NULL ) {
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, 3, &ObjectNameInformation->Name );
}
//
// Parameter[4] - Subject's process id
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, 4, SubjectSecurityContext->ProcessAuditId );
//
// Parameter[5] - Subject's primary authentication ID
//
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, 5, PrimaryAuthenticationId );
//
// Parameter[6] - Subject's client authentication ID
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ClientToken )) {
ClientAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( ClientToken );
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, 6, ClientAuthenticationId );
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, 6 );
}
//
// Parameter[7] - DesiredAccess mask
//
SepSetParmTypeAccessMask( AuditParameters, 7, DesiredAccess, ObjectTypeIndex );
//
// Parameter[8] - DesiredAccess mask
//
SepSetParmTypeHexUlong( AuditParameters, 8, DesiredAccess );
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if ( ObjectNameInformation != NULL ) {
ExFreePool( ObjectNameInformation );
}
if ( ObjectTypeInformation != NULL ) {
ExFreePool( ObjectTypeInformation );
}
}
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION
SepQueryNameString(
IN PVOID Object
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Takes a pointer to an object and returns the name of the object.
Arguments:
Object - a pointer to an object.
Return Value:
A pointer to a buffer containing a POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION
structure containing the name of the object. The string is
allocated out of paged pool and should be freed by the caller.
NULL may also be returned.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
ULONG ReturnLength = 0;
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION ObjectNameInfo = NULL;
PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName = NULL;
PAGED_CODE();
Status = ObQueryNameString(
Object,
ObjectNameInfo,
0,
&ReturnLength
);
if ( Status == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) {
ObjectNameInfo = ExAllocatePoolWithTag( PagedPool, ReturnLength, 'nOeS' );
if ( ObjectNameInfo != NULL ) {
Status = ObQueryNameString(
Object,
ObjectNameInfo,
ReturnLength,
&ReturnLength
);
if ( NT_SUCCESS( Status ) && (ObjectNameInfo->Name.Length != 0) ) {
return( ObjectNameInfo );
} else {
ExFreePool( ObjectNameInfo );
return( NULL );
}
}
}
return( NULL );
}
PUNICODE_STRING
SepQueryTypeString(
IN PVOID Object
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Takes a pointer to an object and returns the type of the object.
Arguments:
Object - a pointer to an object.
Return Value:
A pointer to a UNICODE_STRING that contains the name of the object
type. The string is allocated out of paged pool and should be freed
by the caller.
NULL may also be returned.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
PUNICODE_STRING TypeName = NULL;
ULONG ReturnLength;
PAGED_CODE();
Status = ObQueryTypeName(
Object,
TypeName,
0,
&ReturnLength
);
if ( Status == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) {
TypeName = ExAllocatePoolWithTag( PagedPool, ReturnLength, 'nTeS' );
if ( TypeName != NULL ) {
Status = ObQueryTypeName(
Object,
TypeName,
ReturnLength,
&ReturnLength
);
if ( NT_SUCCESS( Status )) {
return( TypeName );
} else {
ExFreePool( TypeName );
}
}
}
return( NULL );
}
VOID
SeAuditProcessCreation(
PEPROCESS Process
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Audits the creation of a process. It is the caller's responsibility
to determine if process auditing is in progress.
Arguments:
Process - Points to the new process object.
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
ANSI_STRING Ansi;
LUID UserAuthenticationId;
NTSTATUS Status;
PSID UserSid;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
HANDLE ProcessId;
HANDLE ParentProcessId;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
PAGED_CODE();
//
// Set up the various data that will be needed for the audit:
// - process id
// - parent's process id
// - image file name (unicode)
//
ProcessId = Process->UniqueProcessId;
ParentProcessId = Process->InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
//
// NtCreateProcess with no section will cause this to be NULL
// fork() for posix will do this, or someone calling NtCreateProcess
// directly.
//
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DETAILED_TRACKING;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_PROCESS_CREATED;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
//
// Use the primary token here, because that's what's going to show up
// when the created process exits.
//
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( SubjectSecurityContext.PrimaryToken );
UserAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( SubjectSecurityContext.PrimaryToken );
//
// Fill in the AuditParameters structure.
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ParentProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
return;
}
VOID
SeAuditHandleDuplication(
PVOID SourceHandle,
PVOID NewHandle,
PEPROCESS SourceProcess,
PEPROCESS TargetProcess
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine generates a handle duplication audit. It is up to the caller
to determine if this routine should be called or not.
Arguments:
SourceHandle - Original handle
NewHandle - New handle
SourceProcess - Process containing SourceHandle
TargetProcess - Process containing NewHandle
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
PSID UserSid;
PAGED_CODE();
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( EffectiveToken( &SubjectSecurityContext ));
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DETAILED_TRACKING;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_DUPLICATE_HANDLE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SourceHandle );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PsProcessAuditId( SourceProcess ));
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, NewHandle );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, PsProcessAuditId( TargetProcess ));
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
}
VOID
SeAuditProcessExit(
PEPROCESS Process
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Audits the exit of a process. The caller is responsible for
determining if this should be called.
Arguments:
Process - Pointer to the process object that is exiting.
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
PTOKEN Token;
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PSID UserSid;
LUID LogonId;
HANDLE ProcessId;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
NTSTATUS Status;
PAGED_CODE();
Token = (PTOKEN) PsReferencePrimaryToken (Process);
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( Token );
LogonId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( Token );
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DETAILED_TRACKING;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_PROCESS_EXIT;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, LogonId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
PsDereferencePrimaryToken( Token );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
}
VOID
SepAdtGenerateDiscardAudit(
VOID
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Generates an 'audits discarded' audit.
Arguments:
none
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PSID UserSid;
PAGED_CODE();
UserSid = SeLocalSystemSid;
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_SYSTEM;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_AUDITS_DISCARDED;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeUlong( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SepAdtCountEventsDiscarded );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
}
NTSTATUS
SeInitializeProcessAuditName (
IN PVOID FileObject,
IN BOOLEAN bIgnoreAuditPolicy,
OUT POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION *pAuditName
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine initializes the executable name for auditing purposes. It allocates memory for the
image file name. This memory is pointed to by pAuditName.
Arguments:
FileObject - Supplies a pointer to a file object for the image being
executed.
bIgnoreAuditPolicy - boolean that indicates that the call should proceed without
regard to the system's auditing policy.
pAuditName - Supplies a pointer to a pointer for the object name information.
Return value:
NTSTATUS.
ISSUE-2002/03/11-kumarp : need to document the case when return code
is STATUS_SUCCESS
Environment:
KeAttached to the target process so not all system services are available.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION TempNameInfo;
ULONG ObjectNameInformationLength;
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION pInternalAuditName;
PFILE_OBJECT FilePointer;
PAGED_CODE();
ASSERT (pAuditName != NULL);
*pAuditName = NULL;
//
// Check if the caller would like to get the process name, even if auditing does not
// require it.
//
if (FALSE == bIgnoreAuditPolicy) {
//
// At the time of process creation, this routine should only proceed when Object Access or
// Detailed Tracking auditing is enabled. In all other cases, the process name is acquired
// when it is requested.
//
//
// Longhorn-ISSUE-2002/03/11-kumarp : why capture subj context twice?
// bug# 572609
//
if (!SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryObjectAccess, TRUE, FALSE, NULL ) &&
!SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategoryDetailedTracking, TRUE, FALSE, NULL )) {
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
}
FilePointer = (PFILE_OBJECT) FileObject;
//
// Compute full path for imagefile.
// This first call to ObQueryNameString is guaranteed to fail.
// The ObjectNameInformationLength contains only a
// UNICODE_STRING, so if this call succeeded it would indicate
// an imagefile name of length 0. That is bad, so all return
// values except STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW (from NTFS) and
// STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (from DFS). This call gives
// me the buffer size that I need to store the image name.
//
pInternalAuditName = &TempNameInfo;
ObjectNameInformationLength = sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION);
Status = ObQueryNameString (FilePointer,
pInternalAuditName,
ObjectNameInformationLength,
&ObjectNameInformationLength);
if ((Status == STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) ||
(Status == STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
//
// Sanity check ObQueryNameString. Different filesystems
// may be buggy, so make sure that the return length makes
// sense (that it has room for a non-NULL Buffer in the
// UNICODE_STRING).
//
if (ObjectNameInformationLength > sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION)) {
pInternalAuditName = ExAllocatePoolWithTag (NonPagedPool,
ObjectNameInformationLength,
'aPeS');
if (pInternalAuditName != NULL) {
Status = ObQueryNameString (FilePointer,
pInternalAuditName,
ObjectNameInformationLength,
&ObjectNameInformationLength);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
#if DBG
DbgPrint("\n** ObqueryNameString failed with 0x%x.\n", Status);
#endif //DBG
//
// If the second call to ObQueryNameString did not succeed, then
// something is very wrong. Set the image name to NULL string.
//
// Free the memory that the first call to ObQueryNameString requested,
// and allocate enough space to store an empty UNICODE_STRING.
//
ExFreePool (pInternalAuditName);
ObjectNameInformationLength = sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION);
pInternalAuditName = ExAllocatePoolWithTag (NonPagedPool,
ObjectNameInformationLength,
'aPeS');
if (pInternalAuditName != NULL) {
RtlZeroMemory(pInternalAuditName, ObjectNameInformationLength);
//
// Status = STATUS_SUCCESS to allow the process creation to continue.
//
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
} else {
Status = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
} else {
//
// If this happens, then ObQueryNameString is broken for the FS on which
// it was called.
//
#if DBG
DbgPrint("\n** ObqueryNameString failed with 0x%x.\n", Status);
#endif //DBG
ObjectNameInformationLength = sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION);
pInternalAuditName = ExAllocatePoolWithTag (NonPagedPool,
ObjectNameInformationLength,
'aPeS');
if (pInternalAuditName != NULL) {
RtlZeroMemory(pInternalAuditName, ObjectNameInformationLength);
//
// Status = STATUS_SUCCESS to allow the process creation to continue.
//
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
} else {
//
// If ObQueryNameString returns some other error code, we cannot
// be certain of which action to take, or whether it has properly
// set the ReturnLength. For example, ObQueryNameString has slightly
// different semantics under DFS than NTFS. Additionally, 3rd
// party file systems may also behave unpredictably. For these reasons,
// in the case of an unexpected error code from ObQueryNameString
// we set AuditName to zero length unicode string and allow process
// creation to continue.
//
#if DBG
DbgPrint("\n** ObqueryNameString failed with 0x%x.\n", Status);
#endif //DBG
ObjectNameInformationLength = sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION);
pInternalAuditName = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool, ObjectNameInformationLength, 'aPeS');
if (pInternalAuditName != NULL) {
RtlZeroMemory(pInternalAuditName, ObjectNameInformationLength);
//
// Status = STATUS_SUCCESS to allow the process creation to continue.
//
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
*pAuditName = pInternalAuditName;
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
SeLocateProcessImageName(
IN PEPROCESS Process,
OUT PUNICODE_STRING *pImageFileName
)
/*++
Routine Description
This routine returns the ImageFileName information from the process, if available. This is a "lazy evaluation" wrapper
around SeInitializeProcessAuditName. If the image file name information has already been computed, then this call simply
allocates and returns a UNICODE_STRING with this information. Otherwise, the function determines the name, stores the name in the
EPROCESS structure, and then allocates and returns a UNICODE_STRING. Caller must free the memory returned in pImageFileName.
Arguments
Process - process for which to acquire the name
pImageFileName - output parameter to return name to caller
Return Value
NTSTATUS.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PVOID FilePointer = NULL;
PVOID PreviousValue = NULL;
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION pProcessImageName = NULL;
PUNICODE_STRING pTempUS = NULL;
ULONG NameLength = 0;
PAGED_CODE();
*pImageFileName = NULL;
if (NULL == Process->SeAuditProcessCreationInfo.ImageFileName) {
//
// The name has not been predetermined. We must determine the process name. First, reference the
// PFILE_OBJECT and lookup the name. Then again check the process image name pointer against NULL.
// Finally, set the name.
//
Status = PsReferenceProcessFilePointer( Process, &FilePointer );
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Get the process name information.
//
Status = SeInitializeProcessAuditName(
FilePointer,
TRUE, // skip audit policy
&pProcessImageName // to be allocated in nonpaged pool
);
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Only use the pProcessImageName if the field in the process is currently NULL.
//
PreviousValue = InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(
(PVOID *) &Process->SeAuditProcessCreationInfo.ImageFileName,
(PVOID) pProcessImageName,
(PVOID) NULL
);
if (NULL != PreviousValue) {
ExFreePool(pProcessImageName); // free what we caused to be allocated.
}
}
ObDereferenceObject( FilePointer );
}
}
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Allocate space for a buffer to contain the name for returning to the caller.
//
NameLength = sizeof(UNICODE_STRING) + Process->SeAuditProcessCreationInfo.ImageFileName->Name.MaximumLength;
pTempUS = ExAllocatePoolWithTag( NonPagedPool, NameLength, 'aPeS' );
if (NULL != pTempUS) {
RtlCopyMemory(
pTempUS,
&Process->SeAuditProcessCreationInfo.ImageFileName->Name,
NameLength
);
pTempUS->Buffer = (PWSTR)(((PUCHAR) pTempUS) + sizeof(UNICODE_STRING));
*pImageFileName = pTempUS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
return Status;
}
VOID
SepAuditAssignPrimaryToken(
IN PEPROCESS Process,
IN PACCESS_TOKEN AccessToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine generates an assign primary token audit. It is up to the caller
to determine if this routine should be called or not.
Arguments:
Process - process which gets the new token
AccessToken - new primary token for the process
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
NTSTATUS Status;
PSID UserSid;
PTOKEN Token;
HANDLE ProcessId;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
PTOKEN CurrentToken;
PEPROCESS CurrentProcess;
HANDLE CurrentProcessId;
PUNICODE_STRING CurrentImageFileName;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
PAGED_CODE();
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
//
// Get information about the current process, that is, the process
// that is assigning a new primary token.
//
CurrentProcess = PsGetCurrentProcess();
CurrentProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( CurrentProcess );
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
CurrentToken = EffectiveToken( &SubjectSecurityContext );
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( CurrentToken );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( CurrentProcess, &CurrentImageFileName );
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
CurrentImageFileName = &NullString;
}
//
// Retrieve information about the process receiving the new token.
//
Token = (PTOKEN) AccessToken;
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_DETAILED_TRACKING;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_ASSIGN_TOKEN;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Information regarding the assigning process
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CurrentProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, CurrentImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SepTokenAuthenticationId( CurrentToken ) );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
//
// Information about the process receiving the new primary token.
//
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SepTokenAuthenticationId( Token ) );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
if ( CurrentImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( CurrentImageFileName );
}
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
}
VOID
SeAuditLPCInvalidUse(
IN PUNICODE_STRING LpcCallName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING LpcServerPort
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Audits the invalid use of an LPC port.
Arguments:
LpcCallName - type of call: impersonation or reply
LpcServerPort - name of port
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
LUID UserAuthenticationId;
PSID UserSid;
LUID ThreadAuthenticationId;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PEPROCESS Process;
HANDLE ProcessID;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
NTSTATUS Status;
PAGED_CODE();
if ( SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext( AuditCategorySystem, TRUE, FALSE, NULL )) {
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
ProcessID = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_SYSTEM;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_LPC_INVALID_USE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( SubjectSecurityContext.PrimaryToken );
UserAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( SubjectSecurityContext.PrimaryToken );
//
// Fill in the AuditParameters structure.
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessID );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
if ( SubjectSecurityContext.ClientToken ) {
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SepTokenAuthenticationId( SubjectSecurityContext.ClientToken ));
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, LpcCallName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, LpcServerPort );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
}
return;
}
VOID
SeAuditSystemTimeChange(
IN LARGE_INTEGER OldTime,
IN LARGE_INTEGER NewTime
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Audits the modification of system time.
Arguments:
OldTime - Time before modification.
NewTime - Time after modification.
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters;
PSID UserSid;
LUID LogonId;
HANDLE ProcessId;
PEPROCESS Process;
PUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
NTSTATUS Status;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
PAGED_CODE();
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
//
// Make sure that we care to audit system events.
//
if (SepAdtAuditThisEventWithContext(AuditCategorySystem, TRUE, FALSE, &SubjectSecurityContext)) {
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( EffectiveToken(&SubjectSecurityContext) );
LogonId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( SubjectSecurityContext.PrimaryToken );
Process = PsGetCurrentProcess();
RtlZeroMemory (
(PVOID) &AuditParameters,
sizeof( AuditParameters )
);
Status = SeLocateProcessImageName( Process, &ImageFileName );
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
ImageFileName = &NullString;
}
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_SYSTEM;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_SYSTEM_TIME_CHANGE;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS;
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
ProcessId = PsProcessAuditId( Process );
SepSetParmTypePtr( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ProcessId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, ImageFileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, LogonId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
if ( SubjectSecurityContext.ClientToken ) {
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, SepTokenAuthenticationId( SubjectSecurityContext.ClientToken ));
} else {
SepSetParmTypeNoLogon( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount );
}
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeTime( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, OldTime );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeTime( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, NewTime );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
if ( ImageFileName != &NullString ) {
ExFreePool( ImageFileName );
}
}
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
}
VOID
SeAuditHardLinkCreation(
IN PUNICODE_STRING FileName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING LinkName,
IN BOOLEAN bSuccess
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Audits the attempted creation of a hard link.
The caller checks audit policy.
Arguments:
FileName - Name of the original file.
LinkName - The name of the hard link.
bSuccess - Boolean indicating if the hard link creation attempt was successful or not.
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
LUID UserAuthenticationId;
PSID UserSid;
SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext;
SE_ADT_PARAMETER_ARRAY AuditParameters = { 0 };
PAGED_CODE();
ASSERT( SeAdtParmTypeNone == 0 );
AuditParameters.CategoryId = SE_CATEGID_OBJECT_ACCESS;
AuditParameters.AuditId = SE_AUDITID_HARDLINK_CREATION;
AuditParameters.ParameterCount = 0;
AuditParameters.Type = bSuccess ? EVENTLOG_AUDIT_SUCCESS : EVENTLOG_AUDIT_FAILURE;
//
// Use the effective token.
//
SeCaptureSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
UserSid = SepTokenUserSid( EffectiveToken( &SubjectSecurityContext ));
UserAuthenticationId = SepTokenAuthenticationId( EffectiveToken( &SubjectSecurityContext ));
//
// Fill in the AuditParameters structure.
//
SepSetParmTypeSid( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserSid );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeString( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, (PUNICODE_STRING)&SeSubsystemName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeLogonId( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, UserAuthenticationId );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, FileName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepSetParmTypeFileSpec( AuditParameters, AuditParameters.ParameterCount, LinkName );
AuditParameters.ParameterCount++;
SepAdtLogAuditRecord( &AuditParameters );
SeReleaseSubjectContext( &SubjectSecurityContext );
return;
}